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ABSTRACT 
The Affect-Emotion Gap: 
Soft Power, Nation Branding, and 
Cultural Administration in Japan 
by 
Daniel White 
This dissertation analyzes the appropriation of the political theory "soft power" 
within Japanese national bureaucracies as a discursive mechanism through which anxious 
concerns for Japan's present are manufactured into hopeful sentiments for its future. In 
doing so, it examines how certain nonconscious capacities to feel, affects, are made 
knowable in more formally narrated and perceived sentiments, emotions. These terms 
constitute the two sides of what I call the affect-emotion gap, whereby the slippages 
between what one feels and what one knows about what one feels are made into sites of 
political and economic investment. 
Based on two years of fieldwork conducted at the major national bureaucracies 
engaged with cultural diplomacy and policy in Japan--the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Agency for Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the 
Japan Foundation--! observe how soft power ideologies are translated into administrative 
policies that seek to turn aesthetic production, specifically within the field of Japanese 
popular culture, into political resource. Ultimately, I argue that the uneasy 
accommodation of soft power ideology to everyday bureaucratic practice reveals a 
contradictory movement in which soft power is at once delegitimized as practical policy 
and activated as discursive ideology which, in suturing economic anxiety in the present to 
hope for Japan's culture industries in the future, nonetheless sustains soft power's 
circulation. 
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Note on Language 
Japanese words in this dissertation are written in revised Hepburn romanization. 
Names are given in the traditional Japanese style of family name first and given name 
second. All names of personal interlocutors are pseudonyms except where permission 
was granted to the author. Any names resembling actual individuals are coincidental. 
Commonly Used Acronyms 
ACA Agency for Cultural Affairs Bunkacho 
BC British Council 
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization Nihon boeki shinkO kiko 
JF Japan Foundation Kokusai koryu kikin 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Kokusai kyoryoku kikO 
Agency 
METI Ministry of Economy, Keizai sangyosho 
Trade and Industry 
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gaimusho 
NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation Nippon hoso kyokai 
To coin a new word or phrase for an inchoate, 
affectively imbued thought is both to express what 
has not yet found articulation and to change the dark 
precursor as it is drawn into an intersubjective 
network of similarities and contrasts. But to place a 
new word or phrase into an established network is 
also to alter the network itself in a small or large way. 
-William Connolly, Neuropolitics 
Now that's soft power! 
-Japanese Director of the 
Agency for Cultural Affairs 
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Chapter One 
The Affect-Emotion Gap 
Signs and stories of anxiety pervade Japan's present. Falling birthrates, a rapidly 
aging population, a faltering economy, rising debt, slipping political prestige: these are 
the dominant figures through which the nation is today imagined. As if to officially 
confirm this anxiety, Japan's public broadcaster (NHK) has gone so far as to call it a 
national "syndrome" and proposed a series of programs in order to address the situation: 
NHK to launch Overcoming "The Japan Syndrome" Campaign 
January 6 2011 (Tokyo)- NHK is to start months of intensive coverage 
about Japan's national malaise rooted in years of economic and social 
stagnation, naming it "The Japan Syndrome." 
The campaign will be lead by "Next Japan," NHK's flagship project 
providing comprehensive reporting and analysis of long-term issues 
surrounding Japan. 
Masaru Shiromoto, head of"Next Japan" project, said "anxiety clouds 
over the society as Japan faces unprecedented demographic change and 
global competition. We will address the issue head on and search for a 
remedy to climb out of this situation." [NHK 20lla] 
NHK's press release describes a persistent, long-lasting anxiety inflicting Japanese 
society and, most importantly, gives it a name: "The Japan Syndrome." Interestingly, the 
title is not NHK's own but is taken directly from an article in the November 20, 2010 
issue of The Economist, "The Future of Japan: The Japan Syndrome."1 Thus, in a 
rhetorical act that has been performed repeatedly throughout Japan's modernity, the NHK 
release fuses a particular national anxiety to an image of Japan as seen by the West. 
In naming an abstractly perceived, national malaise, "The Japan Syndrome," 
NHK effectively transforms anxiety into an object amenable to administration and 
1 The Economist article features in the NHK' s promotional video for the new series (NHK 2011 b). 
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management. Problematizing anxious sentiment as administrative object enables projects 
of hope as political strategy, and despite what NHK identifies as a national anxiety rooted 
in "years of economic and social stagnation," there is reason to be optimistic. It is best 
articulated in an article widely circulated among Japan's national government 
bureaucracies: 
Japan is reinventing superpower-again. Instead of collapsing beneath its 
widely reported political and economic misfortunes, Japan's global 
cultural influence has quietly grown. From pop music to consumer 
electronics, architecture to fashion, and animation to cuisine, Japan looks 
more like a cultural superpower today than it did in the 1980s, when it was 
an economic one. [McGray 2002: 44] 
Douglas McGray's article published in Foreign Affairs in 2002 and translated into 
Japanese in the popular literary magazine Chilo koran (Central Review) in 2003 became 
a neatly crafted narrative through which to understand Japan's uneasy position at the cusp 
of shifting global power relations. True, McGray acknowledges, with its economic 
problems, a rapidly growing China, and an increasingly disinterested United States, Japan 
seems to be struggling. On the other hand, Japan's popular culture is loved around the 
world; its content industries tripled in size from 1993 to 2003, making it the second 
highest exporter of cultural goods in the world (METI 2005); and, as was repeated to me 
by a number of Japanese government officials, it ranks second out of twenty-three 
countries in a BBC World opinion poll measuring perceptions of a nation's "positive 
influence" (BBC World Service 2008). These repeatedly circulating sets of negative and 
positive images indicate the double movement that seems to characterize Japan's 
contemporary moment. Today, to think of oneself in relation to Japan's present is to feel 
both anxious and hopeful for its future. 
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It is no wonder, then, that in this unsettling environment of loosely circulating 
anxieties that McGray's article would attract so much attention. Although in no way 
solely responsible for igniting hope among those most responsible for Japan's future, its 
elite bureaucrats and politicians, like NHK's "Japan Syndrome," the article gives hope a 
name with its title: "Gross National Cool." The term was quickly and widely circulated 
throughout Japanese government offices and media and contributed in part to the label 
that now marks a number of national branding campaigns: "Cool Japan." The power of 
McGray's article lay in its ability to so neatly and concisely link Japan's growing cultural 
prestige with its slipping economic and political status. 2 The mechanism through which 
it did so was by associating Japan's growing pop culture presence with an emerging and 
quickly growing theory within international relations that this dissertation takes as its 
primary object of inquiry: "soft power." 
Soft Power 
IfNHK imagined Japan's contemporary anxiety through a framework that 
explicitly referenced Japan's relationship to the West, it is no surprise that narratives for 
imagining hope for Japan's future would make similar appeals. Responding to criticism 
in the 1980s that the United States might be losing some of its own political and 
economic prestige, a rapidly growing Japanese economy, not incidentally, stimulating 
much of this concern, Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye set about investigating the 
legitimacy of these claims. In 1989, as he recalls (Dodd 2011), he began by measuring 
the general strength of the United States' military and economic power. But he quickly 
realized something was missing. He called this "soft power," the ability for a nation to 
2 The article itself is short, only eleven pages, and illustrated with attractive color photographs making for 
an easily digestible and aesthetically pleasing read. 
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get what it wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Rooted in a 
country's culture, its ideals, and its policy, it operates by getting others to want what you 
want (Nye 2004: x). Most importantly, it operates distinct from a power based in military 
or economic strength. Nye introduced this concept in his book Bound to Lead in 1990 
and, due to the term's rapid popularization, he outlined his theory more explicitly in Soft 
Power: The Means to Success in World Politics in 2004. The theory has been wildly 
popular in Japan, no doubt facilitated by Joseph Nye's widely published statement that 
"Japan has more potential soft power resources than any other Asian country" (Nye 2004: 
85). In Japan today, one need not search far in any number of fields--political science, 
international relations, media studies, popular culture, economics, business-to find 
references to soft power as an innovative concept of modem government, politics, 
diplomacy, and even industry. 
Today, soft power is by all measures a global discourse, circulating within an 
interlinked register of elite, national administrations of government and supported by a 
media network that in its hyper attentiveness to government and national politics 
facilitates communication and integration. Contributing to its global circulation is the 
perception that the United States, in its economic crises, war on terror, and unilateral 
style of international politics, is losing credibility, enabling the rise of other soft power 
contenders, especially in Asia. "Contenders" refers not only to Japan but, increasingly, to 
countries like India and China. India's rising high technology and communications 
sectors combined with its status as having one of the few legitimate democracies in South 
Asia, it is suggested, make it a viable competitor for soft power (Dodd 2011); and if the 
United States' soft power has often been measured in the influence of Hollywood, 
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Hollywood's quickly rising number high budget productions and rapidly growing fan 
base throughout Southeast Asia and the Middle East make India a formidable challenger. 
On another front, China's "charm offensive," as it has been branded (Kurlantzick 2007), 
is attracting even more attention than India. It made impressive displays at both the 
Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010, and its Confucius 
Institutes, 282 centers offering generous funding for Chinese language and culture 
classes, now operate in 88 countries. Hanban, its administering organization, aims to 
establish 1000 of these centers around the world by 2020 (China Daily 2010). 
Typical debates surrounding the global soft power discourse discuss questions 
such as what is and is not soft power; who has it and who doesn't; in what is it actually 
rooted, whether content industries, culture, or political values; and to what degree is it 
dependent on harder forms of military and economic power. These are not the questions 
I am interested in. Rather, I want to understand how this global discourse is appropriated 
within national administrations whose bureaucratic elites perceive global power relations 
in particular ways that transform soft power into a discursive agent capable of producing 
and organizing new forms of local culture. National administrations make especially 
interesting sites in which to analyze processes like these as they occupy a middle position 
between global and local power structures, acting as important conduits of globalization 
as national officials translate perceptions of global urgencies into problems of policy 
imagined through local frameworks of thinking and feeling. Administrative practice, 
then, activates global discourses in local environments. Its capacity to affect local lives is 
enabled by its formulation in national policies that through intricately linked bureaucratic 
structures are able to penetrate everyday lives. This dissertation traces these processes 
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and, in doing so, shows how soft power in ideology is something much different from 
soft power in practice. 
Anxiety and Soft Power 
Portraits of Japanese national anxiety like the one offered by NHK above, suggest 
a kind of cultural sensibility rooted in and pervasive to a uniform Japanese society. This 
is not what I found in my research. I conducted fieldwork among bureaucrats in Japan's 
national government agencies that are concerned with the administration of national 
culture, public diplomacy, and national branding campaigns. Specifically, I was 
interested in those agencies working on projects related to or designed explicitly through 
the lens of soft power. I refer to officials working in fields related to cultural policy as 
,"cultural administrators." Although there is not a commonly used Japanese designation 
for those working specifically within the field of culture, national officials are referred to 
in general as kOmuin, or, more informally, as oyaku nin, a generic term for a government 
official or bureaucrat. 3 I was most interested in those oyaku nin tasked with the 
responsibility of strategizing how to effectively and ethically administer what is 
formalized as "Japanese culture," most specifically, "Japanese popular culture," toward a 
number of different ends designed to secure Japan's "national interests" in one way or 
another. Putting several of these words in quotes---''Japanese culture," "popular Japanese 
culture," "national interests"---emphasizes the contingent nature of these categories that I 
hope to best define through the course of ethnographic description. These officials 
among whom I conducted fieldwork are located in a number of different bureaucratic 
organizations: Japan's Ministry ofForeign Affairs (MOFA), the Agency for Cultural 
3 Oyaku nin consists of the honorific prefix "0," which is sometime omitted given the relative formality of 
the situation, and two Chinese characters: (f;t), which means "duty" or "office," and (A),which means 
"person." 
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Affairs (ACA), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and most 
importantly, the Japan Foundation. 
What I found among these officials was a particular set of sentiments of concern, 
unease, and distress over the future strength and status of Japan that for the time being I 
call "anxiety." An anxious concern for the future state of a nation one calls his or her 
own is in no way particular to the Japanese case, and, indeed, that such anxiety can be 
found in administrations of national culture across a number of nation states constitutes 
important evidence for one of my arguments that the form of anxiety found among 
Japanese government officials is sustained as much by interrelated structures of global 
culture as it is by those of local culture. However, what I identified in these 
administrators was a particular way that bureaucratic obligation binds one to a particular 
form of imagining and caring for the nation. For example, the work of national cultural 
administration demands that the administrator think about the state--its vitality, its 
problems, its future--in a way that is at once an occupational obligation and a personal 
responsibility.4 Such a form of thinking about national concerns could in no way be 
conflated with a sense of national cultural identity pervasive to Japanese society or 
culture in general. That narratives of national culture are to a large extent produced in 
powerful networks circulating between national administrations and media does, in fact, 
signify a capacity for these narratives to circulate and affect widely, but to conflate this 
with Japanese culture at large masks the particular ways that powerful institutions shape 
4 One might be tempted to call this particular pairing of obligation and personal investment a "vocation," 
following Weber (2004). However, I see the form of obligation among cultural administrators less 
constitutive of subjectivity than I do in Weber's politician and scientist; rather, I see this obligation as 
rooted in a particular arrangement of bureaucratic practice. A vocation in this sense does not construct a 
life purpose so much as it does a temporary occupational register through which one moves in and out of 
relative to shifting personal demands. 
and circulate the discourses through which many operate in adopting, resisting, or 
creatively reformulating their relationship with the nation they call their own. 
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The study of national anxiety in Japan is not new. Its themes--insecurity in 
relation to Western countries, the self-Orientalization identified as a product of it, and the 
reactionary ethnocentrism identified as central to the still thriving genre of nihonjinron 
("theories of Japaneseness," often called bunkaron in Japanese }-have become 
conventional storylines in studies of modem Japan. There is no need to repeat them. 
However, there is, I argue, something importantly contemporary about the anxiety I 
found among government administrators, which is to say that in so much that the 
contemporary can be defined, following Rabinow, as "a moving ratio of modernity, 
moving through the recent past and near future in a (non-linear) space" (2007: 2), there is 
something particular, emergent, and instructive about such anxiety. This sense of 
anxious urgency, its particular contemporariness, has motivated my attempt to situate 
anxiety empirically within those institutional networks that sustain it. My primary aim in 
this dissertation is not to provide an argument about the character of Japanese culture but 
rather to show how, in the contemporary, particular affects of anxiety and hope both 
sustain and are sustained by the idea of"Japanese culture," a discursive field hardly 
restricted to the geographical parameters of Japan or to those who identify themselves as 
of Japanese ethnicity or citizenship. I argue that soft power within Japanese national 
administrations serves as a discursive mechanism through which loosely formed anxieties 
over Japan's economic and political future are manufactured into clear policies and 
vessels of hope. My secondary aim is to present fieldwork findings on the appropriation 
of soft power within Japanese administration as evidence for a particular way that affect 
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and emotion function in relation to each other in producing new arrangements and forms 
of cultural life. 
The Soft Power Contradiction 
Early in my research I was struck by a particular contradiction that seemed to 
characterize the soft power discourse in Japan. In short, the amount of energy and 
optimism over soft power's potential was not matched by evidence suggesting it could, in 
fact, be successfully realized. Soft power seemed to face a number of real problems. 
First, within administrations strategizing soft power, defmitions of it were multiple, 
poorly formulated, contradictory, and vague. Second, there was a large consensus that 
soft power could not be quantified in measurable indexes, a particularly acute problem 
for bureaucracies that are required to demonstrate clear relationships between programs 
and outputs in order to justify their taxpayer supported budgets. Third, what indicators 
might exist for measuring soft power's positive effects would likely become foreseeable 
only far into the future. The benefits of educational exchange programs, for example, can 
best be evaluated only ten to twenty years after their implementation, when students 
reach positions in industry or politics high enough to effectively influence colleagues and 
form partnerships beneficial to the host country. Fourth, hard evidence from those 
content industries cited as resources for Japan's soft power demonstrates a stagnation if 
not decline in many sectors (Kawamata 2005). Finally, Japan's pop culture content 
industries (anime, manga, music, games, film), the sector of the economy most 
optimistically perceived to generate Japanese soft power, is threatened by the common 
observation that consumers in adoration of a nation's cultural goods are equally as 
capable of despising its policies. While Chinese and South Koreans may adore manga, 
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for example, this in no way aids the Japanese government in realizing its policies, which, 
as issues like Y asukuni and various territorial disputes illustrate, often elicit outright 
hostility from foreign publics. Further, where national governments do seek to involve 
themselves with cultural commodities the results are often counterproductive. To put it 
bluntly, there is nothing more uncool than having ageing, stiff-suited bureaucrats 
promoting counter-culture. 
Given this set of challenges imbedded in the concept and combined with the 
obviously enthusiastic narratives of soft power's promise relayed to me by some officials, 
soft power seemed to constitute a discourse sustained largely by affective energies. That 
is, through its ability to transform present anxiety into future hope, soft power proved 
effective in generating an optimism powerful enough to sustain soft power's ideological 
promises even in the face of its practical challenges. As soft power became slowly 
inscribed in various bureaucratic organizations, it manifested this contradiction more 
poignantly. Bureaucracies which had over a long time established standardized 
procedures and objectives found it difficult to incorporate such a vague concept into 
practical administration. However, the circulation of the concept itself increasingly 
naturalized the term within bureaucratic environments. Thus, as soft power was 
becoming naturalized within government administrations it was at the very same time 
revealing its unnatural adaptability to them. What resulted was a number of new kinds of 
policies and programs, some quite strange in the eyes of everyday observers (see chapters 
6 and 7), that were previously unimaginable outside a logic of soft power. All this 
demonstrates the power of affective investments in national imagining to direct, sustain, 
and alter both policy and the forms of its institutionalization. I argue that in the way soft 
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power becomes unevenly appropriated and inscribed by government administrations we 
see a particular function of how affect and emotion interact with each other in the 
production of emergent cultural forms. 
Culture, Emotion, Affect 
Anthropological investigations of emotion have been traditionally undertaken 
within frameworks of"culture." These are the elegant ethnographies ofLevy's Tahitians 
(1973), Rosaldo's Ilongets (1980), Lutz's Ifaluk (1988), and Schieffelin's Kaluli (1990). 
Such works have gone far in relativizing the Western demarcation between emotion and 
reason and the common subjugation of the former to the latter. As is commensurate with 
ethnographic texts from the 1970s and 80s, arguments proceed within a cross-cultural 
framework, taking up native narratives of emotive life and contrasting them with familiar 
Western cases in an exemplification of cultural difference. Emotions in these works 
reside in individuals who embody, feel, and perform those sentiments particular and 
common to a particular culture or "collective body," an illustrative metaphor. The idea 
that single individuals can serve as typified representatives of the collective at large is the 
premise upon which these as well as other, classic single-informant or "person-centered" 
ethnographies--Crapanzano's Tuhami (1985), Shostak's Nisa (1990)---are legitimized. 
This cross-cultural framework serves the time and object of these ethnographies well. 
Ethnographic work among globally intertwined networks of cultural processes, however, 
cannot rely on the same conceptual borders between self and other. Globalization has in 
many sites, though not all, rendered this relationship virtually unworkable; and the 
reflexive critique of anthropological authority in the 1980s has rendered it almost 
unthinkable. These developments have had significant effects on the working conditions 
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of ethnographers in the field (Faubion 2009), significant enough to inspire 
anthropologists to rethink the notion of "emotion" as an individuated, collectively shared 
object appropriate to the study of sentiment in cultural context. 
Recent years have seen a burgeoning interest in the notion of"affect." Patricia 
Clough has gone so far as to call it the "affect revolution" (2007: ix). And like most 
academic "revolutions" or, perhaps more appropriately named, "fads," definitions, 
redefinitions, and reformulations proliferate faster than the time it takes to establish a 
common ground for inquiry. In general, recent work on affect follows one of two 
genealogical trajectories. The first is more generally found in psychology, often 
intersecting with evolutionary debates inspired by Darwin's The Expression of the 
Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), passing through and often splitting at James's 
publication, "What is an Emotion" (1884), then authoritatively relegated to the realm of 
instincts and the unconscious in Freud, soon after adopted in various forms in the 
cognitive sciences, and finally culminating in its most recent forms in works like Silvan 
Tomkins' momentous Affect Imagery Consciousness (2008). The second and more often-
cited trajectory is philosophical, beginning with Spinoza's Ethics in 1677, rekindled in 
De leuze's radical materialism, and most popularized today in the work of Brian Massumi 
(2002). The plethora of scholars (Lawrence Grossberg 1992, 2005; Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri 2000, 2004, 2009; Rei Terada 2001; Philip Fisher 2002; Eve Sedgwick 
2002; Sara Ahmed 2004; Theresa Brennan 2004; Manuel De Landa 2006; Patricia 
Clough 2007, Kathleen Stewart 2007; Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth 2010) 
within the humanities and social sciences recently taking up projects that at least in part 
address affect are most often indebted to this latter tradition. 
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The explosion of these studies, especially in the social sciences, begs the 
questions, why affect? Why now? Do these publications indicate a simple resurgence of 
interest in emotion under a newer and somewhat sexier new name? Or does affect 
constitute a realm of feeling distinct from emotion and worthy of alternative modes of 
inquiry? A survey of the literature suggests, I think, both. For example, in 1983 Arlie 
Hochschild published The Managed Heart. In it she introduced the concept of 
"emotional labor" (7) to both emphasize capital's dependence on and appropriation of 
emotion as well as to designate a set of industries in which, as in her example of the flight 
attendant, "the emotional style of offering the service is part of the service itself' (1983: 
5). Almost two decades later, in their books Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004) 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri introduce, or at least popularize, the term "affective 
labor": 
What warrants this focus on affect rather than emotion is that "unlike 
emotions, which are mental phenomena, affects refer equally to body and 
mind. In fact, affects, such as joy and sadness, reveal the present state of 
life in the entire organism, expressing a certain state of the body along 
with a certain mode of thinking. Affective labor, then, is labor that 
produces or manipulates affect. [2004: 108] 
To be fair, Hardt and Negri indeed mobilize the term "affective labor" to describe a set of 
processes unconsidered by Hochschild, specifically in their historicization of the 
changing role of labor under evolving forms of capitalism (Hardt 1999). Still, their 
distinction between emotion and affect as apportioning the former to "mental 
phenomena" and the latter to both "body and mind" hardly constitutes a distinct field of 
inquiry. As testament to this, Hardt and Negri seem even to allude to, if not outright 
appropriate, Hochschild's example: "One can recognize affective labor, for example, in 
the work oflegal assistants,jlight attendants, and fast food workers (service with a 
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smile)" (2004: 108, italics added). Although it is grossly unfair to limit a critique of 
Hardt and Negri's "affective labor" to this single example, it indicates the degree to 
which terms like "affective labor" have become commonplace within current social 
scientific rhetoric without clear justifications for its distinction from terms like 
"emotionallabor."5 
On the other hand, Brian Massumi's work provides a clear justification for why 
affect should be distinguished from emotion, thus opening up a new space for critical 
theory's investigation of feeling outside the realm of emotion. Massumi builds from 
Deleuze's materialism, rooting affect not only explicitly in the body but, in faith to 
Spinoza, in the body's capacity for movement. Preserving Spinoza's defmition of affect 
as a capacity to affect or be affected and the body as that which is defmed by "'relations 
of movement and rest"' (2002: 15), he says, "For Spinoza, the body was one with its 
transitions. Each transition is accompanied by a variation in capacity: a change in which 
powers to affect and be affected are addressable by a next event and how readily 
addressable they are" (15). Massumi maintains Spinoza's emphasis on affect as a 
capacity, an important point in my own application of the term. Affects are capacities 
enabling action and an exercise of power: power to affect but also to be affected. Further, 
each affective movement enables a "next event," in which relations of affect are in a 
shifting relation with others with different capacities to subsequently affect. Massumi's 
philosophy is one of movement and in-betweenness, charting how possibilities for new 
appropriations and forms of life are constantly emerging. 
5 Despite what I think is a limiting characterization of it at this citation in Multitude (2004: 108), 
subsequent engagements with the term "affective labor" by some anthropologists have proved effective in 
mobilizing "affect" as a term distinct from emotion, specifically to refer to modes of feeling that become 
the object of particular projects of politics and labor rather than the medium of them (see especially 
Muehlebach 2011). 
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Most important to Massumi's treatment of affect is his clear distinction of it from 
emotion on the basis of consciousness. Affects are explicitly nonconscious, and as such, 
are absolutely resistant to narrative, to cognitive capture: "It is the perception of this self-
perception, its naming and making conscious, that allows affect to be effectively 
analyzed--as long as a vocabulary can be found for that which is imperceptible but 
whose escape from perception cannot but be perceived, as long as one is alive" (36). In 
short, in trying to describe and to name affect one only accomplishes the realization that 
affect has escaped perception. By quantum logic, once one observes the phenomenon, in 
fact, precisely because one does so, it's gone. Taken at his word, the consequences of 
this fact should be devastating for an anthropology of affect whose task is precisely that 
of capture and narration. How does one capture the uncapturable, narrate the 
unnarratable? 
This is precisely the problem that Kathleen Stewart makes the object of inquiry in 
her experimental ethnography, Ordinary Affects (2007). Admitting, or really posing as a 
question, the impossibility of capturing affects in academic prose, Stewart presents a 
number of vignettes stripped of explanation, interpretation, or analysis that are intended 
to point to affect. She does not narrate affect but rather recreates the situations in which a 
particular matrix of affects arise. Her work is beautifully crafted, her point effectively 
expressed, and she succeeds in communicating rather than describing affect. The 
problem that remains, though, is accounting for what allows for Stewart's ability to 
communicate affect at all? Remaining faithful to Massumi's distinction of emotion from 
affect requires understanding the latter as uncoded intensities of feeling, devoid of 
semantic content. Given this fact, we should not expect Stewart's vignettes to affect the 
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reader through description alone. Yet they do affect. The reason, I think, is because 
those readers having similar experiences to those described by Stewart have had the 
particular capacities to feel similarly in those situations similarly built into their bodies. 
That is, experiences do, in fact, code bodies in certain ways, making them susceptible to 
arousal in particular cultural arrangements of space and time. Stewart's vignettes affect a 
good number of American readers, then, because they are, for lack of a more appropriate 
term, "American" affects. 
My point in this is not to challenge Massumi's distinction. Massumi would in no 
way object to the suggestion that affective capacities do not depend on their environment 
for both construction and activation. In fact, rooted firmly in systems theory, his 
argument depends on it. However, I do want to mobilize Massumi's rich description of 
affects for my own project of ethnographic description, and this requires finding a way to 
write about the social construction or "coding" of affects. 
Given Massumi and Stewart's problematization of affect as one of"vocabulary" 
and "narration" respectively, it is fitting that I should find the most suitable treatment of 
affect for my own study in a literary theorist. Sianne Ngai is more confident than me in 
attributing to Massumi an understanding of affect and emotion that categorically 
distinguishes between the two. Extrapolating from his claim that "affect is feeling or 
'intensity' disconnected from 'meaningful sequencing, from narration'" (Massumi 2002: 
28), she reasons the following: 
The difficulty affective "intensity" poses for analysis is thus strikingly 
analogous to the analytical difficulty which Williams coined his term 
"structures of feeling" to address-that is, the kind posed by social 
experiences which "do not have to await defmition, classification, or 
rationalization before they exert palpable pressures and set effective limits 
on experience and action" (1977: 128). In escaping qualification much 
like Williams' structures of feeling, which as "social experiences in 
solution" lie "at the very edge of semantic availability" (132), affective 
intensity clearly creates difficulties for more positivistic kinds of 
materialist analysis, even as it always remains highly analyzable in or as 
effect (Massumi 2002: 260, note 3). [Ngai 2005: 26]. 
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The "difficulty" Ngai identifies is analogous to the one I described in Stewart. However, 
Ngai offers a working solution. Rather than placing affect and emotion in categorically 
distinct fields whereby one can in no way "know" the other, she places them on a 
continuum of feeling. She calls this a "modal" distinction in contrast to Massumi's 
"formal" one: 
What the switch from formal to modal difference enables is an analysis of 
the transitions from one pole to the other: the passages whereby affects 
acquire the semantic density and narrative complexity of emotions, and 
emotions conversely denature into affects. [Ngai 2005: 27] 
Ngai maintains Massumi's critique that affects do not have the social formalization of 
emotions but she argues that this does not mean they lack structure altogether, that they 
are "code-free" or "meaningless" (27). The distinction, thus, is one of degrees of 
perceptibility. Her formulation opens the possibility for ethnographic description and an 
anthropology of affect that enables the study of emotional processes not exclusively 
catalogued under the domain of emotion. And also importantly, it does so by remaining 
open to processes of movement and transition that better characterize cultural processes 
under globalization today, processes that move in transnational lines and feedback loops 
less constrained by classic models of culture. 
This finally brings me to the formulation of affect upon which my own study 
relies, one highly indebted to both Massumi's categorical cognitive distinction between 
affect and emotion and N gai' s move from the formal to modal frame of analysis that 
seeks to transcend it. What both theorists emphasize in their treatment of affect is its 
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resistance to formalization in conscious thought. Massumi surmised that knowing affect 
in its pure affective form was impossible. Ngai suspended this impossibility for what she 
calls "aesthetic productivity" (2005: 28). Both approaches acknowledge what can be 
called an epistemological gap between affect and emotion. It is precisely in this gap 
between feeling that is felt but not perceived and feeling that is felt and made known that 
I identify a particularly active process of cultural generation. I call this function the 
affect-emotion gap. 
The Affect-Emotion Gap 
The affect-emotion gap posits that what we feel and what we know about what we 
feel are two distinct things. Most importantly, and faithful to Massumi, what we feel is, 
in its reality, impossible to know.6 And it is this inability to know affect combined with a 
will to make it known that gives the affect-emotion gap its productive capacity. 
Although I take liberty in constructing affect in a way more conducive to anthropological 
analysis, I feel it at the same time preserves both Massumi's and Spinoza' s understanding 
of it entirely. I treat affect as nonconscious capacities to feel, built into bodies by the 
impossibly complex feedback loops established between the organism and its 
environment, or what amounts to the same thing because it is inextricably and thoroughly 
a part of it, its culture. One can recognize affect most simply in moments of individual 
laughter or tears, where feeling swells in the body irrespective of the mind's ability to 
account for it. One can also recognize it in the surging energies of crowds, where 
collective bodies are moved to action, often violent, that no individual subjects would in 
their singularity otherwise perform. Affects are rooted in bodies but they are also entirely 
6 More specifically, it is impossible to know in both the moment and quality of its ontological emergence. 
It can only ever be known as something other than what it is. 
social things. That laughter is at once the most spontaneous and most culturally 
dependent forms of affective evocation is evidence for this. 
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Emotion, on the other hand, is what a body knows, performs, and communicates 
as feeling. It is feeling embodied in mind, narrative, and symbol. The distinction is 
nearly commensurate with the American psychologists Stanley Schachter and Jerome 
Singer's "two factor theory of emotion" (1962), breaking emotion into a physiological 
arousal and cognitive label. However, I want to allow for the possibility that affects can 
take form in a range of objects in processes of being made known, not simply in 
cognitive labels like love, pride, and anger but also in complex narratives, symbols, 
processes, and in a diverse array of configurations in which feelings are made 
perceivable, such as public policy. This is the point made by Silvan Tomkins in a 
profound but deceptively simple observation: "Affect can take any object" (1991, I: 347, 
cited in Sedgwick 1995: 503). The point is also captured in Michael Taussig's notion of 
the "mimetic faculty," although I want to avoid his distinction between culture and a 
nature that exists outside it, however figurative his always elegant writing might have 
otherwise implied: "I call it the mimetic faculty, the nature that culture uses to create 
second nature" (1993: xiii). 
The impossibility of entirely accounting for one side of the affect-emotion gap via 
the other enables its productivity. However, to be more precise, it is not the gap alone 
that activates its productivity but the formulation in culture of the gap as something that 
should, could, and in many cases, must be reconciled. One could call this desire, or 
motivation. One could also, I think, call it "will," of a kind that if not in accordance is at 
least in tune with the form ofNietzche's "will to power" that claims, "All meaning is a 
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will to power" (Cavelier 2010). However, one should wholly not mistake such a will as 
some universal mark of anthropos, as if it either preceded or constituted some necessary 
condition for the human, or even the uber-human. One could certainly imagine and even 
point to ethical projects ofliving, many called "religious," that take gnosis not as the 
telos of practice but as the impossible, unattainable, or sacred object whose secrets are 
meant to be venerated rather than known. 
Today's economics and politics have, however, found the activation of the affect-
emotion gap in their own will to power more productive and more desirable than its 
veneration. The affect-emotion gap reveals how the difference between what we feel and 
what we think about what we feel often becomes the site of repeated political, economic, 
and ethical appropriation. It recognizes that any project to make affect known is a 
political one. Knowing is an action that is always already constituted through 
arrangements of power and techniques for knowing. Projects of knowing become 
projects of power as narratives offering closure of the affect-emotion gap, and the varying 
methodologies--ethical, religious, scientific-mobilized toward that end, are applied to 
economic and political gain. This is not to suggest something necessarily sinister about 
such projects--even the most venerable of meaning making practices operate under 
similar configurations of epistemology and power; it is only to say that those narrative 
investments in the affect-emotion gap backed by the most resources and most sound 
infrastructure tend to turn what enables their success--largely, social, political, and 
economic capital--into ends themselves. 
Psychoanalysis is an exemplary model of the institutionalization ofthe affect-
emotion gap. Through the naming of the "unconscious" it constitutes a science and 
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politics of knowing or interpreting what one is affected by but cannot realize. Further, 
psychoanalysis creates the desire that both sustains and legitimizes its discourse, inspiring 
in many of its American interpretations both a will to know one's "true" self and a 
methodology to do so. Related, though by no means constitutive of it, one fmds similarly 
constructed models of interpreting affect in a pharmaceutical industry operating under a 
logic of late capitalism where advertisements name low level states of affect as 
"depression" or "social-anxiety disorder" (SAD) and high ones as "hypertension" or 
"restless leg syndrome" (RLS). 
The advertising industry, which also serves the pharmaceutical industry's 
generation of capital, is perhaps the most dominant appropriation of the affect-emotion 
gap. Pioneered in large part by Freud's nephew Edward Bemays in an industry newly 
imagined in the form of"public relations" in the 1920s, it applied Freud's science of the 
self to industry, reappropriating the affect-emotion gap to even more radically productive 
ends. It reasoned that if there exists such opacity between what people feel and what they 
know about what they feel, one need not be satisfied with a science that explains affect 
but can extrapolate from that science a method that actually engineers it (Bemays 1952). 
Bemays transformed public relations from a mechanism that sought to understand what 
consumers want to one that explicitly tells them what they want. Interestingly, such a 
logic of advertising operates similarly within nation branding campaigns, a major strategy 
of soft power cultivation. 
Today, realized in the advertising industry, public relations has inundated our 
lives to such a degree that not only do we expect industry to tell us how we feel but we 
also know perfectly well that we are being manipulated by it. It is obvious that the sports 
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car ad appeals to us through images of sex and prestige. We get it now. However, what 
is significant about this is that recognizing advertising's effects is not in itself sufficiently 
liberating. We may still be motivated to buy the car despite knowing that we are being 
manipulated to do so. Such a fact confirms the power that affects hold over emotion: 
decoding them does not necessarily disarm them. 
The Empirical Basis of the Affect-Emotion Gap 
From one perspective, in understanding how emotion functions in culture one 
may do without the philosophy of Spinoza and the high theory of De leuze and Massumi. 
That is, in the way they appropriate aspects of culture toward their own ends, the 
pharmaceutical industry, advertising, nation branding, and, indeed, soft power, have their 
own theory of emotion. It is a pragmatic one. Advertising discovers quite on its own a 
slippage between feeling and its form of cognizance. It proves or manufactures this 
slippage by producing out of it capital. Thus, the empirically observable products of 
these discourses in action serve as evidence for the affect-emotion gap as an operative 
theory of feeling in culture. In my fieldwork, soft power proved to operate similarly, 
identifying a productive incongruence between what people feel and what they "know" 
about what they feel. I examine how the affect-emotion gap is brought to light in my 
fieldwork in two ways: one that operates through the discourse of nation branding and 
one that operates through the term soft power more generally. 
Nation Branding 
Nation branding stakes a claim in the gap between what consumers feel about 
their products and what they know about what they feel about their products. In Japan, 
where nation branding is applied specifically within the field of popular culture, it seeks 
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to capitalize on the affective attachments consumers build between themselves and their 
commodities. Nation branding offers an alternative narrative for these affective 
attachments, suggesting that one likes anime not for its unique story lines or fantastic 
worlds but because it possesses a charm rooted in a Japanese culture. And on account of 
that, if one shows affection for anime, a commodity imbued with the charm of Japanese 
culture, nation branding reasons that one might also show affection for other products and 
elements of Japanese culture in which, precisely because they are "Japanese" things, 
possess the same charm. "Japaneseness," then, becomes the object of appeal, and to the 
degree that popular commodities can be labeled with the charm of Japan, called in 
Japanese branding strategies "Cool Japan," nation branding can stimulate appeal in other 
commodities produced by Japanese industry, both revitalizing industry as well as 
cultivating an affection that can be counted as Japanese soft power. I take up this aspect 
of the affect-emotion gap in nation branding strategies most specifically in chapter 5. 
Soft Power 
My analysis of the affect-emotion gap within administrations of national culture 
treats soft power as a discursive mechanism for making anxious affects known through 
various narratives, policies, and strategies for realizing national prestige. Soft power as 
operative discourse, rather than as ideological theory, reveals some of the ways capacities 
to feel anxious about the nation have been variously built into bodies, both administrative 
and personal. Discovering slippage between soft power's promises and its actual 
products, and between its ideological forms and its practical ones in administration, I 
show how in the various ways that soft power assembles new fields of knowledge and 
power in relation to one another it reveals the productive function of a gap between 
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feelings that are experienced and felt in one way and stories that make those feelings 
known in another. In this way one can witness how the incongruence between both sides 
of the gap function like a fractal equation, each side feeding the other with new 
information that enables subsequent responses and capacities to affect. 7 The dissertation 
primarily addresses this function of the affect-emotion gap. 
Finally, before moving on from an explicit discussion of affects in relation to 
emotion, I want to make a further distinction, not between affect and emotion but 
between affect and affects. By doing so I hope to establish some precision in both my 
own application of affect and in the way affect comes to be discussed in anthropological 
theory more broadly. By "affect," I refer, quite faithfully, to Spinoza, to the body's 
ability to affect and be affected. That is, I refer to affect fundamentally as "capacity," 
most specifically, as capacity to feel and be moved in particular ways. By "affects," on 
the other hand, I refer to different kinds of feelings and capacities, to their moods, 
intensity levels, and tendencies. This enables me to describe a particular set of affects as 
"anxious," in that they are characterized as having a medium intensity level with an 
irritating and uneasy tone and show a general proclivity to attach to certain kinds of 
feelings and narratives over others. 
Making Affects Known 
In his study of the relation between neural and cultural networks, William 
Connolly offers a passage which eloquently captures how my research moves from an 
analysis of anxious affects to their inscription and transformation in soft power policies: 
7 I refer to Benoit Mandelbrot' s discovery of a set of fractal equations for which each side of the equation 
establishes a feedback loop with the other, essentially enabling new and unique outputs to infinity in both 
positive and negative directions. I allude to Mandelbrot's equation as a metaphor for how affect and 
emotion continually affect and effect changes in the other, creating new responses but also forming 
perceivable patterns and trends of affective production (See Lesmoir-Gordon 2010). 
To coin a new word or phrase for an inchoate, affectively imbued thought 
is both to express what has not yet found articulation and to change the 
dark precursor as it is drawn into an intersubjective network of similarities 
and contrasts. But to place a new word or phrase into an established 
network is also to alter the network itself in a small or large way. [2002: 
72] 
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Connolly's description resonates with an image of the affect-emotion gap that recognizes 
a productivity in the translation of unformed but circulating affects into a network of 
relations always already shot through with unequal lines of power in which those affects 
are put into discursive and cognitive play. The NHK press release I opened this chapter 
with is just one way of naming a set of abstractly perceived, uneasy feelings evoked in 
imagining the state of Japan as nation. It calls these feelings "anxiety" and "melancholy" 
(NHK 2011). In the course of its reporting on the "Japan Syndrome" NHK will no doubt 
provide even more well-formulated narratives in which anxious affects can take 
knowable shape. In turn, it will consequentially alter those affects, providing, in the 
hopes ofthe broadcaster, a "remedy to climb out ofthis situation" (2011). 
In John Dewey's unique theory of the public (1927), he describes the role that 
agencies like Japan's public broadcaster play in taking what he calls the "indirect 
consequences" of human action, which are "felt rather than perceived," and making them 
known: "At present, many consequences are felt rather than perceived; they are suffered, 
but they cannot be said to be known" (1927: 131). Required in the process of making 
such unperceived feelings known is a form of presentation: "Presentation is 
fundamentally important, and presentation is a question of art. Artists have always been 
the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward happening in itself which is new, but 
the kindling of it by emotion, perception and appreciation" (183). Dewey's theory 
emphasizes the role artists play in the process of making "indirect consequences," a term 
26 
entirely commensurate with my use of the word "affects," known. He published these 
words in his work The Public and its Problems (1927) at a time when the mass media in 
the United States was perceived as having more influence in society than ever before. 8 
His "artists," thus, referred equally if not explicitly to the media which he saw as having 
significant responsibility in aiding in the construction of a healthy public. 
Interestingly, Dewey's theory of the public was simultaneously a theory of the 
emergence of the state, broadly conceived: "When indirect consequences are recognized 
and there is effort to regulate them, something having the traits of a state comes into 
existence" (12). States, publics, or communities more generally come into being, Dewey 
argues, through specific problems around which they organize. The translation of 
unperceived consequences of social interaction affecting a group of individuals into 
known perceptions is the process through which that group comes to realize itself as a 
community. Extrapolating from both Dewey and Connolly, we can understand soft 
power as a form of presentation that translates a set of anxious affects, themselves a 
consequence of a particular social organization of"nation" and "citizen," into known 
emotions of concern for the nation's present status or of hope for its future revitalization. 
Constituting those affects in terms of a discursive pairing of politics and culture, as 
Connolly writes, is to alter those affects--his "dark precursor" (2002: 72). But to bring 
forth a new form of presentation is also to alter the previously existing network of 
relations that paired affects to cognitive scripts and symbols in different ways. 
8 This problem, in fact, became the central point of what came to be called the "Dewey-Lippman debates," 
an expression referring to a set of arguments put forth in text between Walter Lippmann (1922; 1925) and 
John Dewey (1927). In fact, there was no actual set of formal debates; nor was there significant evidence 
that the two consciously wrote in response to one another. As Michael Schudson argues, the expression 
was an invention of liberal intellectuals in the 1980s and 1990s who sought to ''take stock and seek hope" 
in a similar "moment of democratic dissolution" (2008: 1032). (Also see Marres 2005). 
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Methodology and Figures of Fieldwork 
How does one go about tracing an ever-shifting network of relations between 
affect and its discursive presentations? George Marcus provides one possibility in what 
has now become a rather standard approach to multi-sited research. Revisiting his 
defmition of the multi-sited is useful, especially in noting the imagery with which he 
describes it: 
Multi-sited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, 
conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer 
establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, 
posited logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines 
the argument of the ethnography. [1998: 90] 
Marcus imagines the multi-sited field in various kinds of lines: ''pathways," "chains," 
"threads." They are lines of the ethnographer's own design but they are argued as having 
embedded in them an empirically observable logic of connection. One strategy for both 
discovering and observing these lines is to follow particular subjects, objects, metaphors, 
stories, or conflicts as they circulate within a network of relations, illuminating the logic 
of those relations in the process (89-95). Following "soft power" through a network of 
national bureaucracies is an ideal strategy for tracing patterns of affective evocation and 
attachment. Where soft power emerges, I found, and perhaps not surprisingly, it is often 
accompanied by historical contextualizations that emphasize themes such as prestige 
("Japan as number one"), confidence (and its escapes), and attention (specifically in 
regard to the United States). Such themes consistently evidence the development of a 
poignant capacity among officials to feel anxious in various moments of imagining 
Japan. And as I have already mentioned, soft power also elicits sentiments of hope for 
Japan's revitalization through the fields of popular culture and the content industries. In 
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tracing soft power through networks of Japanese administration, which, incidentally, are 
in no ways limited to Japan's national borders, what I observed was soft power's ability 
to suture loosely formed affects of anxiety surrounding images of Japan's current status 
to sentiments of hope for a more prestigious future. In this way soft power acts as a 
discursive needle and thread repeatedly stitching tight the affect-emotion gap. 
Marcus's lines, then, serve as an important metaphor guiding a multi-sited 
methodology. Most importantly, they provide a way of orienting oneself in conditions of 
fieldwork where traditional notions of the "culture" concept prove unsustainable. Soft 
power continually moves through and in relation to global circuits of influence. Under 
these conditions one needs alternative models for piecing together sometimes awkward 
and incongruent wholes from the ever-moving parts. Paul Rabinow's formulation of a 
toolkit to negotiate precisely these conditions proves useful, especially in his appeal to 
Michel Foucault's understanding of the dispositif(apparatus), a model equally as 
dependent on images of lines and relations: 
A resolutely heterogeneous grouping comprising discourses, institutions, 
architectural arrangements, policy decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophic, moral and philanthropic 
propositions; in sum, the said and the not-said, these are the elements of 
the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that can be established 
between these elements. [cited in Rabinow 2003: 51] 
Rabinow's consideration of Foucault's few and sometimes altering views on the 
apparatus suggest a concept constructed with less formality than could safely warrant a 
direct application in fieldwork. But as Rabinow notes of Foucault's work, as he does of 
his own, such concepts might be unproblematically taken up in so much that they prove 
useful as "toolkits" for subsequent research, within reason of course (Rabinow 2003: 50). 
Soft power may not meet Foucault's criteria for the apparatus as a network of relations; it 
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may be better to call that network "cultural diplomacy" or "pubic diplomacy." However, 
in my fieldwork I observed how soft power functions as precisely that which establishes 
relations between heterogeneous groupings of objects. Soft power shows an amazing 
ability to connect a set ofknowledges, images, institutions, utterances, and administrative 
techniques in a particular relation with one another that was previously unimaginable. 
Foucault's apparatus proves useful in so much that it aids in the elucidation of this fact. 
The imagery of lines that arises with Marcus and Foucault are even more explicit 
in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. There, they serve not only as metaphors of 
circulation and connection but also of determination. This is another function of lines 
that proves important in my fieldwork. In "What is a Dispositif," Gilles Deleuze 
generalizes Foucault's work as an "analysis of concrete 'dispositifs. "' He then proceeds 
to defme an apparatus as a "skein," a "multilinear whole," "composed of lines of different 
natures" (2007: 343). "Lines," then, become essential for Deleuze's description of 
Foucault's apparatus. He describes them as directions of force that establish connections 
between elements, rendering them capable of affecting one another and even productive 
of things--the way a fishing line can produce a fish by means of connecting a pole to bait 
(345). Deleuze identifies four different types of lines: lines of visibility; lines of 
utterance; lines of force; and lines of subjectivation. In this sense lines enable what can 
be seen, expressed, affected, or, in the latter case, individuated into something called a 
"self," "subject," "group," or a "people." Deleuze's lines provide a richer metaphor than 
those of Marcus in suggesting how a researcher should move through a network unveiled 
by their tracing. In short, he should not simply identify which lines are of importance but 
also pay attention to how those lines connect, given the fact that the way they relate 
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disparate objects to one another actually determines the kind of cultural formations that 
are subsequently produced. Deleuze suggests that research among apparatuses might 
entail not only following lines but ''untangling" them: "Untangling the lines of an 
apparatus means, in each case, preparing a map, a cartography, a survey of unexplored 
lands--this is what [Foucault] calls 'field work"' (343-344). In turning fieldwork into 
ethnography through writing, I tried to pay specific attention not only to how lines of soft 
power connect objects but also to how they enable varying capacities to affect and 
determine those objects. 
For example, while tracing soft power reveals numerous lines of connection, not 
all of these are significantly productive of cultural emergence and influence. The term 
"soft power" certainly moves through spaces of theory, academia, government 
administration, media, and a number of sites in the everyday, but it proves most 
productive in those lines that connect administrations of national culture, not only 
between different bureaucracies in Japan concerned with cultural administration but also 
between their parallel organizations in other nation states. Like neurons in a neural 
network, as more of these lines of communication are established between bureaucratic 
nodes and enable more frequent exchanges of information, they grow in strength and in 
affective capacity, making them significantly more powerful in their ability to shape and 
activate the soft power discourse. This is why I limit my study of soft power primarily to 
those bureaucratic agencies engaging with it. Supported by significant capital and 
infrastructure, they play the most prominent role in determining how soft power will 
affect those sites and subjects it attempts to accommodate to its own interests. 
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Cultural Expediency 
The way De leuze's lines differently enable cultural production across time and 
space also describes the uneven processes by which "culture" has become variously 
appropriated by capital and politics under globalization. Global flows are not, of course, 
smooth. Soft power's emergence has dramatically reconstituted the field of culture as an 
active site for new projects of political investment and contest through its ability to turn 
aesthetic production into political resource, or what George Yudice has called "culture-
as-resource": 
Culture-as-resource is much more than commodity; it is the lynchpin of a 
new epistemic framework in which ideology and much of what Foucault 
called disciplinary society (i.e., the inculcation of norms in such 
institutions as education, medicine, and psychiatry) are absorbed into an 
economic or ecological rationality, such that management, conservation, 
access, distribution, and investment--in "culture" and the outcomes 
hereof-take priority. [2003: 1] 
The increasing circulation of the soft power discourse has reframed older debates of 
cultural imperialism, recasting culture in a new ethical matrix of criteria for determining 
the proper and improper uses of culture. If Hollywood under the framework of cultural 
imperialism was a malignant force, under soft power it is an exemplary resource for a 
more modem and ethical employment of power relative to older, less refined, hard power 
strategies of military and economic coercion. The increasing naturalization today of soft 
power as something every nation can and should cultivate puts culture at the forefront of 
the field of international political contest. Such developments shows culture's unique 
ways of globalizing relative to other spheres of global flow, as Malcolm Waters describes 
in the opening to his book, Globalization: 
The theorem that guides the argument of this book is that: material 
exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic 
exchanges globalize. It follows that the globalization of human society is 
contingent on the extent to which cultural arrangements are effective 
relative to economic and political arrangements. We can expect the 
economy and the polity to be globalized to the extent that they are 
culturalized [1995: 9, cited in Yudice 2003: 29] 
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National administrations like the ones among which I conducted fieldwork occupy a 
critical position in the processes Waters describes. Interlinked with counterpart agencies 
in other nation states, they create powerful architectural grids that direct the flow of 
certain kinds of cultural exchange, enabling and accelerating some forms while 
effectively demobilizing others. Such functions of an interlinked register of national 
administrations, which I discuss at length in chapter 3, reveal potential ideological 
closures embedded in soft power thinking. These closures have serious consequences for 
how nation states construct notions of cultural citizenship as it is accommodated to 
economic and political demands made urgent by intensifying pressures of international 
competition. 9 
As a globally circulating discourse, soft power shows itself exemplary of what 
Appadurai has called the "cannibalizing" properties of globalization more generally: 
The central feature of global culture today is the politics of the mutual 
effort of sameness and difference to cannibalize one another and thereby 
proclaim their successful hijacking of the twin Enlightenment ideas of the 
triumphantly universal and the resiliently particular. [1996: 43] 
Soft power's ambiguity as theory makes it an especially productive agent of 
globalization's cannibalizing capacities: it is as capable of facilitating homogenization as 
it is of fracturing and resisting it. This dissertation argues that the cultural production 
emerging from much of soft power's fracturing as it is appropriated within Japanese 
9 I am indebted to Koichi Iwabuchi for his discussions with me on the notion of"ideological closure." 
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national administrations is dependent on the degree to which soft power feeds on and is 
fueled by affective energies engendered by particular arrangements of national 
imagining, bureaucratic structure, and locally circulating sentiment. I argue that a 
constellation of affects loosely identified as "anxious" are the dominant energies feeding 
soft power's prolific output of new cultural arrangements and forms oflife in and through 
the idea of Japan. 
Anxiety's Space 
In situating the affect-emotion gap within the context of Japan and the literature 
of Japan anthropology more generally, I want to establish more clearly what I mean by 
"anxiety" and how I treat its relationship to soft power. Anxiety as a field of related 
affects is a set of capacities to feel an ongoing, medium-level intensity of energy that is 
irritating and irksome enough to motivate its realization in emotion or some other 
cognitive vessel of conscious recognition in order to transform it into something less 
uncomfortable. As such, it always shows a propensity to move forward, to find objects in 
which it can be made known, managed, and, ideally, converted into something more 
positively productive. Anxiety has both spatial and temporal dimensions. Its space, 
although certainly that of the individual body, is also, and more importantly, that which is 
created in the relation between bodies. This aspect of affect is shared, albeit somewhat 
differently, between both Freudian and resolutely anti-Freudian theorists of feeling. 
While the former defme affective space as that which is formed between one subject and 
another through processes of''transmission" (Brennan 2004) or one subject and either a 
subject or object through processes of"projection" (Freud 2009), the latter, more 
specifically, those consistent with a Deleuzian understanding of the social, define space 
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in terms of connections made not only between one subject and another but between parts 
of subjects and parts of other things in vast matrixes of interdependence too complex to 
trace and model with certainty. This arrangement of the social builds affective capacities; 
its complexity makes those capacities unavailable to a conscious mind working in much 
slower, simpler, and linear modes of reasoning. The body, as Damasio explains (1994), 
is better at registering this complexity in its own faculties of detection, a point I take up in 
more detail in chapter 6. 
Additionally, the space of anxiety, as affect, is necessarily more diffuse than more 
socially determined emotions like jealousy or envy that emerge once they have taken 
precise objects. Though anxiety has a propensity to realize itself in objects, it does not 
always and necessarily do so (Ngai 2005: 21). Kierkegaard explains this in The Concept 
of Anxiety (1980), arguing that anxiety has nothing as its object (cited in Ngai 2005: 224), 
which, one can easily imagine, can be a source of anxiety itself. This does not mean, 
however, that anxiety does not transfer and transform into more semantically rich forms 
of emotion as it attaches to perceivable objects. 
Anxiety's Temporality 
Anxiety is one of a number of affects Ngai characterizes as ''ugly feelings." Ugly 
feelings bear less intensity than others. They are defined by a "flatness or ongoingness" 
(2005: 7). This characteristic "ongoingness" of anxiety is one quality of its general 
temporality, which is consistently future-oriented. Ernst Bloch calls these kinds of 
feelings "expectant emotions" (cited in Ngai 2005: 210). Expectant emotions have an 
"anticipatory character," activated by matters of concern whose directedness toward the 
future determines their present effects. "They aim," Bloch says, "less at some specific 
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object as the fetish of their desire than at the configuration of the world in general, or 
(what amounts to the same thing) as the future disposition ofthe self' (Bloch 1995: 74-
75, cited in Ngai 2005: 210). From this perspective, imagining Japan's futur~e task 
required of those managers of the Japanese state-is to feel anxious in the present (in 
fact, as I show later in chapter 6, developing the capacity for anxiety is one important 
requirement for successful managers of national culture). 
What makes this anxiety even worse is what Sheldon Wolin (1997) and William 
Connolly (2002) have pointed to as the fracturing of the contemporary into several 
registers or "zones of time," all moving at different tempos (Connolly 2002: 140). Most 
significant is the distinction between fields like economy and culture, which "move at 
breakneck pace, due to changes in the infrastructure of transportation, communication, 
and entertainment" (140), and a field like politics, which demands a more "leisurely 
pace": 
Starkly put, political time is out of sync with the temporalities, rhythms, 
and pace governing economy and culture. Political time, especially in 
societies with pretensions to democracy, requires an element of 
leisure .. .in the sense, say, of a leisurely pace. This is owing to the needs 
of political action to be preceded by deliberation and deliberation, as its 
"deliberate" part suggests, takes time because, typically, it occurs in a 
setting of competing or conflicting but legitimate considerations. [Wolin 
1997: 2, cited in Connolly 2002: 140] 
Connolly and Wolin point to an affective mood of political administration that is 
necessarily anxious given its disjunction from the fields of economy and culture that it is 
ever attempting to control but with which it can never keep up. This results in an anxiety 
that in political bureaucracies becomes disproportionately attached to images of the 
nation it is itself trying to manage. The consequences of this fact are significant for 
anthropological treatments of national anxiety in Japan that typically ascribe that anxiety 
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to Japanese culture at large. That anxiety, as the NHK. press release suggests, seems 
pervasive to Japanese society in general may be a consequence of an oversensitivity to 
anxiety in national organizations that have a disproportionate role in shaping and 
circulating national narratives. My research tracing anxiety's emergence and paths of 
circulation as it connects with soft power indicates as much. 
Nostalgia and Anxiety 
In illustrating this point, it may help to compare my approach to anxiety to one 
that treats anxiety as a condition more uniformly distributed throughout a bounded 
cultural space. Marilyn Ivy's work Discourses of the Vanishing (1995) is one of the 
richest ethnographies written on Japan; and this dissertation is entirely indebted to it. 
However, her treatment of"Japan" in her work as an integrated and cultural whole in 
which one can identify homologous structures, patterns, and sentiments from top to 
bottom is not consistent with what I found in fieldwork. Within this bounded albeit 
uneven cultural field, Ivy identifies a logic ofloss, or "nostalgia," that is similarly 
constructed across varying sites. She argues that this sense of loss emerges with Japan's 
transition to modernization, which evoked a "double movement whereby that which was 
marginalized by the advent of nationalist modernity in the Meiji period (1868-
1912)-peasant practices, superstitions, the folkloric--was in the same movement 
objectified as most essentially traditional" (1995: 25). The objectification of that which 
is lost, namely, ''traditional Japanese culture," creates an object in which that loss can be 
sustained and continually experienced as loss itself. National culture, then, becomes 
importantly fixed to a past that must be repeatedly recalled to affirm it. She makes her 
point in a brilliant elocution: "For the loss of nostalgia--that is, the loss of the desire to 
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long for what is lost because one has found the lost object--can be more unwelcome than 
the original loss itself' (10). This characteristically Japanese kind of nostalgia identified 
by Ivy operates on the logic of Freud's fetish, which is to say that it operates 
therapeutically, addressing a "symptomatic" anxiety rooted in Japan's past (11 ). I 
wonder, however, if the degree to which Ivy situates her treatment of anxiety within an 
assumed, bounded space of culture does not efface some of the multiple and diverse ways 
anxiety takes form through Japan as a discursive rather than organic object. Ivy's 
ethnographic method is multi-sited, and impressively so. She identifies her cultural logic 
of nostalgia in a number of divergent sites: the nativist ethnology of early twentieth 
century folklorist Yanagita Kunio; contemporary tourist campaigns of Japan's then 
national railway; memorial practices at Japan's holy Mount Osore; and in taishu engeki 
(traveling variety theater). Ivy suggests that what is found in each of these distinct sites 
is a uniform pairing of nostalgia and anxiety-that the form of anxiety in one place is the 
same as that in another. Reading Ivy's text, it is unclear how much her ethnographic 
evidence vouches for such cultural uniformity and how much her theory of a uniform 
cultural logic assumes it. On either account, her reliance on the culture concept to secure 
the legitimacy of her ethnography is clear. 
To be fair, Ivy's work is, she confesses, not traditionally ethnographic (26). Hers 
is a discourse, or discourses, analysis, one that examines "narratives" and "rhetorics." 
And she too puts "Japan" in quotes. She too questions what Harootunian calls the 
"holonic society," the image of a homogenous Japanese community whose totality is 
recognizable in each of its multiple parts (Ivy 1995: 19, n39). But despite Ivy's critical 
positioning and conscientious reflexivity, her identification of a uniform logic of 
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nostalgia found among disparate yet homologous sites within Japanese culture is 
ultimately guided by the very image of the integrated, holonic society she herself sets out 
to critique. By relying on a bounded model of culture to hold together the widely 
disparate sites of her fieldwork, thus rendering complex and multiple registers of anxiety 
uniform, she reveals the limitations of such a model's conceptual reach. 
Ivy's reliance on the culture concept fixes not only the spatial dimensions of her 
ethnographic purview but also its temporal ones. By rooting her analysis of national 
culture in the concept of nostalgia, broadly conceived as endemic to a society that was 
created in the process of Japan's modernization, she portrays Japanese culture as haunted 
by a form of anxiety that has passed relatively unchanged from the Meiji Revolution 
(1868) to the present. It is a surprisingly static picture of culture. In contrast, the 
discourse of soft power that emerges in Japan in the early 2000s in response to widely 
circulating unease over the state of Japan's economy, China's rapid development, and the 
United States' seemingly waning interest in Japanese affairs, reveals anxious concerns in 
regard to national culture that seem to be in dynamic transition. Further, Ivy's analysis 
locates anxiety's antidotes in the past, in a sentiment of nostalgia for traditions lost. The 
soft power discourse, on the other hand, is entirely future-oriented, positing anxiety as a 
fear of what is to come and hope as anticipation of anxiety's demise. Ivy's study is one 
of the most rigorous and theoretically refmed ethnographies on modem Japan. For all its 
brilliance, though, it may also be outdated. If in the latter decades of the twentieth 
century it was the past that inundated Japan's present, in the opening decades of the 
twenty-first century it is its future. 
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This study seeks different figures of anxiety and culture than does Ivy's. Through 
a theory of feeling that soft power and nation branding themselves operationalize, it 
traces soft power's translation of one side of the affect-emotion gap into the other. In soft 
power's ability to turn ambiguous anxieties of the present into concrete hopes for the 
future, it also enables the inscription of that future in present-day policy. 
Institutionalizing soft power in bureaucratic organizations, themselves powerful 
organizers of everyday life, increasingly fixes feelings of national pride to the global 
proliferation and perceived prestige of Japanese pop culture commodities, echoing 
similar couplings of national prestige and economic success in Japan's recent past. But 
in showing how perceived national anxieties like those articulated in NHK's "Japan 
Syndrome" are much more a product of a style of administrative practice than a pattern of 
Japanese culture, it demonstrates the contingency of this pairing, opening up spaces for 
alternative figures of culture that might resist such homogenous and even hegemonic 
narratives. 
Outline of Chapters 
The next chapter explores the emergence of the soft power discourse in Japan. It 
identifies an embedded contradiction in the way soft power is appropriated that reveals 
the affect-emotion gap at work. Specifically, it identifies an inconsistency between the 
optimistic energy soft power generates and the practical political resources it produces. 
Chapter 2 also introduces the concept of"registers," different regions of interlinked 
structures and forms of communication, institutions, and know ledges in which particular 
affects more typically circulate relative to other registers. Important to the notion of 
registers is their ability to be organized horizontally across national borders rather than 
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vertically within them. I locate the particular set of anxious affects that feed soft power 
thinking in Japan within a register of national bureaucratic agencies linked internationally 
with their counterpart organizations in other countries. 
Chapter 3 examines the structure and characteristics of this register more closely, 
analyzing how bureaucracy carries out the function of what Don Handelman has called 
the "torquing of passion and reason" (2007: 134). Situating Japanese bureaucracy in 
historical relation to the West, I analyze how an anxiety produced out of perceptions of a 
symmetry in administrative structures but a dissymmetry in degrees of power becomes 
inscribed in typical bureaucratic practice. By examining a symposium hosted jointly by 
the Japan Foundation and its British counterpart, the British Council, I describe how the 
transnational interlinking of national administrations creates an architecture for cultural 
difference that facilitates certain kinds of cultural exchange and inhibits others. 
Establishing channels for cross-cultural exchange proves not always to result in mutual 
influence. Rather, it often produces inverse relationships of affectivity. The British 
Council's disinterest in soft power and cultivation of more non-national, cosmopolitan 
forms of culture, for example, shows tendencies to elicit more nationally imagined, 
protectionist strategies of cultural administration by the Japan Foundation. Chapter 3 
explores this kind of productive friction enabled by an increase in the integration of 
transnational organizations coupled with keenly perceived power imbalances. 
Chapter 4 explores feelings of "urgency" within Japanese bureaucracies and how 
they are engendered by perceptions of increasing international political and economic 
competition. I look at how soft power serves as a rhetorical mechanism for 
conceptualizing this urgency in well-formulated problems made amenable to bureaucratic 
41 
management. Through the analysis of narratives of Japan Foundation officials and the 
observation of advisory panels (shingikai) on issues of cultural diplomacy within Japan's 
Agency for Cultural Affairs, I trace how this urgency and anxiety becomes inscribed in 
formal administrative procedures, practices, and policy. 
In the fifth chapter I show how nation branding strategies both reveal the affect-
emotion gap as an operative and practical theory of feeling in culture and appropriate it 
toward its desired aims. Nation branding stakes its ground in the space between what 
foreign consumers feel about their desired commodities and what they think about them, 
effectively attempting to affix the former to images of Japanese culture in general. 
Nation branding achieves its end to the degree that it transforms affection for manga and 
anime into affection for Japanese culture at large. I examine nation branding strategies in 
two major sites: the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's Neo-Japanesque project 
and NHK's television program, "Cool Japan." In this chapter I seek to understand the 
processes and political consequences of the hypernormalization of the Cool Japan 
discourse and its ability to channel affects of national anxiety into simplified national 
brands, slogans, and narratives. 
Chapter 6 analyzes how affects work on a micro scale. Based on a one-month 
internship I conducted at the Japan Foundation, I assemble observations on everyday 
administrative practice. I argue there exists an organizing homology between how 
Foundation officials are made to feel obligated to their work and colleagues and how they 
are made to feel obligated to the nation. I introduce the term obligatory nationalism to 
describe how patterns of office organization that affectively bind an individual to his 
work similarly bind him to images of the nation as they are practically employed in the 
42 
realization of that organization's ultimate objectives. Government agencies in Japan are 
organized around a specific coupling of practice and objective. And each agency is 
responsible for realizing different objectives of Japan's national interests more broadly 
conceived. In incorporating interviews with officials from Japan's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, I analyze one specific, strategic project of cultural diplomacy jointly 
administered by the Ministry and the Japan Foundation. This project, focused on the 
creation and deployment of kawaii taishi (cute ambassadors), proved to be a polarizing 
one. Observing how the program was discussed and administered by each agency's 
officials, I look at how obligatory nationalism is differently constructed in two 
bureaucratic organizations. I show how national anxiety is not only more characteristic 
of styles and practices of Japanese national administration than it is of Japanese society in 
general but also that it differs between one organization and the next. The existence of 
varying bureaucratic objectives between agencies both of which are involved in projects 
of cultural diplomacy produces an ideological rift: while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
aims to mobilize culture toward the realization of explicitly national interests, the Japan 
Foundation seeks programs that facilitate cross-cultural understanding not necessarily 
conceived of in national terms. I conclude this chapter with an analysis of how Japan 
Foundation officials adopt a practical ethos of"balance" (baransu) in reconciling 
explicitly nationalist interests with more globally conceived cosmopolitan ones. 
Chapter 7 analyzes the cute ambassador program more closely and shows how 
soft power functions like Foucault's apparatus, establishing new relations between 
previously unrelated fields. Further, in its power to assemble, soft power also exhibits a 
productive capacity, enabling the emergence of new forms of cultural life previously 
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unimaginable outside soft power's organizing logic. Through analyses of kawaii (cute) 
culture, I also consider some of the ways gender is unequally built into national policy, 
ultimately asking if anxiety is an affective mode more typical of masculine styles of 
imagining the national body. I conclude with observations on how soft power is not only 
reorganizing cultural arrangements in the present but also how it is reimagining the 
present's relationship with the past. 
Chapter 8 follows soft power out ofbureaucracy and into sites of the everyday, 
examining the way it assembles affect and national sentiment differently from how it 
does so in national administrations. Analyzing soft power's penetration into media, 
creative arts industries, and academia, it acknowledges soft power's ability to circulate 
outside bureaucracy while at the same time noting its shifting function as it does so. Not 
always a vessel for anxiety's alchemy, it does different things in different registers of 
social life, sometimes realizing new objects of culture as political resource but also 
sometimes inciting resistance and transforming ideas of cultural citizenship in ways 
unanticipated by national officials. Despite soft power's fracturing in these sites, 
however, this chapter nonetheless finds evidence for a powerful integration of 
bureaucracy, media, and everyday life that facilitates the proliferation of soft power 
thinking and a national consciousness in which it is rooted. Whether this also serves as a 
conduit for transmitting a bureaucratic anxiety over Japan's slipping prestige into the 
everyday is, however, less evident. 
Chapter 9, the conclusion, imagines alternative ways of thinking through "Japan" 
as a discursive organizer of national thinking and identification. By positing my own 
speculations about possible future Japans as ethnographic data produced collaboratively 
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between interlocutors and ethnographer in discussions on author Murakami Haruki, it 
entertains possibilities of affective rather than rhetorical strategies of resistance and self-
fashioning. In concluding with my own reflections on the future, it proposes that one 
value of the ethnographic engagement can be its ability to stimulate a kind of positive 
imagination of anthropological alternatives, rooted in empirical observations of 
contemporary culture but directed toward future desires of the ethnographer's, 
interlocutor's, and reader's collaborative creation. 
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Chapter Two 
Soft Power's Emergence, Contradictions, and Registers 
It's June of 2009 and I'm attending a conference sponsored by Fulbright and 
CULCON, the US-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange. This 
year's theme is, "Japan and U.S. Soft Power: Addressing Global Challenges." Many 
high level officials from the United States and Japan are in attendance, including former 
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, former chairman ofthe bank ofTokyo 
Gyoten Toyo, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Shibayama Masahiko 
reading a message from then Prime Minister Aso Taro, and even the crown prince 
Naruhito. After the customary opening aisatsu (greeting) the lights are dimmed and our 
attention is drawn to a ten-meter-tall screen upon which is projected a gigantic image of 
Joseph Nye's head. Seated in front of the screen are a number of Japanese national 
administrators, cultural and otherwise, and me among them, craning our necks to give 
Joseph Nye's giant visage and its elocution of soft power through a video recorded earlier 
our undivided attention. The image is commanding, overbearing even, but the voice 
more compassionate, a softer and gentler uncle to Orwell's Big Brother. As the lights 
come back on I look around, startled. The electricity and energy quickly dissipate and 
the conference proceeds with a palpable discordance between the intensity of the opening 
and the formality of the proceedings that follow. The scene serves as an apt metaphor for 
the varying moods of excitement and reticence, optimism and pessimism that characterize 
soft power's respective ideological and administrative forms in Japan. 
Soft power was, of course, the theme of the conference and after cataloguing 
interpretations of the term from politicians, economists, bureaucrats, and arts 
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administrators, I had collected a wide variety of definitions. For Richard Armitage, soft 
power came down to, "and you're not going to like this," he warned the audience, "cool 
calculated national security." This obviously contrasted with, and one could also likely 
assume irritated, the definition given by Director of the Japan Society Art Gallery, Joe 
Earle. For Earle, soft power was not about security but about cultivating artists and art 
exchanges between Japan and the United States. Long-term diplomat Agawa Naoyuki 
proposed that soft power is a relationship of trust and rapport cultivated in face-to-face 
diplomatic exchanges, something Japanese officials are not exceptionally skilled at. 
Professor at Japan's National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Kurokawa Kiyoshi, 
suggested that soft power relied on educational exchanges. Managing Director for 
Morgan Stanley Japan, Robert Feldman, and former Chairman of the Bank of Tokyo, 
Gyoten Toyo, debated how Japan's economic policy contributed, or more likely did not, 
to soft power. There were almost as many interpretations of soft power as there were 
panelists. All noted the difficulty of defining soft power; many also noted the near 
impossibility of measuring it. 
So why so many resources, capital, prestigious names, and above all, excitement 
invested in a concept extremely difficult to define and equally as challenging to measure? 
If soft power is so elusive and abstract, how is it capable of organizing such a large group 
of elite national administrators and politicians? The answer is surely complex and multi-
layered, involving paths of influence and connection that circulate meaning in sometimes 
more global and sometimes more local spheres of determination. In tracing these lines of 
soft power through various sites, one can start almost anywher~like a drop of rain in 
the water cycle or of blood in the body, it doesn't quite matter where it begins: eventually 
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it will cycle through the entire network that sustains it. Tracing its path-this is done 
through what is quite literally called a "tracer," usually radioactive, in medicine; 
anthropologists working under multi-sited fieldwork designs might just call it a "key 
word" or "trope" (Marcus 1998: 89-95}----t-eveals the nature, structure, and environment 
of the network as it travels. The questions guiding this process, then, are, how does soft 
power circulate? What things assemble around it or are assembled by it--the activeness 
or passivity of this process seems less relevant in fieldwork than it does in language. And 
fmally, how is its circulation sustained? As my finding is that affects play a large role in 
the process, I pay particular attention to this last question. 
Let me begin a discussion of the soft power discourse broadly, looking at the 
network from afar. I'll then narrow my focus to particular segments and details of the 
network, eventually enabling the capacity to move fluidly between a more general and 
more specific frame of understanding. In a way, then, I am working through Gadamer's 
hermeneutic circle ethnographically. 
Most generally, one cannot think of soft power outside of nation states. National 
imagining, which also enables the rationalization processes of the state (bureaucracy) 
whose task it is to regulate the vitality of the nation, is a prerequisite for thinking through 
soft power. Gellner's distinction between nation and state proves useful for thinking how 
soft power is mobilized toward varying instrumental (state) and sentimental (nation) 
ends.10 As the nation has been traditionally imagined as that community of others to 
10 The social psychologist Herbert Kelman (2001) uses the words "instrumental" and "sentimental" to 
denote two different ways individuals emotionally invest, or "cathect," in national political systems. I 
employ his terms here not as distinct ways in which autonomous subjects relate to a single nation state but 
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which one relates affectively through shared symbols, imagery, stories, texts, or practices, 
the state serves as that political entity whose responsibility it is to administer and secure 
the integrity of it. "Nationalism," as Gellner explains in the opening to his classic work, 
"is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent" (1983: 1). Implicit in this definition is the idea that to the degree 
the state falls short in establishing a harmonious connection between shared ideals of the 
national body and the laws that guarantee or, more importantly, represent it, national 
identity is increasingly threatened. He explains, "Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of 
anger aroused by the violation of the principle [that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent], or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment" (1 ). 
Gellner's theory, if overly prescriptive, provides a framework for analyzing how state 
demands and national desires co-opt each other through the narrative provisions of soft 
power. 
Despite efforts to theorize soft power beyond the nation state, it seldom proves 
convincing (see Repeta [2008] and lmata and Kuroda [2008] on soft power in civil 
society). This is due less to the logical and more to the affective components of it. As 
seen in the Fulbright/CULCON conference, Nye's theory is abstract enough to afford a 
multiplicity of interpretations. Should one want to apply soft power to an explanation of 
civil society or even al-Qaida, as Watanabe does (2008: xxii), he certainly could without 
too much fumbling, or close reading, ofNye's discussion of it (2004). But one would not 
get very far in the discursive environments where soft power is more often and more 
publicly discussed. This is because the discourse itself is invested with far more energy 
to show how discourses of state bureaucracy and national cultural administration impose different demands 
on the subjects they touch. 
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and hope by those concerned with its potential benefit for realizing national interests. 
Those who take a more public, cosmopolitan, or international stance traditionally 
opposed to the narrow conceptualization of national interest have no.need for soft power. 
In general they are skeptical of it, but find their position hard to convey to soft power 
thinkers. This is demonstrated in chapter 6 where I discuss certain officials opposed to 
soft power. These subjects fmd themselves forced to use the language of soft power in 
order to have their ideas which are alternative to a public diplomacy which operates 
exclusively for the benefit of one nation's interests even heard. 
Despite attempts at a formulation of it, then, there is no cosmopolitan soft power. 
Or, I should say, there is no very "adequate" way to think about a cosmopolitan or non-
national soft power. Spinoza defined adequacy in relation to power and truth. To the 
degree that one's ideas were adequate, one approached truth. One knew this by the fact 
that the adequacy of one's ideas proved more powerful: "One importance of the adequate 
idea, then, is that through the expression of its causes it increases our power of thought; 
the more adequate ideas we have, the more we know about the structure and connections 
ofbeing, and the greater our power to think" (Hardt 1993: 90). Crudely put, one who 
knows more can essentially more adequately wield the powers of nature. Spinoza 
seemingly believed quite faithfully in the objectivity of his "nature," which he actually 
called "God"---such were the times. This kind of faith today, especially in a postmodern 
ecumene, is harder to come by. But by relativising Spinoza's "adequacy" to discourse, as 
Foucault has done, one is able to trace how truth is measured by how far one's ideas 
propel one to success, or power, in discourse. To the degree that soft power becomes 
naturalized through the scope of its circulation and the extent of its institutionalization in 
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national institutions of public diplomacy it establishes discursive legitimacy, or relative 
truth, which increasingly excludes more cosmopolitan voices of objection. This makes 
the work of the anthropologist, someone who in general cultivates more cosmopolitan 
sensibilities, more difficult. And the disjunction of ethical positioning toward the nation 
state enables the problem of complicity. Taking an antagonistic stance toward soft power 
in my research, for example, asking not what it really is but how it is understood and used 
by others, has not gotten me very far with national administrators who are by obligation 
concerned with building the nation's prestige. Finding it hard to participate in the soft 
power discourse on account of my own more cosmopolitan opposition to it serves as 
evidence for its rootedness in nationalist sensibilities. 
Academically, soft power is most often taken up within international relations, a 
field in which thought attaches itself to giant amorphous bodies: a powerful and imposing 
United States clashing with a rising and somewhat threatening China; an anxious Japan 
considering more sanctions on a volatile North Korea. It is also popular in political 
science, where it is imagined on an only slightly smaller and more concrete scale: 
American youth consuming Japanese manga and, perhaps, seeking study opportunities in 
Japan. Joseph Nye, his authority on matters of importance in international relations 
already well established, came up with the term in the 1990s, first in his book Bound to 
Lead (1991). It began circulating widely enough throughout the decade that Nye made it 
the topic and title of an additional book, Soft Power (2004). And in only three more 
years it found its way into the Japanese government's most important annual policy 
report, the Keizai zaisaku kaikaku no kihon hoshin, the "Annual Policy Plan for the 
Japanese Economy," or the more informally called Hone buto (thick bone): 
With the economic forecast predicting an economic crisis in addition to 
sweeping changes in industrial and employment structures, there is a need 
for a shift from excessive dependence on economic growth based on 
foreign consumption to a new, more dynamic model of growth. First, 
endeavoring to bring forth a productive cycle based on markets and 
innovation through the creation of global, cutting edge markets in fields 
like low carbon steel, health and longevity, and soft power, we aim to 
acquire an international competitive edge by realizing high quality 
employment and creation. Necessary to achieving this goal is regulatory 
reform, the creation of model markets, domestic and foreign capital, 
human resources, and the continued advancement of technology. At the 
same time, we stand to benefit domestically by resolving problems such as 
resources, the environment, and the improvement of infrastructure facing 
this new world in Asia through the mobilization of our country's superior 
industrial and technological power, contributing to the revitalization of the 
world. [Kantei 2009: 2, italics added] 
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The Hone buto is only one of a myriad of policy papers in which the term can now be 
found. Its emergence in the document shows at least two things. First, it is an idea taken 
seriously enough to make its way into Japan's foremost annual economic strategy report. 
The committee of economists and researchers is set up by the Prime Minister's office, 
well funded, widely circulated, and seriously discussed. Second, the term is ambiguous 
enough to be interpreted in a variety of ways, many of them diverging quite significantly 
from Joseph Nye's original conception of the term. Again, for Nye, soft power is 
distinguished from both military and economic strategies for effecting influence on others. 
It is defined by how well attractiveness to a country's culture can be translated into policy 
objectives. That soft power is conceived of often as a tool for economic development, 
and more enthusiastically, as a potential regenerator of Japan's economic and political 
prestige of the 1980s, shows how various concerns of national feeling are thought into the 
concept. It is also one example of the power of these concerns to sustain what appears as 
a reoccurring contradiction in the soft power discourse: an excitable enthusiasm for soft 
power's potential to revitalize Japan on one hand and a dearth of evidence for its 
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applicability and effectiveness on the other. The Fulbright/CULCON conference is an 
example of this. 
The most demonstrable example of the soft power contradiction comes in a highly 
detailed review of Japan's content industries (2005) by professor at Kyoto Sangyo 
University, Kawamata Keiko. Kawamata's report, "Outlook for the Japanese Content 
Industry" (Nihon no kontentsu sangyii no genjii) was distributed to METI officials and 
informally circulated around other government ministries. Although the paper provides 
varying assessments of each of the content industries' individual fields, its overall 
prognosis is bleak: "Based on the data taken up in this field, it can be said that the future 
for [Japan's] content industries does not look optimistic" (honshiryii de toriageta bunya 
ni kan shite wa, kontentsu sangyii no mirai wa rakkan sen dekinai to ieru no de wa nai 
darii ka). Despite the fact that the content industries as a whole have tripled from 1992 to 
2002 from 500 billion to 150 trillion yen, trends in individual fields such as music which 
has shown a steady decline since 1998 and in anime where production is increasingly 
moving overseas to China and South Korea suggest the content industry at large may be 
headed for decline and, in fact, Kukhee Choo shows that largely due to illegal 
downloading since the middle of the 2000s this suggested decline has already become a 
reality (2010: 53). While Kawamata's critique is focused largely on the domestic market, 
leaving the possibility for hope in foreign markets, the failure of Japanese licensors to so 
far capitalize abroad leaves marketers with no hard facts indicating Japan's content 
industries can meet the optimistic expectations put on soft power by hopeful officials. 
Kawamata's paper shows that where soft power's hopes are conflated with those 
for Japan's content industries, the outlook is, or should be, discouraging. That fact that it 
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is not, that hope for soft power continues to circulate, shows soft power's embedded 
contradictions. Where soft power is discussed in less purely economic terms and 
presented as a mechanism for winning foreign hearts and minds, though, evidence is 
equally as elusive, as the example of the Japan Expo illustrates. The Japan Expo is a 
public event showcasing Japanese pop culture and entertainment, occurring annually 
since 1999 in Paris, France. It is organized by SEF A (Specialists for Public Oriented 
Events), a private public relations company in France which organizes a number of 
conventions showcasing Japanese entertainment. The event hosts numerous booths 
displaying manga, anime, food, film, martial arts, and anything else remotely related to 
Japanese arts and entertainment. They have a cosplay contest, a fashion show, music 
concerts, and a number of other interactive displays. Attracting only 21,000 attendees in 
1999 it has grown to 164,000 in 2009, a figure often cited as evidence for the penetration 
of Japanese pop culture abroad. Though late to attract the attention of government 
officials, both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry now each send representatives, and the event has become a major focus for the 
soft power debate in Japanese bureaucracies. 
Cataloguing the event is the Japanese media outlet MX TV along with 
representatives from MOF A and METI. Over the course of the event, an anchor for MX 
TV interviewed a number of young French attendees, many of them dressed as their 
favorite anime and manga characters, asking them why they have taken an interest in 
Japanese culture and what else about Japan is charming (miryoku teki). In another, 
extended interview with Jean-Marie Bouissou, political scientist and manga specialist at 
the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, the anchor asked what Bouissou 
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thought about the relationship between soft power and Japanese pop culture. Bouissou 
provided a somewhat pessimistic response: 
In 2007 and 2008 the EU Manga Network (administered by myself) 
conducted a survey of 1600 people focusing on their image toward Japan. 
Of these manga lovers, the majority still had an image of Japan as a very 
traditional culture, meaning manga had not become soft power. And 
within that group there were also negative images of Japan (violence, a 
stressful society, a grueling work environment). Of course there were also 
views of Japan as being a very technologically advanced society, but this 
in no way seems to represent this Cool Japan. 
We also conducted a study among people who do not read manga. The 
result was that this group had a slightly more positive image of Japan. 
However, as this favorable impression has not seemed to change from 
before it does not seem to be producing soft power, meaning that it doesn't 
justify Japan supporting soft power at the United Nations or on the 
international stage. 
The number of visitors to the Japan Expo is increasing every year. This 
year it climbed to over 150,000. On the grassroots level there is a growing 
interest in Japan and in the study of Japanese, and the number of people 
visiting Japan is also likely growing, but I don't think one can say this is 
producing soft power. [Unpublished interview, Tokyo MX 2009; also see 
Bouissou 2008 and Bouissou and Dolle-Weinkauff et al. 201 0] 
Bouissou's response seemed to deflate the Japanese interviewer, despite no shortage in 
similar critiques of soft power by other academics (Choo 2010; Otmazgin 2008). 
Exchanges like these between Japan and other show the extent to which Japanese hopes 
ride on the evaluations of those others. As this mode of thinking generalizes and reifies 
national cultures, opinions from representatives of a highly refined French culture 
become especially valued. 
The publication of evidence against the productivity of soft power, like that of 
Bouissou's, is hardly enough to deflate the growing tide of excitement for what it might 
bring. As shown in the two examples above, countries like the U.S. and France play a 
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major role in validating perceptions of Japanese rising or slipping prestige, as another 
example demonstrates. 
In 1988, out of an incident in which U.S. senators smashed a Toshiba radio on the 
steps of the Capitol in protest of the Japanese company's decision to join "a Norwegian 
consortium to illegally sell submarine technology to Moscow" (Tolchin 1988), the phrase 
"Japan bashing" was invented, or so goes one theory. 11 A similar story comes from 1998 
when U.S. President Bill Clinton spent nine days in China, returning home without 
stopping in Japan. Playing off the already popular phrase "Japan Bashing," the phrase 
"Japan Passing" was invented (Chang 2009). It was perhaps, then, inevitable that in the 
2000s one would begin to hear a phrase circulating around the media that seemed to so 
aptly characterize the last three decades ofU.S.-Japan relations: "Japan bashing, Japan 
passing, Japan nothing" Uapan basshingu,japanpasshingu,japan nasshingu]. A 
characteristically broad stroke for Japanese mass media, the phrase captured Japanese 
national sentiment from the 1980s when Americans criticized Japan's seemingly 
threatening economic growth, to the 1990s when such growth, and accordant political 
influence, seemed to be in decline, and finally to the 2000s when it was anxiously 
perceived that Japan's influence in world affairs was disappearing altogether. Under 
such circumstances, it should come as little surprise that Joseph Nye would rekindle some 
hope amidst the increasing despair with this statement: "Japan has more potential soft 
power resources than any other Asian country" (Nye 2004: 85). 
Two Registers of Anxiety 
Nye's assessment, in addition to becoming an enormously popular citation for 
Japanese authors writing about their own country's soft power, serves as a useful 
11 Credit goes to Watanabe Y asushi for this reference. 
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example in which to observe how soft power functions in Japan to bring one form of 
anxiety to bear on another. Put crudely, to be concerned about one's individual economic 
future and to be concerned about Japan's economic future are two different things. 
When someone talks about ''fukeiki'' (poor economic conditions) in Japan or simply "the 
economy" in the United States, what is evoked is a set of concerns about one's job, 
investments, family, and personal capital and resources: in short, one's economic 
security. When someone talks about Japan's economic future, or more specifically, does 
so in reference to a rising China or gaining Korea--that is, in a national comparative 
frame--a very different set of concerns and feelings are evoked. The latter is what has 
been over generalized and exhaustingly analyzed under the term "national identity." 
Nye's phrase pithily captures how soft power brings concerns over a country's domestic 
"resources" and economy into the register of national culture, especially in reference to 
its most immediate and significant sphere of distinction, "other Asian countries." I call 
what distinguishes these two forms of anxiety "registers." 
Registers 
Think ofthree different modes ofhuman movement: walking, jogging, sprinting. 
Each is determined and sustained by a particular kinesthetic relation of muscle, joints, 
and nerves. Each can be qualitatively distinguished from the next, so that there is a clear 
and definable distinction between one and the other (without it racewalking could not 
exist as an Olympic event distinct from the marathon). Each has its own temporality, 
crudely put: slow, medium, fast. Each has its own experiential mode: different sensations 
of the foot connecting with pavement; of the wind blowing through hair; of objects, both 
animate and inanimate, passing one in space. Such registers grow even more 
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complicated with horses, which, depending on the breed of horse, are said to have four 
"gaits": walk, trot, canter, and gallop. Interestingly, the distinctions between each are, 
among other ways, determined rhythmically: the trot, for example, having two beats, the 
canter three and the gallop four. 12 To complicate things, one can distinguish between 
these "natural" gaits and other, "ambling" gates, which include a variety of"footfall 
patterns" that can be taught by trainers ("Horse Gait" 2011). Registers can be taught. 
They are distinct and rooted in the body but mutable and mobile. They are 
simultaneously natural and social things. 
Registers are networks of thoughts, symbols, narratives, and feelings that 
assemble together in repeated associations. They resemble clusters of neural networks in 
the brain where the firing of one neuron repeatedly activates the firing of associated 
others. My conception of registers is similar to Foucault's apparatus in so much as it 
designates a set of relations between a heterogeneous set of objects and is characterized 
not by the constituents of that set but by the way they are related to one another. An 
ethnographic example that approaches what I'm talking about can be found in Judith 
Irvine's study of the linguistic registers ofthe Wolofin Senegal (1990), who perceive 
class distinctions through, among other things, different "affective registers," the waxu 
geer manner of speaking associated with high-ranking nobles, characterized by a low-
level, reserved affectivity and the waxu gewel manner, characterized by "high affectivity" 
(131). While Irvine's analysis is invaluable for the work it does situating affect within 
12 Rhythm is one particularly salient element demonstrating how affect operates on conscious thought. 
William Connolly describes the importance of rhythm for thought in discussing the process of 
"remembering," a situation marked not by the replacement of absence with presence but by a multilayered 
process of recalling that appeals to a variety of strategies, rhythm being one of these. As Connolly 
concludes this discussion, "If you forget a name it may be difficult to recall it, but if you forget the rhythm 
too, it may be lost forever" (2002: 72). 
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social relations rather than in the mind or bodies of individuals, my conception of the 
register is broader still. 
Registers are not restricted to linguistic style, although they are often marked and 
distinguished by it. They incorporate a much larger set of relations including, again, like 
Foucault's apparatus, architectural styles, forms of dress, bureaucratic structures, forms 
of deliberation and other scripts for thinking, speaking, and feeling. An easy way to think 
about social registers is to think of one's relation to ideas like "family," the "public," or 
"work." Such spheres have their own sets of rules, values, and modes of operation. One 
interacts differently in each register, with different criteria for ethical conduct. The 
"good" husband is construed differently from the "good" citizen or "good" official. 
Different registers demand different amounts of time, moving at different speeds. That 
both occupational and familial obligations demand time of the individual often results in 
conflict between registers. But such registers are not rooted in classical portraits of a 
particular culture but deconstruct and transverse them. 
Socioeconomic Anxiety 
Anxiety over economic security within society constitutes a register not 
necessarily implicated in ones of national identity, at least not in so much as the latter is 
constructed in a comparative framework. This anxiety attaches stringently to the 
problems that evoke it. They are called in Japanese shakai mondai (social problems) and 
there is even a section at any average sized bookstore in Japan with the same heading, 
directing one to books on a variety of contemporary issues troubling Japan's present. 
The most commonly circulated ofthese problems address Japan's debt (currently highest 
among developed countries); its declining birth rate and graying population (shoshi korei 
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ka); and the lack of employment opportunities and related sense of hopelessness among 
its youth. A typical example comes from Genda Yuji, a professor of sociology at Tokyo 
University, and his work, Shigoto no naka no aimai nafuan (A Nagging Sense of Job 
Insecurity): 
Confronted by the challenges of globalization and a mountain of bad 
debts, Japanese companies, unable to make flexible, rapid decisions or 
take decisive action, continued to stagnate. Long-term employment and a 
seniority-based pay system came to be regarded as evil practices that these 
struggling companies were unable to change ... In any event, Japan in the 
1990s had lost confidence in itself and had no clear sense of where it was 
heading. As the economy continued to stagnate, the Japanese media 
referred to the 1990s as the "lost decade." What had been lost, however, 
was not simply economic income and wealth. Most Japanese had been 
deprived of any faith in the future. [2005: ix-x] 
Anxiety over this kind of economic security is internally structured. Although it is 
certainly affected by things outside it--all registers bear some lines of connection and 
influence with others--it is imagined in rather autonomous terms, which is why it is 
referred to as shakai mandai (social problems), without any reference to Japan, a referent 
that only makes sense in distinction to other nations. 
Concerns over economic security grab hold of a subject through lines of practical, 
calculative, and instrumental thought: "How can I budget for my son's college 
education?" or "What will become of my retirement fund?" And although they invoke an 
anxiety intense enough to incite a serious personal crisis--an overwhelming majority of 
suicides in Japan, the sixth highest country in the world for suicides per year, is attributed 
to burdens of financial debt--it is not a crisis that is imagined through national symbols 
staked on their relation to those of other nation states. 
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National Cultural Anxiety (Cultural Citizenship) 
National cultural anxiety is perceived not as a threat to one's material needs but to 
his symbolic ones. Personal anxiety is not personal in the sense that it is "owned" by the 
person but is a consequence of symbolic, social interaction that personalizes. This kind 
of anxiety subjectifies or subjectivates (Foucault 1982), creating a subject that is both a 
member of a national body (and thus subject to its influences) and a subject that perceives 
and feels its anxiety as its own in distinction from other subjects with whom it, ironically, 
shares affinity. Affects are created and made possible by communion with others, in the 
classical sense ofDurkheim's collective effervescence and Turner's communitas, but the 
effect ofthem is that they individualize, creating the subject as it is made to feel, whether 
warm, excited, hopeful, or anxious. This is how a nation serves as the narrative channel 
through which affects of collective effervescence take on semantic meaning and 
perception. In this way, the status and meaning of the symbols of the 
nation--increasingly in Japan's case, anime, manga, and kawaii fashion--affect the 
individual in degrees and forms of feeling, often seemingly quite independent of the 
subject's effort to transform or resist their influence. This is evidence for the affect-
emotion gap: affect constructed in processes too complex to understand but that are 
evidenced in feelings and in seemingly spontaneous reactions to stimuli. Tears, such as 
those evoked at a national anthem, can serve as an example. They are spontaneously 
evoked but made knowable, into emotion, through political processes of narration and 
dissemination. 
Under the soft power discourse, Japan's popular content industries--and its media 
commodities that have personal significance for its consumers-are increasingly 
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promoted and circulated as the representative images of national culture through a variety 
of nation branding strategies designed to stimulate economic growth (see chapter 5). In 
this way, national symbols in which subjects are implicated sentimentally are offered as 
solutions for economic anxieties. Individual meaning is staked, then, on economic 
success, a rather tenuous and, ironically, anxiety-producing remedy for anxiety's relief. 
Soft power offers a narrative, a particular line of affect that connects one register 
or network of concerns with another. To the degree that national administrations are 
successful in strategies of soft power cultivation that appropriate domestic concerns of 
economic security, the cultural field of individual identity inundates the economic field, 
an example, again, of Waters comment that "we can expect the economy and the polity to 
be globalized to the extent that they are culturalized" (1995: 9). Culture, especially in the 
breakdown between its high and lower forms rapidly progressing in postmodern styles of 
art and living since the 1960s (Jameson 1991), has been long undergoing processes of 
inundation by economic rationality. What is new in the soft power discourse is the 
degree to which it encourages the nation to invest in culture for both economic and 
political expedience. This particular assemblage of economic rationality, cultural 
production, and national imagining is both sustained by and produces varied affects 
relative to the cultural configurations that inform it. 
Insecurities of National Administration 
To think through the narrative of soft power for national administrators is to 
activate a set of anxious affects structured along asymmetric lines of power. As the 
capacity for those power lines to effect influence is dependent upon the perception of 
national and cultural difference, to the degree that difference is evoked and emphasized, 
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the intensity of those affects is increased. This is the ironic conundrum of"Japanese 
uniqueness": as the trope of uniqueness is increasingly offered as an answer to 
perceptions of national power imbalances, the anxiety evoked by the appeal to difference 
intensifies. To be more specific, the language of soft power activates the perception of a 
kind of difference that is intimately entangled with feelings of anxiety as it posits Japan 
in relation to a United States that is increasingly turning its interest to Japan's primary 
competitor, China. Operating in this register of national difference and competition, as 
national administrators do, is to be continually affected by an anxiety over Japan's 
slipping position in the configuration of contemporary geopolitics. 
In a presentation given by an American diplomat at Japan's International House, I 
heard an even less guarded articulation of the relationship between these gigantically 
imagined, abstract national bodies, America and Japan, as experienced by elite 
administrators: "The relationship between the U.S. and Japan too often, I think, resembles 
a husband and wife," he began. "Sometimes when there is instability in a relationship 
one partner will ask the other, 'do you still care about me?' 'Do you still need me?' It's 
not a healthy relationship. Japan sometimes does this. I think Japan needs to stop being 
so concerned with what The U.S. thinks and start telling it what Japan wants." 
Although this represents the most candid and perhaps most tellingly gendered, if 
not also sexist, version of it, I heard this analogy a number of times in talking to 
administrators. Saito-san is a retired diplomat who worked for over thirty years in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among a number of honorary positions he holds, one of 
them is as a board member of a particularly large corporation, an enormous conglomerate 
of manufacturing, banking, trading, and real estate. These jobs, officially named ama 
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kudari in Japanese (descent from heaven), are reserved for prestigious government 
officials reaching their retirement age. They command high prestige with little obligation 
and are often the object of controversy in Diet debates. I sat with Saito-san in his 
spacious office on the twenty-seventh floor of the corporation's headquarters as he told 
me about the various problems facing high level diplomats: "Japanese diplomats are too 
quiet; they listen too much, a Japanese virtue not respected by other countries. We have 
to do better. Chinese diplomats speak English very well and they always voice their 
opinion." Saito-san's reference to Chinese diplomats was typical of criticisms I heard 
from Japanese diplomats and bureaucrats reflecting on Japan's inability to both formulate 
and communicate its interests. 
Agawa Naoyuki was the Japanese ambassador to the United States in charge of 
public affairs. Agawa has an excellent command of English with a witty and somewhat 
sarcastic attitude, which made me feel comfortable in speaking with him. He spoke much 
more candidly with me than did other officials, both in Japanese and English, and thus 
appeared to me as someone who could step outside the bureaucratic register in offering 
his reflections. He had a very laid-back attitude, informal, and often gently poked fun at 
bureaucrats and the various odd formalities and communication styles that were required 
of them. Agawa, too, noted the English language and a general passiveness as major 
barriers to communication between the U.S. and Japan, especially when it came to Japan 
expressing its own interests. He reflected on this at the Fulbright/CULCON symposium. 
Agawa-san was asked a question by the Executive Director of the Japan Foundation's 
Center for Global Partnership: "Japan is very hesitant to exercise its soft power. This 
may be due to the nature of the Japanese, but could this change?" Agawa-san responded: 
It is very difficult for the Japanese to be very eloquent...however, even if 
we do not express ourselves as well we are often evaluated for what we 
are speaking about and our message is appreciated. The attractiveness of 
the speaker and that of the content of the speech is much appreciated, and 
there is no need to imitate the Americans or be as aggressive. 
However ... this is an age of world politics and we need to improve our 
communication skills. For example, when I arrived at the Embassy, I 
underwent training as to how to speak on television. Such opportunities 
for improvement should be made available, not just to diplomats, but to 
others, especially academics. [Fulbright/CULCON 2009: 121] 
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The imbalance of power felt in the personal relations between U.S. and Japanese officials 
and formalized in a rather simple narrative of"the Japanese are quiet, listening much 
more than talking; the U.S. the opposite" is shared by both groups of officials. Richard 
Armitage commented on it as well at the symposium: 
In terms of public diplomacy, I am afraid that the United States is often 
accused, and many times correctly so, of confusing public diplomacy and 
loud speech. If we only speak more loudly, people will understand us. I 
could make the opposite point that if we were only quiet a little bit and 
listen to people, that might make for more effective communication. The 
criticism for Japan, however, is just the opposite ofthat for the United 
States. I think that for far too long Japan has spoken too softly. [2009: 
103] 
Obama's newly appointed ambassador to Japan, John Roos (the appointment of Joseph 
Nye for this position, highly anticipated by Japanese officials I spoke with, fell through), 
expressed a similar sentiment in speaking to a smaller audience at a major university in 
Tokyo: "60 years now after the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, I want to hear what Japan 
wants today. What does Japan need?" 
Such comments reveal the way national imaginaries among bureaucrats are linked 
horizontally across a register of elite diplomats and the institutions, events, and forms of 
communication in which their practices and discursive negotiations take place. (I talk 
more about this register in chapter 3). A good part of national administration takes place 
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in international settings where more ambiguous perceptions of global power relations are 
often felt and played out in intimate settings: dinner and cocktail parties, small meetings 
and working groups, chats and casual conversation between such meetings, and in 
speaking to press and posing for pictures. 
The latter of these is an especially salient site for how these power relations are 
felt on an intimate, personal level. The precedent was impressionably set by McArthur's 
photograph with the emperor Hirohito post Japanese defeat in the Pacific War. In a now 
classic depiction, McArthur, both nonchalant and confident, two important markers of 
power and cool, towers over the rigid and conciliatory Hirohito (fig. one). The image is 
familiar to many Japanese today. And its impact is re-evoked in the media's thorough 
coverage of every meeting between high level U.S. and Japanese officials. The new 
Prime Minister Aso Taro's first meeting with Barack Obama was covered with especially 
high interest, with media anxiously speculating over what kind of impression he would 
make on the enormously popular and charismatic new American President. News 
anchors evaluated Aso' s sonzaikan, a term combining the words "existence" (sonzai) 
with "sense" (kan) and used to judge Aso's visual strength and presence. With explicit 
emphasis on the appearance of Japanese representatives of state abroad combined with 
the cultural pervasiveness of MacArthur and Hirohito's image, it is not going too far to 
suggest that the two are linked through a similarly constructed affective experience of 
power imbalances (fig. two). 
(Figure 1. MacArthur and Hirohito, 1945) 
(Figure 2. As6 and Obama, 2009. This was the second image to appear 
in an image search for "As6 and Obama" on Google Japan) 
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All Form but no Message? McGray and "Cool Japan" 
The unformed, loosely perceived, uneasy buzz of anxiety that colors Japanese 
national thinking when it is done, as it most often is, in reference to its Western 
counterparts, takes a more formalized, conscious, and poignantly felt form as it attaches 
to objects, symbols, concepts, and stories. This is the process Ngai describes in Ugly 
Feelings, "the passages whereby affects acquire the semantic density and narrative 
complexity of emotions" (2005: 27). Discussion of soft power in Japan has grown to 
such a significant degree that the story of its emergence has taken on the status of a kind 
of origin myth. It is a story shared by journalists, bureaucrats, and, increasingly, 
academics alike, and it goes something like this: Joseph Nye constructed a theory of 
power that served as an alternative to hard power forms of military coercion or economic 
incentive; then, in a famous article (2002), Douglas McGray tied this to Japan's pop 
culture commodities casting them as national resources; and Japanese politicians and 
bureaucrats, fueled by the excitement for soft power's potential at a time of anxiety over 
Japan's future--a declining economy and aging population; a rising China; an increasing 
insecurity about its relationship with the Us--began circulating and entertaining the 
theory as a real solution to Japan's economic and cultural woes. Add to this the global 
context in which nation branding strategies have become a new and common technology 
for political administration and we have the general background in which most soft 
power discussions in Japan take place. 
The fact that my own analysis seems at times to accept this story quite 
unproblematically and at other times questions it, constructing the story itself as a 
primary script by which such anxious affects are made public enough to think through 
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consciously, reveals how much the formulation of my own research questions are 
dependent upon a discursive formation of which I am already a part. Pushing for some 
analytical distance by focusing on affect and emotion is the anthropological work of the 
dissertation, resulting in, at best, what has been called by Rabinow as a position or 
"mode" of adjacency (2007); admitting its inextricability from the already circulating 
narratives of soft power and Cool Japan is the reflexive work of the dissertation, 
revealing, for better or worse, what Marcus has called the "complicity" of fieldwork, no 
doubt intensified by the increasing number of job postings for specialists of Japan who 
can teach a course on Japanese popular culture. However, most any product of 
negotiation between the poles of objectivity and complicity must still, I think, begin with 
the article that has become a shibboleth for authoritative soft power analyses in Japan. 
Douglas McGray's 2002 article makes an important contribution to soft power's 
capacity to energize hope in the role it plays of discursive bricoleur and translator. Not 
only did it link two previously distinct discourses of public thought-Japan's pop culture 
trends and its political aspirations--but it translated the personal investments of the 
former into objective resources of the latter. Since the broad circulation and 
institutionalization ofhis article, it became more difficult to think of foreign consumption 
of Japanese pop culture in exclusively cultural or even economic terms. Consumers were 
no longer just consumers but were political resources, as were commodities, fashion 
trends, and a number of other artistic mediums belonging beforehand exclusively to the 
field of culture. McGray's article, with its translation into Japanese (2003), also 
translated an emerging global discourse into locally imaginable terms. Increasingly 
identified within the discourse of"nation branding," it constitutes "culture-as-resource," 
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in George Yudice's words (2003: 1). While bureaucrats had begun thinking about soft 
power prior to the article, it was only after its publication that the links between soft 
power and Japan's pop culture were formalized in the phrases "Gross National Cool" and 
"Cool Japan." 
The format of McGray's article is simple. In eleven pages he catalogues a 
number of emerging pop culture trends in Japan, places them in the historical and 
comparative context of American products of cultural globalization, introduces--and this 
is the important moment of translation--Nye' s theory of soft power, and then speculates 
on the cultural significance of these developments. Despite not being a Japan specialist 
himself, it is not difficult for McGray to recognize the oscillating affects of anxiety and 
hope characterizing the social register in which he conducted his three months of 
research. He begins with the hope: 
Japan is reinventing superpower-again. Instead of collapsing beneath its 
widely reported political and economic misfortunes, Japan's global 
cultural influence has quietly grown. From pop music to consumer 
electronics, architecture to fashion, and animation to cuisine, Japan looks 
more like a cultural superpower today than it did in the 1980s, when it was 
an economic one. [44] 
The optimistic outlook is enough to capture the eye of any steward of the nation whose 
occupational obligations render him or her regularly attentive to assessments of Japan, 
especially foreign, even more especially, Western. Later in the article, McGray situates 
Japan's cultural resurgence within its more anxiously infused patterns of thinking Japan's 
present: 
High incomes, long life expectancy, and many more of the statistics that 
mean anything in terms of quality of life still tilt in Japan's favor. But the 
national swagger is gone, a casualty of a decade-long recession. Gross 
domestic product is down; the yen is down; the Nikkei Stock Index hit a 
17-year low; and full employment, practically a natural right in Japan, has 
been replaced by near-record rates of unemployment. Tokyo has tried to 
keep the International Monetary Fund from investigating its banking 
system, which is suspected to be in even worse shape than the fmance 
ministry has admitted. A recent downgrade from Moody's Investors 
Service rates Japan only slightly more creditworthy than Botswana. The 
country limps its way into G-8 meetings and remains locked out of the 
U.N. Security Council. [46] 
70 
Adding to these concerns over Japan's steadily ageing population and low birth-rate, 
McGray provides a neat example of conventional domestic assessments of Japan's 
present state of crisis, a more intense, punctuated, and emotional rendering of anxiety. 
The key transpositional moment in McGray's article comes with his reference to 
Joseph Nye, a figure whose prominence and authority has already been documented at 
the opening of this chapter: 
National cool is a kind of"soft power''-a term Harvard dean JosephS. 
Nye Jr. coined more than a decade ago to explain the nontraditional ways 
a country can influence another country's wants, or its public's values. 
And soft power doesn't quantify neatly. How much of modem American 
hegemony is due to the ideological high ground of its democracy, for 
instance, how much to its big corporate franchises, to Hollywood, to rock 
music and blue jeans, or to its ability to fascinate as well as intimidate? 
National cool is an idea, a reminder that commercial trends and products, 
and a country's knack for spawning them, can serve political and 
economic ends. [52] 
Making an explicit connection between Japan's pop commodities and its national prestige 
serves as the transistor by which the former can be thought of in terms of the latter, and 
subsequently turned into political strategy and public policy. The connection would 
come to be repeated in a number of speeches by politicians and cultural administrators, in 
policy papers, and in interviews and discussions I had with interlocutors. 
The clarity of the formula--foreign consumption of Japan's pop commodities= 
Japanese soft power--also provides for the easy solidification of affect into more 
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semantic, public, and emotional forms. That it was most explicitly articulated in a form 
of media popular among administrators, the magazine Foreign Affairs, is important for 
this process. I recall John Dewey. In The Public and its Problems (1922), Dewey calls 
journalists, like McGray, the "real purveyors of news," although he uses the word 
"artists" (1991: 184). Dewey describes a process by which unperceived, unconscious, 
and what he calls "indirect" consequences become matters of public concern that 
resemble Ngai's description of the transformation of affect into emotion. lndispensible to 
this process of realization is the formalization of "indirect consequences" in 
"presentation," and presentation, says Dewey, is always a question of art: 
The function of art has always been to break through the crust of 
conventionalized and routine consciousness. Common things, a flower, a 
gleam of moonlight, the song of a bird, not things rare and remote, are 
means with which the deeper levels of life are touched so that they spring 
up as desire and thought. This process is art ... Artists have always been 
the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward happening in itself 
which is new, but the kindling by it of emotion, perception and 
appreciation. [Dewey 1991: 184] 
Although this quote comes at the end of Dewey's work where he waxes more abstractly 
and poetically, straying somewhat from his original intention of demonstrating how a 
public comes into being, his point is relevant. What he calls here the "deeper levels of 
life" are ultimately only consequences of collective organization that go unperceived by 
everyday consciousness most importantly because they do not take form in public 
narratives. These "indirect consequences" are "felt" and "suffered," Dewey says, "but 
they cannot be said to be known" ( 131 ). 
McGray's essay provides an easy format, in both the logic and ease of the 
argument as well as in the brevity and aesthetic layout of the article, in which anxious 
concerns over thinking Japan's present move from one end of the affect-emotion gap to 
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the other as they take a particular conscious form. As they do they grow in intensity and 
perception and as such become much more amenable to political and administrative 
management. However, McGray also leaves bureaucrats with a number of problems: "It 
is impossible to measure national cool," he says (52). Moreover, whereas American soft 
power was perceived to carry particular messages with it- "democracy," "freedom," 
"modemity"-Japan's seems at times "all medium and no message" (52). In this context, 
McGray muses, "It's hard to imagine that Japan will be content to remain so much 
medium and so little message" (52). These two problems of measurement and message 
became prominent themes of the subsequent soft power debate in Japan, most specifically 
in those bureaucratic sites where administrators were tasked with constructing specific 
policies and programs contributing to a new national brand (see chapter 5 on nation 
branding). 
McGray in Japan 
How much influence does this short article by McGray really have? Surely he did 
not single-handedly usher in a new national fervor for Japan's own pop culture industries. 
The multiple and variant paths of circulation that enable discourse make this difficult to 
say. The notion of soft power had been circulating since the early 1990s, and even before 
McGray's article Prime Minister Koizumi had launched a commission investigating the 
political potential of investing in Japan's content industries. Still, the proliferation of 
references to McGray's article after 2003 begs our attention. What made it so powerful? 
Ian Condry's impressions on McGray prove useful here: 
McGray's article was the catalyst, but the ideas had been floating around 
for a while. I would also point to the success of Pokemon worldwide, 
Miyazaki winning the Academy Award for "Spirited Away," and, 
retroactively, "Ghost in the Shell" grabbing #1 for DVD (1996), i.e., this 
happened earlier, but people then looked back at it in the early OOs as 
another example of Cool Japan's legitimacy. It wasn't so much the 
insights of the article itself as the timing, just as Japan was emerging from 
its decade-long recession, and the way it seemed to offer a new direction 
at a time when China (and other low wage countries) are dominating 
manufacturing. There are the generational differences too, exemplified by 
Aso Taro, where people in power now grew up with (and appreciate more) 
manga and anime. What, of all this, is most important? In my opinion, 
Spirited Away, but McGray gave it a name. [Email correspondence] 
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In accordance with Dewey's emphasis on the importance of artists who give form to 
swelling energies and only abstractly perceived affects accompanying shifts and tremors 
of social change, Condry cites the importance of"naming." It was only after McGray's 
article that "national cool" became "Cool Japan," with McGray's article serving as the 
shibboleth of its legitimacy. Examples of this saturate popular media and publications in 
Japan. I offer just a few of these below. 
Nakamura Ichiya is a former bureaucrat from Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications (Somusho). He serves on a number of committees and research 
groups connected with supporting Japan's content industries such as the Content Policy 
Research Group (Kontentsu seisaku kenkyu kai) and the Pop Culture Policy Project 
(Pappu karucha seisaku purojekuto ). Onouchi Megumi is a media arts producer and a 
researcher at Japan's International Foundation for Information Technology (Kokusai IT 
zaidan ). Together they published a book titled Japan's Pop Power: The True Story of 
how Contents are Changing the World (Nihon no poppu pawa: sekai o kaeru kontentsu 
no jitsuzo, 2006). The opening line could hardly better demonstrate the anxious context 
out of which hope for Japan's resurgence through its content industries spring: "Japan's 
economy may have escaped the lost decade [referring to the stagnant 1990s], but it does 
not have the confidence that it has found the path to steady growth" (1 ). Things are not 
looking good. Within this grim assessment, however, there is, of course, hope: "Industry 
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builds culture, and culture is a mechanisms for building industry, so how about hitting 
upon this light of the so-called 'power ofthe culture industries' (sangyo bunka ryoku)? 
The power of the culture industries is clearing the path to a new age" (1 ). 
As justification for such hope, the authors present McGray: 
At the level of evaluation [ hyoka no reberu de], since the publication of 
Douglas McGray's article "Japan's Gross National Cool" in the magazine 
Foreign Policy, Japan's entertainment industries have been garnering 
attention. Gross National Cool is a concept likened to Gross National 
Product and serves as an index of a country's power based on the 
fashionable cultural power, or its "cool." [16] 
The authors follow McGray's logic translating subculture trends into a measure of a 
country's potential power and cite the following, much noted passage from his article: 
Japan is reinventing superpower-again. Instead of collapsing beneath its 
widely reported political and economic misfortunes, Japan's global 
cultural influence has quietly grown. From pop music to consumer 
electronics, architecture to fashion, and animation to cuisine, Japan looks 
more like a cultural superpower today than it did in the 1980s, when it was 
an economic one. [McGray 2002: 44] 
McGray posed the theme of Japanese soft power as a question, asking whether or not 
Japan would be able to turn its culture into a source of power. For McGray, power was 
very much about message. In the caption to a photo showing a male Japanese teenager, 
hair dyed bright blonde, speaking on a cell phone, he quips, "Cool phone! But does he 
have anything meaningful to say to the world?" (52). For the authors, though, McGray's 
article is presented as a confirmation of Japan's already extant soft power resources. 
Message plays little to no role in their work. Most important is identifying the sources of 
Japan's resurgence, and McGray's label, "Gross National Cool," serves as a useful guide 
in the search. 
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Another work, Cool Japan: The Japan the World Wants to Buy (Kuru japan: 
sekai ga kaitagaru nihon, Sugiyama 2006), reveals such similarities in style and content 
that one wonders how it could even sell as a separate book without infringing upon 
copyright law. Like Nakamura and Onouchi, Sugiyama views Japan's content industries 
as a source of hope in an anxious time: 
The rejuvenation of"Made in Japan (meido in japan) is a new industry 
economizing culture and technology to a high degree. This new industry 
is no doubt gaining traction to a new level within a contemporary Japan 
that feels an anxiety over the fate of its national economy and dwindling 
population [shoshi kOrei ka, literally, "decreasing birth rate and increasing 
rate of elderly"]. [5] 
Sugiyama's article cites McGray's article as well, calling it the "impetus starting this new 
benefit to citizenship" (shiminken o toku hajimeta no wa) and one sees how through the 
lens of Cool Japan, culture becomes resource: "The fate of Japan's future is dependent on 
the ability to activate the resources of 'Cool Japan"' (5). Ultimately, Sugiyama is 
hopeful: "Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, manga and anime, which have 
attracted high praise of Japan's pop culture abroad, are enormously popular ... ! feel a 
bright future for Japan's content industries" (3). 
The hopeful sentiments often rooted in anecdotal evidence for the popularity of 
Japan's pop culture overseas might be easy to dismiss as a peripheral soft nationalism 
typical of popular literature on Japan, called in Japanese "bunkaron" (theories of 
Japanese culture), even if often authored by university academics. The degree to which 
the phrase "Cool Japan" or "Japan Cool" (japan kUru) enters into government policy 
reports or "white papers" (hakusho ), however, reveals a network of circulating sentiments 
that pervade bureaucracy as much as media. The report by Kawamata and distributed to 
METI officials provides an illustrative case of how "Cool Japan" fmds its way into both 
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academic and government spheres. The paper opens with a reference to McGray and a 
citation from Sugiyama: 
GNC (Gross National Cool). The word was coined by the American 
Douglas McGray in the June issue of Foreign Policy in 2002 to commend 
Japan's role as a new super power in the field of culture in the 1990s 
compared to its power in the economic field in the 1980s. [2005: 1 07] 
The phrase "Cool Japan" begins to appear more frequently in the early 2000s, most 
noticeably in a number of METI reports by the Contents Global Strategy Study Group 
(Kontentsu gurobaru senryaku kenkyilkai) and even leading to the title of a special 
section within METI called the Kuru japan shitsu, translated into English as the "Creative 
Industries Promotion Office'' but literally meaning, "Cool Japan Room."13 
Such examples, best highlighted by Nakamura, Onouchi, and Sugiyama's 
accounts, are representative of a discourse not only rapidly and widely circulated among 
those thinking through Japan's future but also highly normalized (see chapter 4), 
narrating a hopeful anticipation for Japan's content industries from within a position of 
saliently-felt anxieties over its economic future. McGray's article appears repeatedly as 
the paramount example for the legitimacy of Japan's claim to a future of both economic 
and cultural prestige. Its reoccurrence points to the dependency of practices of national 
administration on Western evaluation. In the next chapter I look at the formal, 
organizational, and institutional structures in which this dependency is inscribed. 
13 Kukhee Choo traces a similar process in governmental proceedings on anime and content industries, 
fmding a sudden and significant proliferation in the early 2000s of proceedings in which the words 
"content" (kontentsu) or "anime" are cited (2009: 122). 
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Chapter Three 
An Architecture for Cultural Difference 
Chapter 2 explored how soft power imagined within the register of national and 
cultural difference organized affects ideologically. This chapter analyzes the institutional 
frameworks in which such difference and its associated affects are inscribed. While the 
previous chapter showed how anxious affects serve as a stimulus of ideology, this chapter 
shows how both those affects and ideology are sustained in state apparatuses that 
organize, manage, and in the process naturalize such an affectively imbued ideology in 
policy. This is what Don Handelman has called the "torquing of passion and reason," a 
major function ofbureaucracy whose ultimate objective is to negotiate the mutual 
demands of nation and state: 
The modem state depends on torquing together the sides of this divide. 
The vector ofbureaucratic logic shifts the State towards the mathematical, 
towards lineal topologies of separating and fitting together parts with the 
exactitude of sameness and difference, while governing these machinic 
processes through rationality, clarity, precision, control. By contrast, the 
vector of totalizing effervescent emotion shifts the State towards the 
modem national, towards the romantic sublime (Weiskel1976), 
combining a secular metaphysics of transcendence with nationalism, 
generating the intense arousing of emotion, their over-abundant penumbra 
of effervescence spilling over, uncontainable within lineal 
classification ... The State must join the two sides of the divide, yet does so 
without being able to predict emergent outcomes. [Handelman 2007: 134] 
Bureaucratic logic is generally understood as absent of emotion; however, as Handelman 
shows, it establishes a fluid and mutually constitutive relationship with a national 
imagining that is actually motivated and sustained by it: "Bureaucratic logic may 
constrict, strangle, choke off the emotionalism of the national, and the enthusiasm of the 
national may overflow and swamp the neat borders and divisions made through 
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bureaucratic logic" (135). Such unpredictable mutual appropriations can produce some 
strange, emergent forms oflife, some of which I discuss in chapters 7 and 8. 
Weber's classic account of the emergence ofbureaucracy (1968) has contributed 
to an understanding of it as existing in a natural and structurally uniform relationship with 
the nation state, as if its forms in nineteenth century France and post-colonial Indonesia 
should be of the same nature given they are ofthe same category. Although Weber 
certainly allowed for the cultural variation of bureaucratic style, it is Michael Herzfeld's 
study of the cultural history ofWestern bureaucracies (1992) that goes the furthest in 
contextualizing bureaucracy to its local and particular function in relation to state needs 
and national desires. His subtitle to the work, "Exploring the Symbolic Roots of Western 
Bureaucracy" is ironic not only because the idea of a bureaucratic style uniform across a 
wide range of countries in the Western hemisphere bears little resemblance to social 
reality but also because it is the imagined symbol of the "West" that Herzfeld posits as 
the object ofhis study of national identity (2-3). "Nationalist ideologies usually lay claim 
to some kind of constructed 'national character,"' Herzfeld says, "Their bureaucracies 
have the task of calibrating personal and local identity to this construct" (3). 
That bureaucratic practice demands the calibration of reason to ideals of national 
character and, more importantly, does so in a way that guarantees the authenticity of that 
calibration, secures the relationship between what Handelman calls "mind-work" and 
"body-work (2007: 135).14 Required of the official engaged in the former is a type of 
concern for or way of knowing the latter and of thus being able to calculate authenticity. 
14 Herzfeld goes so far as to propose "authenticity" as that which displaces "charisma" and "social 
relations" as the basis for modem authority (1992: 62). Herzfeld does not argue that "authenticity" replaces 
Weber's "legal" authority as the form of power particular to the modem state but that it emerges as a 
primary affective defense against the sense of disenchantment that comes as a natural consequence of 
modem rationalization and the loss of charismatic authority. 
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It requires a way of judging whether a film, novel, or art exhibit, for example, does or 
does not authentically represent national character. As I discovered in fieldwork, 
however, developing a sense for authenticity in cultural administration is often far less 
calculative a process than one might expect. It more often resembles a more spontaneous 
and practical "I know it when I see it" ethos, as I show in chapter 6. 
Unique to the demand of negotiating state and nation within Japanese 
bureaucratic practices is the uneasiness with which the two were coupled in the birth of 
the modem Japanese state. Modernization-more accurately, its historical 
narratives--initiated in the Meiji period in the form of a concession to exogamous forces 
seen to threaten the very survival of a unified Japanese body rendered impossible the 
ability for both structural reform and national imagining to be undertaken in anything 
other than a comparative framework. The lack of works of Meiji intellectual history that 
do not reference the history ofWestem thought, as Naoki Sakai has shown (1997: 48), 
attests to this. Further, the similarity of this discursive mode--"Ifthere is thought in the 
West, there ought to be its equivalent in Japan" (48)-to today's nationalist bunkaron 
literature (theories of Japanese culture) shows both the lasting power of this discourse as 
well as, self-referentially, one of the major institutions in which it is sustained: language 
and the publishing industry, a major constituent of national imagining as Anderson has 
shown ( 1991: 3 7 -46). 15 The interesting problem that this inextricability from imagining 
the West when imagining Japan poses is that, for bureaucrats in Japan, calibrating state 
administration to guarantee the successful survival of an authentic national body is to 
unavoidably appeal to Western criteria for statehood, national power, and national 
15 The often-quoted statistic that Japanese consume more newspapers, magazines, and books than any other 
nation is both a fact reaffrrming the power of this discourse as well serving as an example of its discursive 
mode of imagining difference through cultural terms. 
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prestige, what Sakai calls "mimetic desire" (1997: 48). And for all the negotiation and 
ambiguity with which the "West" is imagined in Japan, soft power as first, an 
increasingly ubiquitous resource that nation states seek to procure, second, as a concept 
attributed to a Harvard professor and council to a U.S. president, and third, as an idea first 
put into practice by Britain in its "Cool Britannia" campaign, the concept is imagined as a 
thoroughly Western one. 
History of Japan's Bureaucracies and their Western Models 
Even to recognize oneself as a national administrator in Japan is to identify with a 
formal occupational and personal status conferred by the West. One is necessarily 
implicated in a history of unequal vectors of determination that either more implicitly (in 
styles of dress, office organization, forms of speech, standards measuring the good, 
competent, or ethical administrator) or more explicitly (in the circulation of a position 
paper by Barack Obama at the opening to a hearing at the Japanese Agency for Cultural 
Affairs, see chapter 5) forces one to repeatedly perform patterns of mimicry whereby 
authenticity is measured by one's proximity to Western administrative forms of conduct. 
Historians of the Meiji Restoration have painted varying pictures of Japan's 
modernization in relation to those Western models of administrative organization to 
which Japanese elites looked for guidance. They place them variously along a line 
between the poles of Japan as the "clever copier" of Western traditions and the more 
innovative adapter of Western systems to Japanese contexts (Westney 1987: 4). Both 
views represent varying interpretations of the single fact that Japanese systems were, 
indeed, consciously and rationally modeled after a number of Western ones: "the navy on 
the British; the army first on the French and then on the German ... the communications 
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systems on the British; the police on the French; the banking system on the American; the 
legal system first on the French and then on the German" (Westney 1987: 5). In the 
contemporary genre of Japan's bunkaron (again, theories of Japaneseness), it is the latter 
perspective--Japan as innovative adapter-that wins out. Numerous works in this genre 
laud Japan's ingenuity at incorporating elements from other traditions and making them 
its own-tea ceremony from China, Buddhism from India, technology from the West, 
food from everywhere. 16 The praise of Japanese adaptability turns adaptability, itself, 
into a unique national trait. As Westney writes, "Copying is less estimable than 
inventing; imitation is less honorable than innovation." And "the Japanese of the Meiji 
period, like their descendents today, felt belittled by the Western image of their nation as 
an assiduous copier of other peoples innovations" (5). 
In critiques of the national it is difficult to resist succumbing to the naturalization 
of the metaphor of the national body as logically congruent with the personal body. In 
Westney' s case, this conflation results in the interpretation of a form of Japaneseness in 
which the Japanese body (both personal and national) undergoes an affliction of 
dependent imitation in Meiji that is transformed into, or in psychoanalytic terms, 
repressed by, a value of creative innovation still prominent today. Such an interpretation 
seems too easy, and too much a product of convenient conflations with analytic modes 
found in history and psychology (anthropology's school of national character studies 
succumbed to similar temptations). What, in terms of a structure of feeling, does the 
Meiji administrator really share with the modem one? What is the practical effect of 
16 One Japanese amateur photographer and chronicler of local festivals in Japan enthusiastically expressed 
to me his satisfaction at the fact that no where else but Tokyo could one have at his disposal Korean, 
Indian, Italian, French, Thai, and Japanese food while walking down a single street. Having also boasted 
travelling to over fifty countries, at least one of which must surely have contained a stroll down a London 
boulevard or a visit to an American food court, the comment could hardly be attributed to inexperience. 
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Sakai's historical analysis of the birth of the Japanese imaginary on practices of Japanese 
imagination today? To what extent can or should a continuity be established? 
In asking myself these questions and taking what James Faubion might call an 
"Occamist" perspective on my object (Forthcoming: 1), I sought only those most 
immediate narratives, symbols, and institutional structures in which anxious affects of 
national imagining were rooted. What such an ethnographic perspective on current 
modes of national belonging reveals is not only their particular contemporariness but also 
their dependence on thoroughly transnational and transcultural organizational structures. 
An Architecture for Cultural Difference 
National cultural administration takes place within a bureaucratic register that is 
organized in parallel to a set of numerous agencies, bureaus, and departments in other 
nation states all responding to similar urgencies of both local and global concern. Its 
integrity is established through a number of different modes but its most rigid is 
organizational (Sassen 2007). Importing its organizational structures guaranteed that 
Japan's national administrations would be linked structurally with those of the West, and 
in so doing would consequently establish an asymmetric flow of affectivity, of power. 
Modeling the Japan Foundation after the British Council, for example, which it did in 
1972, guaranteed that administrative structures, styles of operation, and forms of 
evaluation and critique would resemble one another. 
Such organizational symmetry is both a primary marker and facilitator of modem 
globalization. Although people like Appadurai and Tsing have drawn attention to the 
imbalances which generate global flow, in metaphors of"cannibalization" (1996) and 
"friction" (2005) respectively, it is symmetry or compatibility established at least in some 
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degree that allows for affectivity. One needs compatible systems to establish 
connectivity, or, in the language ofDeleuze and Guattari, for machines to connect with 
other machines (1983: 5). This is today represented organizationally in the parallel 
relationship of national administering bodies: Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs parallel 
to the U.S. State Department and British Foreign Commonwealth Office; the Japan 
Foundation to the Alliance Franr;aise and Goethe Institut. 
The importance of organizational symmetry is, perhaps, most clearly exhibited in 
the field of overseas development. For example, the aim of Japan's International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the state's administrative arm for administering overseas aid 
(its counterparts are USAID and Britain's Department for International Development), is 
not simply to donate money to various sectors of developing countries' economies. That 
is, they do not donate money so much as they export bureaucratic structures. An 
overwhelming number of officials sent overseas by JICA are administrative staff rather 
than technical experts. And even experts are engaged much more in organizational 
restructuring than they are in technical development. An expert in customs inspections, 
for example, does not simply introduce x-ray scanners in Phnom Penh's airport but, 
rather, organizes structures for the management of the flow of people. He (male experts 
in JICA far outnumber female ones) reorganizes the placement oflines, the position of 
customs agents, and all the procedures of inspection that depend on such a spatial 
arrangement for their smooth implementation. ODA and other facilitators of 
globalization function through the homogenization of organizational structures: the 
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establishment of symmetric systems that enable the systematization of asymmetric flows 
of capital and power. 17 
Paying attention to these systems is not to reduce culture to institutional 
determinism but to show how their parallel organization establishes connections between 
different localities, however variously imagined, enabling particular kinds of mutual 
influence: feedback. They allow for both exchange and influence, rough homologies to 
the "communication" and "transaction" ofBertalanffy's general systems theory (1969). 
The homogenization of organizational forms, then, allows for the entrenchment of 
significant difference along lines of standardization (although both "nation states," for 
example, the U.S. and Japan are different kinds of them). They enable various affective 
relationships as well, capacities to feel, affect, or be affected that come as both 
consequences of and motivations for connection. "Japaneseness" is found at the 
intersection of this organizational compatibility and affective disequilibrium. 
The Japan Foundation and British Council: Facilitating Mutual Differences 
An example of how such homogenizing organizational forms also function to 
structure particular kinds of difference can be seen in a symposium organized jointly by 
the Japan Foundation (JF) and British Council (BC) in Tokyo in January 2009, "The 
Significance of International Cultural Relations in the World Today" (Kyo no sekai ni 
okeru kokusai bunka koryii no igi). Participating in the event were the respective 
17 Over the course of my fieldwork I held a part-time job as an "English Resource Person" at JICA, which 
provided significant insight into systems of ODA administration. My job entailed assisting in one to two-
week intensive English courses designed to brush up the English skills of technical experts and 
administrators before they would leave for their assignments overseas. English levels were generally quite 
low. The most common activity I engaged in was helping experts design and perform introduction 
speeches that would be presumably delivered at their first meeting with local counterparts. One expert 
travelling to Indonesia as a council to their justice department captured this idea of organizational 
homogenization quite tellingly. He concluded, "In the past, Japan learned judiciary systems from the west; 
now Japan is teaching these systems to the rest of the world." 
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presidents of the British Council and Japan Foundation, the director of the British 
Council's Japan headquarters, a number of Japan Foundation officials, two professors of 
cultural policy, and the director of a private foundation for arts funding. 
Through the course of the symposium, both the JF and BC officials expressed 
similar opinions on matters of cultural relations and in similar rhetorical styles: 
representatives from both sides advocated for cultural relations as a tool for peace and 
solving international problems; they both offered the idea of arts and traditions as global, 
public goods rather than national ones; and they both voiced concerns over the use of the 
phrase soft power in cultural relations. Officials from both sides wear suits; they both 
speak from prepared drafts and take questions; and after the formal presentations they 
mingle with each other with ease and familiarity. Despite critical interpretations 
challenging globalization's homogenizing tendencies, the register of international 
administration exhibits an incredible uniformity of style, deliberation, and, perhaps in 
large part consequentially, of discourse itself Organizational homology, thus, establishes 
structures and forms of communication that, precisely because international 
communication is one major function of these organizations, homogenizes. Difference 
between organizations, then, emerges only in forms these homologous organizational 
structures allow, or, alternatively, in forms oflocallanguage and affective motivations 
that lie outside it. 
Both the director of the British Council, Martin Davidson, and the director of the 
Japan Branch, Jason James, take positions on cultural relations that plays down the role 
of the state, if not also at times making a conscious and deliberate effort to distance itself 
from it. "Cultural relations is not about business, government, industry," Davidson at one 
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point said, "It's about people, cooperation, trust, understanding, communities, peace. It's 
about engaging overseas publics." The metaphor through which Davidson imagined the 
BC's role in the administration of cultural relations, and that was also expressed to me in 
an interview with Jason James, was of a bridge between individuals and groups. It was 
about forming relationships and connections: "We're trying to build two-way mutual 
relationships. Sometimes we use the metaphor of a bridge, so we're trying to build a 
bridge between Japan and the UK that people can walk across in two directions" (James, 
interview). In his speech Davison made a special effort to distinguish the role of the BC 
from the Foreign Ministry: "The British Council is aiming for an honest view of culture 
and leaves the positive view up to the foreign service." Although cultural relations builds 
influence, he later said, the goal is mutual understanding between people, not the 
achievement of foreign policy objectives. James adds, "We're not comfortable with 
power. We're not trying to exert power on Japan. We build relationships that can 
potentially be used by the Foreign Office but we would never use them ourselves. We 
just build relationships. We don't much like the word power." 
Three points that Davidson outlined for cultural relations were: one, it should be 
separate from government; two, it should be made in partnership with people and 
organizations in the host country; and three, it should be built on mutual respect. This 
deliberate effort to clearly distinguish the British Council from the British state reveals 
the organization's ethical obligation to a public imagined to also be independent and 
distinct from the state. Comments from Japan Foundation officials reveal a slightly more 
intimate relationship between cultural relations and state administration. 
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Where Davidson made a special comment expressing his desire to "avoid the 
word 'diplomacy' altogether," Japan Foundation President Ogoura entertained the 
possibility of thinking of the role of the JF through a diplomatic framework. A key word 
for Japan's international cultural exchange is kokueki (national interest). Ogoura 
explained, "The question is of how to tie kokueki to cultural diplomacy." Included in this 
question are issues of globalization, Ogoura continued, of how to meet the other's mode 
of understanding in order to shape messages for transmission (hasshin) and reception 
(jushin). Although here Ogoura problematizes the relationship between national interests 
and cultural exchange, genuinely posing the relationship as a question open for debate, he 
has in other places been more forward about cultural diplomacy, characterizing the role 
of cultural diplomacy in Japan's past as "motivated by the desire to respond to and dispel 
specific misunderstandings and prejudices on Japan" (2009: 29) and calling for a more 
assertive approach: 
It is therefore high time for Japan to voice its vision on the future of the 
world community rather than simply defend its position. If Japan cannot 
summon the nerve and ambition to express its opinions on the shape of the 
world of tomorrow, it risks becoming more and more invisible in the 
global policy-oriented intellectual discussion. [2009: 29] 
Ogoura here shows an often-expressed concern for the fading visibility of Japan on the 
world stage, a concern that time and time again reveals itself as the affective energy 
motivating much thought on cultural exchange and, in its more deliberately political 
iterations, soft power. 
Ogoura's take on cultural exchange, the JF's translation of bunka koryil (the BC 
uses the phrase "cultural relations"), at times resembles Davidson's, but one British 
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official noted what he sensed as a slight difference in emphasis between the British and 
Japanese side in the symposium: 
It did become apparent that there was this slight difference of emphasis 
between the idea of projecting your culture to other people and more like 
sharing things on a mutual basis. If you put it to Ogoura like that I'm not 
sure he would disagree with the British Council's approach but there 
seemed to be a difference of emphasis. 
The "slight difference of emphasis" perceived by this BC official could not be easily 
demonstrated with examples. He simply sensed that Ogoura had a different "emphasis," 
a level of intensity that was dedicated to a different aim of cultural exchange. This 
concern or urgency underlying the motivation for cultural exchange efforts operates in 
the affective background of what seems an otherwise highly formalized and affect-less 
environment. (I discuss the tone of this background in more detail in chapter 4.) 
Ogoura represents opinions at the most cosmopolitan end of the cultural 
diplomacy debate in Japan. He goes on in his speech to argue for a "new paradigm for 
cultural relations," one that addresses the responsibility of private enterprise (minkan 
kigyo). He also offered the idea that "one's culture could be anyone's culture," that 
Japanese culture was not the propriety of just the Japanese people but of everyone, what 
he has in other venues called the ''precious heritage of all humankind" (2009: 18). As 
one example of a contribution Japan might make to this heritage he offered the notion of 
mottai nai seishin, an ethos of preservation and of not letting something go to waste, 
weather it be culture or natural resources. Ogoura's example ofmottai nai seishin, 
however, is a contested one. Along with other notions like Japan's ability to incorporate 
other cultural traditions into its own and its record of environmental preservation (in 
reality spotty at best, Kerr 2001), it is more often appropriated as an example of Japanese 
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uniqueness in the rhetoric of nihonjinron literature than it is a proposal for a global public 
ethic. In this sense, to the degree that feelings of pride motivated by affects of anxiety 
over unbalanced power relations attach themselves to objects like mottai nai, or manga 
and anime as the case may be, the very substance of cosmopolitan, trans-national 
communion and communication becomes appropriated as the particular propriety and 
prestige of the nation. As the nationally imagined discourse of soft power and nation 
branding circulates and gathers energy, Ogoura's cosmopolitan claim loses traction. 
What these subtle discursive distinctions reveal are more significant affective 
ones underlying them, and the notion of"pride," explained by Ogoura, serves as a 
particularly useful point for analyzing how the latter affect the former. An additional role 
for cultural relations highlighted by Ogoura is that of"restoring a country's pride" where 
it is found damaged or lacking. He offered this in line with a number of other ethical 
services to which the JF can contribute through cultural relations: kokoro iyashi (soothing 
or healing hearts);fokushi (welfare); kokusai mondai (environmental problems). It is 
more difficult to imagine representatives from the BC making a similar point, and in fact, 
in Davidson's own thoughts on an issue related to pride one sees a very different set of 
feelings: "Culture should carry any amount criticism. One should have enough 
confidence in one's culture to be willing to undertake such critique." Granted Ogoura's 
and Davidson • s comments are offered in different contexts, one can discern very different 
sentiments underlying investments in cultural relations. Where Davidson connects a 
country's pride--or an individual's pride as he imagines himself as a member ofthat 
country--to the ability to accept criticism of it, Ogoura emphasizes the necessity to build 
pride where it is found lacking. While Davidson embodies a pride that is open to 
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critique, Ogoura seeks a form of critique which can build national pride. These 
distinctive "styles" of national imagining, to use Anderson's phrase (2006: 6), 
materializes out of a set of affective capacities to feel differing degrees of confidence in a 
set of cultural traits, objects, or practices one calls his own. 
The joint Japan Foundation/British Council symposium reveals different lines of 
connectivity and influence. Abstracted somewhat crudely from the more detailed 
analysis above, they operate on a sliding scale of sameness and difference: from 
organizational homogony on one end to affective particularity on the other. Strangely 
enough, affects, which have traditionally been understood as the most "biological" and 
thus the most universal of human traits, reveal themselves here to be the most particular, 
personal, and distinctive. Organizational structures, imaginaries, and values-the usual 
stuff of cultural difference--prove far more rigid, consistent, and uniform within national 
administration. Such a fact posits affects, understood as capacities to feel and to be 
affected in certain ways enabled through complex processes of socialization, as evidence 
for globalization's failures to homogenize absolutely or, as Wim Wenders has it, as 
evidence that the Yanks have yet to completely "colonize our subconscious" (Adam 
2005: 351). It is also evidence for the localness of affect and affect's dependence on 
intimate forms of communication not entirely interchangeable with communication 
technologies, a point which has been suggested by Appadurai as well (2005). What 
accounts for the British Council's development of the metaphor of the bridge between 
peoples of different publics while the Japan Foundation sticks to more nationally 
embedded "sharing of cultures" framework is, of course, a great many things. But affects 
seem to play a major role. The importance of affirming national affinity is far more 
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prevalent in the Japan Foundation. If it is difficult to chart the complex network of 
relations that allows for the BC to concede national identity where the JF clings to it, the 
fact that one concedes and the other clings is still good evidence for the distinction 
between what those networks allow: differing affective capacities within the national 
register. 
The progressive notion that British pop, for example, can also be understood as a 
globally shared public good is a point far less stressful to concede for the British 
administrator than it is for the Japanese one thinking about manga. Consider briefly this 
response by a Japanese METI official to a South Korean government-sponsored booth 
displaying Korean manhwa (manga) at the Japan Expo, a major festival exhibiting 
Japan's pop culture hosted outside Paris each year since 1999: "Who would have thought 
Korea would go this far? It looks as though we will be overtaken even by manhwa" 
(Asahi 2010). The dismay expressed by METI's Cool Japan Monitor demonstrates how 
deeply cultural commodities like manga and anime are rooted in and claimed for by a 
national consciousness. The foreign challenge to appropriate a cultural commodity 
perceived as the exclusive propriety of Japan produces visceral responses of shock and 
disgust. The plethora of critical comments vilifying Korea that this story elicited on 
blogs and online discussion boards demonstrates just how deeply the notion of national 
propriety of certain cultural commodities is inscribed in bodies. The story published in 
the liberal and progressive Asahi Newspaper concludes, "Sports, the economy, in one 
field after another Japan's ascendency is being robbed by these two countries (Korea and 
China). Now one can feel their increasing presence in the field of culture" (2010). Under 
such conditions where the participation of groups of two different nations in a common 
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field of cultural production (manga) evokes impassioned and automated affective 
responses of disgust and fear, it is hard to imagine Ogoura's softer view of cultural 
exchange taking root in cultural administration in Japan. 
What can be extrapolated from this is that in the nationally imagined relationship 
between the UK and Japan there is far more at stake for the latter. One affiliating with 
Japan feels there is more to lose in forfeiting one's national cultural traditions to a 
"heritage of all humankind." Other cultural relations administrators working in or with 
Japan identify this sense. One officer from the British Council offered an eloquent 
summary of what has become the typical narrative through which this sense of Japanese 
anxiety among administrators is perceived by its counterparts in other nations: 
The rise of China puts Japan in quite a difficult position in many ways. 
Japan has seen itself as natural leader in this part ofthe world ... And 
obviously after the war has been trying to develop that in most peaceful 
means ... and this has been mainly based on economic relationships where 
Japan is a massive investor in a lot of the countries in this region and 
wants to be seen as the sort of elder brother for other countries in the 
region. Urn ... it never quite worked the way Japan wanted ... so Japan 
now may have kind of missed its opportunity because China has suddenly 
appeared in the last ten, fifteen years. The Chinese economy will overtake 
the Japanese economy within the next year as is generally expected and 
now the Chinese are coming up with proposals that they be the natural 
leaders of Asia, which in a sense is more logical. They are a particularly 
much bigger country in terms of population and if you look at the very 
long sweep ofhistory China has been the leader of Asia for most of it so 
you can kind of see where they're coming from, but that leaves the 
Japanese rather uncertain about how they fit into the picture and I think 
there's a lot of soul searching about that at the moment. And that's feeding 
through in this area of public diplomacy and how Japan can best project its 
culture and its image, particularly in the Asian region. But also how Japan 
can avoid being ignored by everyone else because they're only interested 
in China these days. 
Stories like these root perceptions of Japanese feeling in narrative. And while it may not 
be entirely useful to investigate to what degree narratives produce feeling and to what 
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degree feelings take form in narrative-given that the two are quite obviously mutually 
determined--keeping Dewey's model of the public in mind draws attention to the process 
by which affects, perceived within relationships of power, solidify into more semantically 
rich and pointedly perceived emotions in narrative. The way these perceptions informed 
the perspective of the British administrator are likely too multiple to trace completely, 
with influences coming in numerous forms: history classes, popular media, perceptions of 
race, everyday encounters in Japan. On an administrative level, though, this official can 
point to specific instances where such power imbalances become obvious, such as when 
Japan Foundation officials seek advice from the UK on program evaluation methods. 
And even without these everyday performances of power imbalances, the fact that the 
Japan Foundation appropriated the British Council as an organizational model permeates 
perceptions of contemporary relations between the two organizations. 
Such power imbalances, perceived sometimes more and sometimes less keenly, 
are heightened by the contemporary intensification of competitive power struggles 
between a China and Korea increasingly seen as "threats" (kyOi) as labeled by the story 
on Korea's manhwa exhibit. Contemporary public and cultural diplomacy within the 
Japan Foundation is structured in response to a keenly perceived urgency that seems to be 
lacking within the British Council. How this more ambiguous and pervasive sense of 
urgency is translated into more semantically structured narratives of self-reflection, 
understanding, and subsequently, administration and policy is the subject of the following 
chapter. 
----------------
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Chapter Four 
Managing Urgency in the Agency for Cultural Affairs 
"What Japan lacks is a coordinated effort to strategize its public diplomacy." This 
was offered to me by a high-ranking official in the Japan Foundation's Intellectual 
Exchange Division. It was a common theme running through public diplomacy debates 
in Japan. At an informal study group meeting of Japan Foundation and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs' officials, a woman posed the concern in the form of a question: "What 
can Japan do to organize officials from different ministries and politicians to build its soft 
power and current activities in cultural diplomacy?" In a class on international cultural 
relations I took from another Japan Foundation official, the problem was formulated in a 
similar way: "bureaucracies in Japan work primarily for their own interests and there is 
no coordination between them. Public diplomacy requires coordination between 
agencies." 
In different ways, Foucault and Dewey both described how discourses often 
emerge in response to specific urgencies. Foucault called these "problematizations"; 
Dewey called them "problems" (Rabinow 2003: 18-19). Around these emerge sets of 
collectivities, institutions, and rhetorical styles that order truth and falseness, significance 
and irrelevance, called "discourse" by Foucault and the "public" by Dewey. For a long 
time after my exposure, observation, and participation in the discourse of public 
diplomacy and soft power in Japan I simply could not follow along. Although I quickly 
became familiar with the language and "concerns" of Japanese public diplomacy, I could 
not sense the urgency that motivated it. This uncomfortable discord which I attributed to 
a particular cognitive deficit in my understanding of public diplomacy repeatedly 
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generated a simple question: why?! Why is it necessary to coordinate Japan's public 
diplomacy efforts across different bureaucracies? Why is it important to increase the 
number of Japanese speakers and exchange students to Japan? Why should Japan 
officials spread the news ofanime's popularity both domestically and abroad? After 
several months of fieldwork, though, I realized my confusion was not due to a lack of 
understanding but to a lack of feeling. 
For much of my fieldwork, I was disappointed at the simplicity of my question, 
"why?" Surely my training in anthropology should elicit far more critical of a research 
question than, "why this policy?" The question was entirely reactive. Sensitive to the 
affective moods accompanying my thought, I found these ones irksome. And I identified 
in them a certain affinity with the American diplomat who in similar irritation likened 
America and Japan's relationship to a husband and wife, however politically incorrect. I 
also identified in them an affmity with the Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy, 
Ron Post, and the director of the British Council in Japan, Jason James: a somewhat 
condescending perplexity at Japan's strategic investment in pop culture which manifests 
ultimately as a sentiment bordering on a chauvinistic indifference. Here were styles and 
affective investments in national affmity clashing: broad and abstract generalizations 
(stereotypes) of cultural difference imagined through national character and operating in 
the everyday. They were ubiquitous and strong enough to penetrate a decade of 
anthropological training in reflexivity and elicit from me the same irritating and 
condescending reaction that it did from my Western interlocutors: "What's the big deal? 
What are you Japanese bureaucrats so worried about?!" 
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Frustrated with encountering the same soft power narrative repeated over and 
over again in interviews with interlocutors, daily conversations with officials, and 
magazine and newspaper articles on public and cultural diplomacy, many of them written 
by these same officials, I tried a more direct and uncensored approach. Speaking with an 
official with whom I worked closely at the Japan Foundation about one of these articles I 
was recently reading, I asked: 
Why do we so seldom hear in these articles promoting Japan's cultural 
diplomacy the reason or justification for it? For example, the author here 
[pointing to the article] once again argues that while although the Japanese 
language is being increasingly taught around the world it is not enough. 
But he does not tell us why. My concern is that if there is no discussion 
over the justification for Japan's cultural diplomacy efforts then all the 
reader hears is a kind of empty nationalism, or even propaganda!" 
Although my questions did not always take this direct of an approach, they were most 
often motivated by this reaction that was somehow kindled in me over and over again. It 
was perhaps my desire to move beyond this form of evocation that most motivated the 
directness of my question. My colleague and friend who apparently understood much 
more of my perspective than I did ofhers gave an answer which cut to the root of my 
question. She later formulated this answer in writing: 
Indeed, culture could be a scary thing should it become a mere tool. 
Where to draw the line between using culture for the purpose of fostering 
peace and for gaining power for your own country over others is difficult. 
The recent popularity of Japanese pop culture emerged, for better or 
worse, not out of a desire to gain attraction overseas; rather, culture 
produced in local Japanese settings simply happened to become popular 
overseas. The idea that some people have since expressed that if Japanese 
pop culture is this popular we should use it for diplomacy as well is not a 
very deep one, in my personal opinion. Pop culture is ultimately only a 
virtual (biicharu) thing. I think it's important from there to deepen an 
interest about the real (riaru) Japanese culture and people. It's less about 
nationalism and more about security (sekyuritez). 
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It was this last line that jarred my senses. The notion of security spoke precisely to that 
sense of urgency motivating an interest in cultural diplomacy efforts. Interestingly, it 
also reminded me of John Ashcroft's bald statement that soft power was simply about 
cold calculated national security; however, I also assumed that my colleague's 
understanding of"security" was much deeper than that of Ashcroft's. Asking her to 
elaborate, she offered the following: 
I haven't studied the academic meaning of the word "security" (sekyuritei) 
but for me (jibun no naka de wa) one part of security (anzen hosho) is 
based on the people of other nations looking positively (or at least not 
having feelings of animosity) at the Japanese people and the nation called 
Japan (Nihon to iu kuni), which I think involves politics, economics, and 
the study of culture. So, the ultimate purpose of the Japan Foundation is 
to increase the number of people abroad who like Japan and the Japanese 
people. If we can use culture for the "utilization of peace" (heiwa riyo) 
then I think it's a good thing. I want to contribute to programs that use 
pop culture as an entry way (iriguchi) for people to take an interest in the 
real (riaru) Japan and Japanese people. 
Revealed in my colleague's statements, which, again, were conveyed to me in writing, 
suggesting that she took more time thinking and reflecting than she would in answering 
this question in person, is a sense of urgency slowed down, calmed through a process of 
thought, and expressed through the language of cultural diplomacy. Anxiety over the 
state ofthe national image, here, is expressed in terms of people liking Japan and mutual 
security and peace. My colleague's narrative serves to formalize the complexity of 
anxiety's affective makeup into something manageable. In this way affect becomes an 
object accessible and amenable to work, most specifically, the work of cultural 
administration and image management that can in turn alter and influence the original 
affective composition elicited when thinking through the register of the nation state. 
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If my colleague's description of soft power and cultural diplomacy as tools of 
peace and garnering affection differed from Ashcroft's "cool and calculated national 
security" (it hardly approaches, according to Yudice (2003: 65), Ashcroft's role in 
legalizing violations of immigrant and citizen rights and abridging the Freedom of 
Information Act, for example) it is also not entirely distinct from it. That is, to think 
through the lens of soft power is to think of the nation competitively and to admit that an 
official of the nation works not primarily for a common or public good but for the 
interests of his or her nation. Even though officials often stress that there can be "win 
win" solutions to soft power strategies, such a perspective concedes that the playing field 
of geopolitics is a fiercely competitive one, and some nations have clear advantages over 
others. This sentiment was noted by the Director of the Japan Foundation, Ogoura 
Kazuo: 
The concept of soft power is usually put forward by the party exercising 
the power and discussed from the perspective of that party ... While words 
like attraction and influence may appear "soft" to the party exercising the 
influence, those on the receiving end of the soft power often perceive 
elements of compulsion, threat or coercion. [2009: 43] 
With Joseph Nye and John Ashcroft headlining the Fulbright/CULCON conference on 
soft power, the imbalance of the power relationship between the two nations was 
palpable. However, the hope seemingly expressed by Japanese organizers was that any 
threatening elements of American soft power could be abated by the Japanese convincing 
John Ashcroft, the obvious star of the event, and the other Americans that Japan had 
enough cultural resources to legitimize its role as an equal partner in soft power, rather 
than as a victim of it. 
99 
The "power" (in Japanese, pawii) element of soft power is simultaneously that 
which inspires hope that Japan can achieve as much prestige as the U.S. or Britain as well 
as that which sustains the anxiety that Japan's future is indefinitely tied to nation states 
historically and presently far superior to it. A young Japanese official at the Japan 
Foundation, Tanaka-san, summarized this conundrum of Japan in a narrative that had 
been repeated to me a number of times (here, he offers his thoughts in English in an email 
which I edited slightly for fluency but maintained much of his punctuation and 
idiosyncrasies): 
If you look at the history of Japan, you realize that Japan has never created 
a system which enforces the common rule or built the common foundation 
for even regional countries to follow. It became more obvious and 
somewhat interesting to look at the contrast between Japan's rapid success 
after the Meiji Restoration and WWII, yet Japan has never enjoyed the 
status of hegemony. Japan developed so rapidly during/after the Meiji 
Restoration--1)upposedly more rapid than any other country in the world 
at the time. As you know the motto of Japan at the time was "Wealthy 
Nation and Strong Soldiers" [usually rendered in English as "rich country, 
strong army" fukoku kyohei] and Japan was so determined to go out of 
Asia and enter Europe, culturally, socially, economically, and even 
militarily. And they ( .... We??) did it. We so successfully adjusted many 
parts of society to mimic Western styles and even become so strong as to 
defeat Russia, which must have been the biggest astonishment for most of 
the Western countries as well as for Japanese themselves. Western 
countries must've thought, "Oh no, (yellow) monkeys defeated humans!" 
Again, after we lost the war, we determined one more time to rebuild our 
economy. This time, we pursued only economic development since we 
learned a very harsh lesson after the war, and people were somehow 
traumatized. And again, we successfully rebuilt our economy and became 
almost no 1. in the world. At that time, as you know, Japanese were called 
"Economic Animals," but at the same time, they were respected. Japan as 
No. 1 [Japan as Number One, Ezra Vogel, 1979] was the best seller at the 
time. Many Asian countries were also encouraged by Japan's success. 
But again, we were only trying to pursue economic development, 
according to the Western Capitalist System, and we never came up with 
our own creative idea to control the world. We have never taken the 
initiative to commit ourselves to international affairs, such as the Gulf War 
or the Iran-Iraq War, etc. You might think this is true for almost all non-
Western countries, and I do think you are right about it, to a certain extent 
that this free-market, capitalism system with democracy was somewhat 
very unique system created by the Western countries. And since it is so 
appealing, it is extremely hard for non-Western not to follow the same 
system or to create our own system. However, even in comparison with 
other emerging Asian countries, I think a significant difference is that 
those emerging countries commit themselves toward, at least, regional 
problems, but Japan still remains indifferent to them. 
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Tanaka-san's narrative is interspersed with sarcasm, however imperfect, acquired over an 
extended period of study at a university in the U.S. The humorous tone of phrases like 
"yellow monkeys" and a "creative idea to control the world" serve to distance himself 
from the narrative he offers. Tanaka's uncertainty over to what degree he identifies or 
not with the narrative he offers is further demonstrated in his statement, "And they 
( .... We??) did it [escaped from Asia]." He offers the statement parenthetically, as a 
graphic representation of a moment of self-reflection. 
Although Tanaka-san is unsure about his own relationship to the narrative he 
provides, that the narrative is the one he immediately appeals to and that it in so many 
ways resembles the narratives of other officials and authors thinking through 
contemporary national identity reveals the degree to which to even begin to think of one's 
relationship to the Japanese nation requires the body's capacity to feel an anxiety rooted 
in an unrealized desire to be, as Tanaka writes, "No. 1." Such affects both inject feeling 
into particular histories of the nation and are, in tum, evoked by their telling. Feeling in 
this way is a kind of understanding. And the fact that I could not understand the urgency 
underlying the discourse of cultural diplomacy in Japan was due to my inability not to 
conceive of it, but rather to feel it. 
Interesting about Tanaka-san's narrative is his reference to Vogel's Japan as 
Number One (1979), which he referred to as the "best seller of the time." In fact, Japan 
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as Number One is, today, still a top seller of books in Japan written by foreigners. 
Incidentally, Ruth Benedict's The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) is also at the top 
of the list. Vogel's book has achieved iconic status in Japanese culture, despite, as 
Edward Seidensticker laments in a review, having listed in its index not a single native 
informant (1980: 416), and the trope of"Japan as number one" has continued to serve as 
a vessel into which much hope and anxiety over Japan's international prestige has been 
invested. 
At an English training session for officials of Japan's International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA), equivalent to USAID or the UK Department for International 
Development, one official referenced the book in his practice biographical sketch which 
was expected to serve as a draft of the speech he would present to his counterparts in 
Bangladesh as part of his introduction. "My reason for becoming a civil servant is 
because I want to help make Japan number one," he said. Even granting that the 
official's English ability, like that of most officials taking JICA's training course, was 
limited, his reference to Vogel's book makes clear that to think of the nation state is to 
think of it in competition for prestige. Such expressions reveal the pervasiveness of the 
anxiety among national officials over Japan's slipping status. 
A similar narrative of urgency and soft power is found in the research on Japan's 
higher education conducted by Yonezawa Akiyoshi, professor at Tohoku University. 
Yonezawa describes Japan's contemporary political position as one of"crisis" (2008: 
54): 
Overall, Japanese education as a source of soft power is in crisis. 
Reflection on history and current conditions is indispensable to the 
development of a future vision. The report "Japan's 21st Century Vision" 
(Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy 2005) clarified the danger that 
------------------
Japan will be left behind in the process of globalization, and specified 
human resource development and education as priority areas for policy 
action [2008: 55] 
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Yonezawa exemplifies, quite conspicuously, how an anxiety over Japan being left behind 
by processes of globalization motivate strategic thinking of soft power in national policy. 
He is equally forthright in explaining precisely what countries serve as the prime 
motivators for Japan's soft power investment: 
Japanese academics and students are aware that they are not at the global 
center, and they feel the necessity to further internationalize Japanese 
higher education to improve linkages with the global community. In 
contrast to the U.S. example, the soft power of Japanese education in the 
domestic context and in the global context are clearly distinguishable. 
[55] 
In Yonezawa's explanation we find the reproduction of a familiar global model which 
posits the United States at the top and, below that, Japan, struggling to maintain its status 
at the top of Asian countries: "Japan is no longer the only Asian country that can be 
proud ofhigh academic achievement and technological advancement" (55). After 170 
years of internationalization it is still this perceived geopolitical order of Japan at the top 
of Asia, but threatened, that represents a source of anxiety. 
Although Japanese students may indeed admit to occupying less than the "global 
center" of education, it is more difficult to assert that they feel an urge to bolster 
education to "improve linkages with the global community," similar to how elites like 
Y onezawa feel. Average university students in Japan are far more concerned with their 
respective club activities or "circles" (sakuru) than they are with educational prestige. 
These keep students far busier than does their school work, which is minimal at most, 
seldom requiring students to read more than fifty pages a week (the average amount of 
reading in my MA program in international relations was about thirty pages). Fourth-
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year students typically reduce their club activities in preparation for shushoku katsudo 
(job hunting activities). University life in Japan, thus, is typically thought of as a much-
earned break from the demanding studies required to secure a spot at a top university and 
the grueling life of a company employee (shain) that follows. University students, thus, 
are faced with few invocations to think through national identity in the same register that 
bureaucrats and many academics do. It is primarily in adopting the role as a steward of 
the nation that one enters into it. 
As this particular register of national affinity characterizes the culture of the upper 
tiers of policy and administration, the history that sustains it is institutionalized in 
powerful bureaucracies in the position to effectively circulate such narratives to wider 
publics, most efficiently achieved through national education policy (the enduring 
revisionist history textbook issue an iconic representation of this) and the media, whose 
particular structure in the form of exclusive clubs attached to each government ministry 
(kisha kurabu) guarantees the faithful translation of policy into news. It is 
understandable, then, that Yonezawa would provide a narrative similar to Tanaka-san's in 
describing Japan's historical relationship with soft power. Beginning with Meiji, 
Yonezawa, like Tanaka-san, appeals to the idea offukoku kyohei ("rich country with a 
strong military," 56) as the primary policy guiding Japan's modernization project. He 
goes on to narrate three distinct periods of the historical relationship "linking education 
and the military, the economy, and soft power" (56). In the process he rewrites soft 
power, an altogether novel term, into Japanese history, showing how it transformed from 
a resource that first relied on military power (1868-1950), then was accumulated with 
economic development ( 1950-1980), and finally became employed as a tool for 
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transforming Japan into a postindustrial society (1980-2007) (56). In this reimagination 
ofhistory we see how anxious affects take a more sentimental (and semantically rich) 
form in narrative in response to a contemporary urgency imposed by perceived threats of 
globalization--perceivable only on account of an affective capacity to feel a gap between 
a nation imagined as a leading country in the world and a state that falls short in realizing 
it,18 a sentiment offered in the form of a warning with which Yonezawa concludes his 
discussion: "If the Japanese fail in their efforts to establish such educational 
environments [ones that ensure the well-being of citizens living both inside and outside 
of Japan], the soft power of Japan's educational institutions and therefore of Japanese 
society itself will face very challenging international circumstances in the not-too-distant 
future" (72). 
The Coding of Affect in Memory 
National histories like those provided by Tanaka and Yonezawa encode anxious 
affects in narratives that express explicit power imbalances between Japan and other 
Western nations. Present experience and historical narrative are thus mutually 
constructed with affect serving as the motivating principle guiding both the interpretation 
of experience and the construction of history. Images such as the one I showed in chapter 
3 of McArthur and Hirohito, discussions of the Japanese Constitution's Article 9 
prohibiting Japan from having a standing army often interpreted as a "castration" of 
Japan's national autonomy, or Joseph Nye's giant visage lecturing Japanese bureaucrats 
on soft power: all these scenes encode in bodies an anxious sense of an imbalance in 
power relations. Inversely, the repeated evocation of such narratives and images 
reactivate and entrench those affects. This pairing of anxious affect with stories 
18 Recall Gellner's distinction between nation and state discussed in chapter 2. 
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representing a power imbalance between Japan and other nations then serves as a formula 
through which to interpret future evocations of affects recognized as of a similar kind. 
Narrative and affect are mutually reinforced in their telling. 
Stories like Tanaka-san's that condense a modem history of Japan into a few 
paragraphs illustrating Japan's efforts to achieve a "number one" status in the world (the 
phrase itself coming, like soft power, from an American author in Ezra Vogel) are short, 
concise, and easily circulated. They were constantly repeated to me in discussions of soft 
power and U.S.-Japan relations. Such stories of Japan's loss of prestige are found across 
literature and history from World War II to today and their precedents can be easily 
found in every generation going back to the appearance of Commodore Perry's black 
ships in Edo Bay in the nineteenth century. Their prevalence today demonstrates the 
amazing strength by which anxiety over Japanese prestige is fixed to narratives of its 
relationship to Western nations. 
Even further, these anxious affects attached to comparisons of national prestige 
and power prime one's attention to recognize other similar stories. Anxiety, then, 
functions like a metal detector mining the resources of history in search of stories that 
confirm its relevance and prevalence today. This mode of historical reproduction is 
confirmed over and over again in the literature: from Maruyama's intellectual history 
(1974) to Dower's cultural history of Japan's defeat in World War II (1999) to the 
plethora of references idolizing the "Overcoming Modernity Symposium" (Calichman 
2008). The "Overcoming Modernity" thinkers did not succeed in their task to overcome 
that precise attachment of anxiety to perceptions of Western superiority on account of the 
failure to understand their relationship to the modem or to provide alternative modes of 
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thinking it, but because the conference itself became idolized as the iconic symbol of 
Japan's crisis of dependency on Western nations. As anxious affects still found their way 
into future experiences of contact between Japan and other, the conference became an 
inescapable precedent for even more stories into which such affects were made conscious 
enough to be formulated into an object of self-understanding and strategies of 
management, transformation, and therapy, however unsuccessful the latter of these 
proved. The soft power discourse necessarily invokes these stories in efforts to reimagine 
and reformulate Japanese prestige, this time along cultural lines. 
The Agency for Cultural Affairs and the 
Administrative Translation of Anxiety into Hope 
Although the trope of"Japan as a cultural nation" (bunka kokka) has circulated 
since Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, serving as an alternative national narrative 
through which to reconfigure national pride after its humiliation in the war, the 
accelerated economic growth of the 1970s and 80s largely replaced this image with one 
celebrating Japan as an economic giant: Vogel's Japan as Number One (1979). With the 
economy's collapse in 1989 and the subsequent stagnation of the 1990s, however, the 
image of bunka kokka slowly returned. But only with the introduction of "soft power" 
did there emerge a practical, administrative mechanism for turning anxiety into hope. 
Japan's Agency for Cultural Affairs (ACA) serves as a primary administrative site where 
Japan's economic and national urgencies are translated into policy aimed to boost Japan's 
cultural prestige and soft power. 
The notion of soft power has inspired the formation of a number of shingikai 
(working groups or advisory councils) within the ACA. These shingikai are made up of 
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government officials and various experts from the private sector. They are organized by 
all government ministries and are one of the many structural forms of Japanese 
bureaucracy that facilitate kanmin yuchaku, "the growing together of the public and 
private sectors" (McVeigh 1998: 91).19 Although shingikai are often promoted as 
government giving a voice to public concerns from a wide variety of social sectors, both 
its official and unofficial procedures most often produce a consensus adhering closely to 
ministry policies. It is, in general, a privilege to be invited to participate on such panels 
and rarely are overly critical opinions voiced. Moreover, as members are selected and 
invited through informal networks of social capital established by ministry officials, 
opinions tend to be rather uniform even before proceedings begin. Reports drafted in 
these councils, usually by ministry officials themselves, serve as evidence for careful 
deliberation and justification for the enactment of policy. As these meetings operate 
entirely outside parliamentary approval and expenditures do not appear in government 
budgets (McVeigh 1998: 91), they serve as a primary mechanism sustaining the often 
criticized but seldom reformed system through which bureaucrats rather than politicians 
are said to control Japan's government policy and administration. 
Over the course of fieldwork I attended several meetings of a number of different 
advisory councils of the Agency for Cultural Affairs. The agency is organized as a 
section of the Ministry of Education (MEXT) and is in charge of Japan's cultural policy, 
the administration of national museums and cultural and religious artifacts, arts 
education, and most importantly for Japan's content industry, copyright law. Key words 
19 The characters for kanmin ('§' ~) stand for "officials" and "people" respectively. In Japan the word 
public (kiikyo), as Hayashi explains (2003), most often refers to officials of state administration rather than 
in the traditional Habermasian sense (1989) in which the public stands for that which is precisely distinct 
from it. Yuchaku O.iUI), a medical term, means adhesion, healing up, or union (McVeigh 1998: 91). 
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like "soft power" and "cool Japan" can be heard throughout these meetings but the most 
common thread uniting the variety of these panels is the notion of Japan as a cultural 
nation (bunka kokka). The ideological framework in which Japan as a cultural nation is 
imagined is best revealed in a 2005 book Imitated Japan (Moho sareru nihon) by 
Hamano Yasuki, a professor in the graduate school of media studies at Japan's most 
prestigious academic institution, The University ofTokyo, and member (one as the 
deputy chairman [kaicho dairi]) of a number of these advisory councils. In his 
introduction, Hamano constructs a comparison between France and Japan, noting how in 
the past France was known as a cultural nation and Japan as an economic one. 
"However," he says, "in contrast to then, now in France it is common to hear one say, 
'cultural Japan, economic France"' (2005: 8). While in the past Japanese people 
embraced French fashion and brand name products, now, patters have changed: 
The value of Japanese animation has been rising among French people, 
shops focusing on Japanese manga and Japanese pop culture goods are 
growing in the Bastille area of Paris, and there are frequent events 
focusing on anime and manga. Moreover, there are many photographic 
journals focusing on Japanese youth street fashion being published. [8] 
Hamano goes on, just as other authors (cited in chapter 2) writing on Japan's new pop 
culture power do, to cite Douglas McGray and his evaluation of"Japan's Gross National 
Cool." He concludes the opening section to his introduction with another common 
reference, Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One (1979): 
Just like the time of Ezra Vogel's Japan as Number One that praised 
Japan's economy, Japanese people who are constantly having critique 
thrown at them from the outside have jumped at this essay by McGray. 
The axis of Japanese critique has all of the sudden changed from economy 
to culture, specifically to pop culture. [ 11] 
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Hamano' s account is simultaneously a reflection on and endorsement of those scripts 
through which national cultural identity is imagined. Although Japanese seem dependent 
on outside critique for understanding the state of the nation, he also introduces Vogel and 
McGray as authoritative accounts of it. The remainder of his book consists of short 
synopses on a variety of lifestyle trends, cultural traditions, and products of Japan that 
have been "imitated" (moho) by admiring foreigners. If in the past there was a certain 
anxiety coupled with the importation and imitation of foreign traditions by Japanese 
bureaucrats since the Meiji period (Westney 1987: 4), that anxiety is today transformed 
into pride in the fact that Japan is now the source of imitation. This script of Japan 
learning from the West and then in the late twentieth century becoming a model for other 
less developed nations has remained an incredibly resilient one in Japan's modernity. It 
is the lens through which Hamano constructs his theory of moho (imitation) and through 
which Japan's soft power is interpreted: if the United States was the original model of 
soft power's efficacy it is now Japan's turn. Formalizing this ideology in the form of the 
Fulbright/CULCON conference, discussed in chapter 2, is both an affmnation of this 
ideology and a strategy for inscription in institutions that sustain it. And while it is the 
institutions themselves--MOP A, ACA, the Japan Foundation-where researchers, 
including this one, look to analyze Japan's soft power investments, it is important to 
identify the affects of anxiety that inspired institutional change. 
Hamano's text provides an insight into the affective dimensions of bureaucratic 
reform. His reflection on the practice of incorporating foreign critique in the construction 
of Japanese character, a point rendered cliche by the number of academic works both 
inside and outside Japan making this same assessment, shows how the perception of 
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power imbalances motivates a hopeful desire for reconciliation, for Japan to regain what 
ground it lost since Vogel's proclamation of it as number one. This perception of a 
power imbalance, especially between the Japan and U.S., is poignantly felt. It seems 
always to reside just at the surface of consciousness, ready at any moment to burst into 
speech. 
The U.S. and the powerful affects its image elicits often appeared in 
administrative deliberation. In the ninth meeting of the cultural advisory panel on culture 
policy (Bunka shingikai bunka seisaku) within the ACA, at which Hamano-san was in 
attendance, the section meeting deputy chairman ( bukaicho dairi) opened the meeting 
asking members to look at the first reference document (shiryo) customarily provided at 
each meeting. It was a two-page printout from www.barackobama.com titled, "Barack 
Obama and Joe Biden: Champions for Arts and Culture" (2009) along with a two page 
translation into Japanese. The deputy chairman, Fukuzawa-san, introduced the policy 
summary as an example of how much energy the United States was putting into 
improving arts education. He followed this point by indicating that both China and 
Korea were also making enormous investments in cultural policy.20 Implicit in his 
comments was the view that if the U.S. was investing heavily in culture then so should 
Japan. Further, that China and Korea were making similar investments while Japan was 
not was seen as an embarrassment. It was this sentiment of embarrassment that had 
clearly pushed Fukuzawa-san to introduce Obama's policy statement into the council 
meeting. Later in the meeting, in response to Fukuzawa-san, Takahagi-san, the vice 
president of the Tokyo Metropolitan Art Space (Tokyo geijutsu gekijo) voiced a counter 
20 See again Kukhee Choo's work (2009) on the emergence of"Cool Japan" as in large part stimulated by 
South Korea's own investments in its culture industries. 
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perspective. He highlighted a specific passage in the policy summary: "The purpose of 
arts education is not to produce more artists, though that is a byproduct. The real purpose 
of arts education is to create complete human beings capable of leading successful and 
productive lives in a free society." Takahagi-san's comment is representative of someone 
not directly affiliated with bureaucracy but with arts promotion in the private and civil 
sector. Representative of this, the passage to which he drew the committee's attention 
was not a statement by the author of Obama' s policy position but a quote by the 
Chairman of the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts. Takahagi-san's statement was 
politely received but not discussed, and attention quickly turned to other members 
voicing other, separate opinions on the subject of the council: Japan's cultural policy. 
Takahagi-san's statement reveals the difference in motivation for Japan's 
investment in cultural policy between arts administrators and national administrators of 
the arts. While his own opinion seems clearly inspired by an understanding of art as a 
value in itself--art for art's sake--Fukuzawa-san's is focused first and foremost on the 
nation. The latter's investment is clearly motivated by affects generated within a 
bureaucratic register that demands a national imagining of Japan and a concern for its 
prosperity. And this register, especially in so much as it relates to Japan's soft power, 
proves repeatedly and seemingly unavoidably interlinked with the United States. 
This is how powerful affects of perceived power differences enter into 
administration. Affects, thus, pervade discourse, from policy discussions and decisions 
over cultural policy to the more intimate sites of bodies capable of being affected by 
perceived imbalances of global power relations. Affects inundate bureaucracy, policy, 
and consciousness. They are not separate spheres of social action in which affect 
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differently resides but spheres placed in a particular relation to one another by the nature 
of those affects. That this form of affect emergent with the register of imagining Japan 
not only pervades but also places in relation to each other bureaucracy, policy, 
consciousness, and even unconsciousness, is best exhibited by the closing remarks to the 
meeting. As is traditionally done at these meetings, the director of the Agency for 
Cultural Affairs, a rather ceremonial position recently given to individuals outside the 
agency itself, was solicited for some final thoughts. At the time of the meeting in January 
2009, the director was Aoki Tamotsu, a prominent cultural anthropologist. Aoki-san 
responded in his typically cheerful and informal manner by telling the council about a 
dream he had the previous night in which Obama appeared and offered his thoughts on 
Japanese culture. Affects stirred and sustained by perceptions of imbalanced power 
relations between the U.S. and Japan, subsequently inscribed in institutions of national 
cultural administration, seem to appear not only in policy but even, perhaps not 
surprisingly, in dreams.21 
Hamano's historicization of the shift in the image of Japan from an economic 
power, represented in Vogel's account, to a cultural power, represented in McGray's, 
points to an affective mechanism of social reproduction. As I mentioned earlier, the urge 
to see Japan at the top, as number one, or as a leader has emerged so often in Japan's 
modernity that accounts of it, whether in narratives of nihonjinron literature that promote 
it or in those of academic critique that deconstruct it are all but cliche. However, the fact 
that such an urge has persisted, taking so many various objects in history--Japan as 
economic leader, technological leader, even military leader for a period, and now as 
21 The affective energy surrounding Obama's rhetoric of hope has been described as a global phenomenon. 
Christine Yano's essay (Forthcoming) on its permutations in Japan is especially informative and relevant to 
my discussion here. 
113 
cultural leader--calls for a different kind of interpretation. That Japan's nationalism has 
been reproduced in superlatives indicates the power of narrative to shape sentiment. The 
discomfort ensuing from the perceived fall from the number one economic status of 
Japan in the 1970s and 80s, for example, is interpreted as a state of affairs reconcilable 
only by Japan's reclamation of that status in a separate field. Its inability to do so, then, 
is productive of an anxiety among those most obliged to care for Japan's future: its 
bureaucrats. 
I want to suggest that the seemingly unchanged desire to be number one 
represents not some immutable Japanese cultural disposition but, rather, the way that 
anxious affects have been built into national organizations, institutions, and modes of 
administration and become subsequently attached to nationalist narratives. The 
construction of the soft power discourse and its inscription in these organizational 
structures demonstrates this. As Ngai reminds us by way of alluding to Ernst Bloch's 
description of "expectant emotions," feelings like anxiety "aim less at some specific 
object as the fetish of their desire than at the configuration of the world in general, or 
(what amounts to the same thing) at the future disposition of the self' (2005: 210). He 
says that expectant feelings have an "incomparable greater anticipatory character" than 
other feelings (Ngai 2005: 210). Anxiety is one of these. So is hope. And it is the 
pairing of these that so characterizes the affective dimensions of the soft power discourse. 
As they propel one's thought further and more deeply into the future, anxious and 
hopeful affects become entangled in a numerous array of plans, organizations, and 
structures that impose strictures on one's mood in the present. It is the job of policy 
makers more so than others to plan, organize, and guarantee the security and feasibility of 
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this future. If affects of anxiety become inscribed in this future that by the very means of 
its planning imposes upon and constructs the character of the present, then those subjects 
who occupy that present are increasingly invested in its success. In other words, they are 
hopeful. In the event of the future's failure or collapse, such affects are neither easily nor 
completely disentangled from the present and the subjects who imagine themselves as 
belonging to it. 
Emotions are more dependent on precise objects than are affects. Emotions 
attach where affects entangle. Thus, affects which solidify into emotional attachments, 
such as pride in Japan's economic prestige, should that prestige be destroyed, they can 
easily and quickly re-solidify into pride for something else, say, Japan's cultural prestige. 
Although emotions might be quickly dissolved, affects are not, on account of their 
entanglement in so many structures of both daily and, especially for national bureaucrats, 
administrative life. My suggestion is that anxiety as an affect that is constructed in a 
Japanese modernity modeled on the West is repeatedly built into administrative practices 
of bureaucratic organizations that parallel those of the West. This is the social 
reproduction of affect in Japanese national administration. That a kind of anxiety 
produced both emotions of pride in the Japanese economy in the 1980s and a pride in 
cultural prestige ,in the 2000s suggests this action of administrative inscription. Such an 
anxiety is not rooted in an unchanging "culture" pervasive to Japanese society at large, as 
Ivy suggests (1996), but rather is reproduced in structures of administration that employ 
the term "Japanese culture" as a discursive tool of politics. The size and complexity of 
bureaucratic organization in which anxiety is inscribed makes it difficult to disentangle. 
Such anxiety may extend into those sites of the everyday that bureaucracy touches, as I 
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discuss in chapter 8, but it need not, and there are plenty of sites where the everyday 
proves to contest and overcome such nationally constructed forms of sentiment (see 
Condry's study of hip-hop 2006). 
The Agency for Cultural Affairs' shingikai represent just one mechanism for 
inscribing hope for Japan's future as a cultural nation into a number of organizational 
structures in the present. Anxiety over its possible failures, also secured in memories and 
histories of Japan's past failures, motivates this process and even utilizes those memories 
in formulating strategies and mechanisms for hope's realization, for soft power's 
realization. One important advisory council (shingikai), or called in this case a 
"roundtable" (kondankai), that does this is the Roundtable for the Transmission of 
Japanese Culture (Bunka hasshin senryaku ni kan suru kondankaz). While McGray's 
article opened the eyes of Japanese bureaucrats to how much presence Japanese media 
commodities had established overseas, Joseph Nye's theory indicated a gap between 
cultural presence and soft power: cultural resources, though they may contribute to soft 
power, are not synonymous with it (Nye 2004: 11 ). Thus, while the popularity of anime, 
manga, and video games abroad are enough to stimulate hope for cultivating Japanese 
power among top level bureaucrats and politicians, the much more difficult process of 
translating resources into actual power falls to the adininistrators within government 
ministries. The Roundtable for the Transmission of Japanese Culture, thus, employs the 
term "cultural transmission" (bunka hasshin) as a way to facilitate a particular kind of 
cultural exchange that should lead not only to the increase of Japanese presence abroad 
but also to the translation of that presence into soft power. It is in this process of 
strategizing and policy making in roundtables like these where those affects of anxiety 
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are made into hopeful policy, and where hope for the future becomes institutionalized in 
the present. 
The Midterm Summary ( Chukan matome) for the roundtable on transmitting 
Japanese culture lists strategies and suggestions for ways to improve Japan's cultural 
transmission. The purpose for this as outlined in the report situates the translation of 
presence to power in terms of"intemational cultural relations" (kokusai bunka koryu) and 
"cooperation" (kyoryoku): 
With the advance of globalization, the charm (miryoku)22 ofvarious forms 
of Japanese culture, from the traditional to the modem, are being 
transmitted and the deepening of understanding between Japan and foreign 
countries is being strongly sought after. Further, the achievement of this 
depends on the promotion of all of Japan's cultural arts. Under these 
conditions in which Japanese culture on a whole and in various fields has 
achieved this present status, there is a need to construct a mechanism for 
the culture's effective transmission. Toward this purpose we establish this 
roundtable of experts to clarify the state of contemporary Japanese culture 
and provide a general investigation into the strategies for cultural 
transmission through Japanese international cultural relations and 
cooperation. [Agency for Cultural Affairs 2009: 6] 
The "aim" (shushi) of the roundtable recognizes the "charm" (miryoku) of Japanese 
popular culture abroad and seeks ways to construct a "mechanism" or "framework" 
(shikumi) for its transmission (hasshin). It aims to do this by way of thirteen different 
recommendations, which I paraphrase below: 
1. Create a plan to meet the interests that other countries, beginning with 
Asia, have in various fields of Japanese culture, especially in regard to 
new media arts like manga, anime, and games. 
2. Utilize the network of foreign organizations such as overseas 
consulates, Japan Foundation Offices, and the Japan National Tourism 
Organization to introduce various aspects of Japan's cultural arts. 
22 Miryoku (charm) is written with the characters mi (it), meaning "charm," and ryoku (fJ), meaning 
power. 
3. Utilize overseas broadcasting, the internet and other media sources in 
order to raise the level of interest of foreign people (learners of Japanese 
language, former exchange students and those desiring to conduct 
exchanges, and related individuals) already interested in Japan. 
4. Establish a system to recognize the efforts and achievements of foreign 
people working toward the introduction and exchange of Japanese cultural 
arts abroad. 
5. Promote the translation ofwebsites, Japanese literature, and other 
prestigious artworks, making these available to people through many 
different languages. Promote contemporary Japanese arts by offering 
explanations of lectures and exhibitions through programs and catalogues 
in multiple languages. 
6. Establish and promote international festivals and meetings featuring 
Japanese art. 
7. Build and support student exchange programs with the aim of 
producing a future group of people who understand the value of Japanese 
culture through establishing programs and cultural establishments for 
exchange students, providing volunteers to offer Japanese language 
education in different regions, build model plans for travel, and establish 
various consortiums and venues for cultural exchange. 
8. Establish educational programs and opportunities for arts education in 
order to raise the awareness among Japanese people of the value of their 
own Japanese culture, creating so called "Japanese cultural ambassadors" 
out of each citizen (kokumin hitori hitori ga iwaba 'nihon bunka taishi' no 
yakuwari o hataseru yo). 
9. Establish information bases for the transmission of Japanese culture 
such as national art centers, museums, and theaters. Also, investigate the 
establishment of facilities that can collect, preserve, and sponsor general 
information on our country's manga, anime, games, and other new media 
arts. 
10. Support high level Japanese education for the purposes of deepening 
understanding of Japanese culture through the development of researchers 
and experts of Japan. 
11. Encourage the creation of so called "creative cultural arts cities" 
(bunka geijutsu sozo toshi) in order to cultivate the creativity of artists 
contributing to creative industries such as design and film. 
12. Promote the establishment of heritage sites that preserve Japan's 
traditional culture and towns, as cultural assets are a source of Japan's 
cultural arts and fascinate many foreign visitors. Promote the passage of 
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the Law for the Preservation and Maintenance of Historical Sites of Scenic 
Beauty. 
13. Improve the association between institutions and collaborate between 
the Agency for Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Japan Foundation, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism, and other related ministries and offices in order to build the 
effectiveness of Japan's cultural transmission. [2-5] 
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Out of each of these strategies have emerged various programs and projects which have 
or are beginning to institutionalize both the ideology of "culture as resource" under the 
narrative of soft power and the affects of national anxiety and prestige that sustain it. 
Many of these programs are designed and executed by the Japan Foundation, 
where I conducted an internship, and I discuss these in chapter 6. However, what is most 
important to recognize in these strategies, and in cultural administration in general, is a 
tension between integration and departmentalization, also clearly exhibited in the last of 
the roundtable's strategy points. Bureaucracy, as Weber first articulated, is dependent 
upon the division and distribution of responsibilities. One consequence of this is a 
particular protectionism among bureaucrats for their respective agencies. Inter-
administrative battles are typical. They compete for funding, for maintaining positions 
and jobs, and for prestige in general. Bureaucrats identify with their agency, which 
produces images, feelings, talk, and stereotypes of the character of different 
organizations-the somusho (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) the 
arrogant elites with the most money and power; the keisansho (Ministry of Economy 
Trade and Industry) full of University of Tokyo number crunchers. The capacity for this 
identification and consequential name-calling requires a particular in-group 
organizational ethos. Built into this ethos is an ethics of administration composed of a 
practical and organizing telos. Put simply, administrators in different agencies work 
----------------------------------
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toward the realization of different ends. While members of METI are focused on 
rejuvenating Japan's industries, the Japan Foundation is working to build mutual 
understanding between publics of different nations. This is different from MOF A whose 
officials are concerned about security and the smooth implementation of foreign policy 
and the exercises in diplomacy that accompany it. This is different still from the ACA 
whose job it is to cultivate artists, provide for the arts education of Japanese citizens, and 
maintain artistic facilities and treasures of the nation. The aims of each organization, the 
strategies, technologies, and methods it uses to meet these aims, and the general everyday 
ethos that arises from this are distinct from one agency to the next. Yet the rhetoric of 
soft power and Cool Japan can be found in each of these agencies. As I noted earlier, the 
ambiguity and breadth of soft power theory allows for multiple interpretations. It is 
consequently able to sustain a variety of ethical investments from each of these 
organizations, even those most contradictory (I examine one of these programs that 
seems to embody such contradictions in chapter 7). 
Despite this division of interests, often promoted in political theory as a benefit to 
democracy as it provides for a multiplicity of opinions and a system of checks and 
balances on a potential monopoly of them, there are constant calls among administrators 
from many agencies to establish a mechanism for the integration and collaboration of 
these bodies, as called for in recommendation thirteen above. Administrators from both 
the Japan Foundation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have even suggested to me the 
possibility of creating a separate, overarching body to collaborate with different agencies. 
What emerges from this is a contested discourse of soft power into which many different 
bodies struggle for determining the ethics of the political uses of culture. Soft power, 
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though it reveals itself as an ideology capable of organizing a diverse field of interests 
and organizations not previously imagined in relation to one another, is also an open 
field. Its meaning is not precisely defined, although it is still productive of a variety of 
programs and policies. This is what makes soft power such a rich and timely object of 
study today as it proves to hold within it extraordinary potential to imagine Japan's future 
in a way that inspires a wide variety of institutional changes in the present. Such change, 
especially in a bureaucratic field as resistant to it as is Japan's, requires powerful affects 
to realize. Further, it is precisely at this moment of change when those affects are 
inscribed in institutions that facilitate their integration into numerous facets of 
administrative and daily life. It is in this process of institutionalization that new 
assemblages of ideas, rhetorics, and organizations acquire durability and temporal 
longevity, approaching the status of an institutional apparatus that has the potential to 
determine the meaning and uses of culture in rigid and inextricable ways. Whether this in 
fact happens or not is unknowable, but the emergent connections between politics, art, 
consumption, and power that soft power is generating makes the contemporary a period 
of both significant interest and consequence for thinking through possible futures. 
The National Media Arts Center and Soft Power Objections 
One new ACA program that drew particular attention as well as criticism, largely 
due to the enormous budget it called for (roughly 11.7 billion yen or 120 million USD), 
was the establishment of a national media arts center (Kokuritsu media geijutsu so go 
sentii). After receiving significant support from officials in MOF A and the ACA and 
especially strong support from then Prime Minister Aso Taro, who served from 
September 2008 to September 2009 and is known for his love of manga, plans for the 
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center were entrusted to the Committee for the Preparation of Establishing the National 
Media Arts Center (Kokuritsu media geijutsu sogo sentii yakuritsu junbi iinkai). This 
comparatively large committee, made up of fourteen permanent members and additional 
five to six temporary members and advisors that rotated with each meeting, included 
ACA officials, academics, arts administrators, industry, and a number of prominent 
figures in film, manga, anime, and video games. 
The committee was headed by the same Hamano Y asuki whose book, Imitated 
Japan, I cited above. As the chairman of the committee and as one who serves as the 
default mediator for the meetings, Hamano-san commands significant influence on the 
direction of the proceedings. At the third meeting of the committee, held at MEXT's 
headquarters in Kasumigaseki (the site of Japan's primary government ministries), 
Hamano-san took a rather strong stance on the Center which had been receiving criticism 
from DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan) lawmakers intent on claiming power from the 
LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), which they in fact did in August 2009: "The 
international competition is severe (hageshii), so we have to do something now! Why is 
there a manga museum in Korea and not in Japan?" The heightened emotional tenor of 
Hamano-san's plea was atypical for the generally mild-mannered mood of these 
proceedings. There was little dissent from the committee. 
As I mentioned earlier, the proceedings at advisory councils facilitate consensus. 
And although this committee was designed under the assumption that the Center would, 
indeed, be built, it invited a different set of"experts" from various fields each week to 
voice what opinions, whether supportive or critical, they might have. Such consensus is 
facilitated by a number of factors. Besides the fact that many members are chosen 
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through informal networks of social capital that all but guarantee a similarity of opinion 
from the start, the structure, setting, and mood of the proceedings further facilitate 
consensus. There are many different settings and rooms in which advisory panels take 
place. And through the architecture and design of the rooms some evoke a sense of 
central power and authority more so than others. In fact, many government offices, even 
in the highest sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, strike the visitor as rather plain, 
drab, and mundane, hardly evocative of the kind of dignified regality that one might 
imagine of such institutions. However, the room at which the third meeting of the Media 
Center committee took place was of the more formal and imposing kind. Let me draw a 
picture of this rather typical advisory council meeting. 
Advisory Panel: Setting the Scene 
The room was large and rectangular with dark wood walls and bright fluorescent 
rather than soft lighting. The carpet was light gray with a simple but elegant print and the 
long rectangular table a dark mahogany, in color at least. The chairs were leather and 
large, the back tall enough to support the head of most members, even extending above it 
for some others. As I entered the door I was greeted quietly by two young women and 
one young man who marked my name, handed me a large packet of materials for the 
meeting's proceedings, and directed me to a row of seats at the far end of the rectangular 
room. On one long side of the rectangular table, farthest from the door through which I 
entered, sat eight specialists from different fields of media arts. Opposite them were five 
officials from the ACA. Hamano-san, the chairman, and the deputy chairman sat at the 
head of the table. Advisors invited to give their opinions to the committee that day sat on 
the row next to ACA officials, at the end of the table opposite the Chairman and closest 
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to the rows of seats made available to observers like myself. Behind the main table was a 
second row of tables in au-shape where other officials and support staff of the ACA sat. 
As a few of the invited specialists entered the room there was a quiet but formal 
exchange of meishi (business cards) with each of the members of the committee. One 
never fails to bring at the very least twenty-some cards to these meetings, enough to 
cover exchanges with the entire committee. At 3:00 PM not all of the members had yet 
arrived. Those present say quietly, many of them their hands folded rather formally on 
the table. One member, a representative from NHK, Japan's public broadcaster, was 
working on a palm pilot. An older gentleman in a black apron wheeled a cart of coffee 
into the room. He placed the decorated paper cups (sometimes these are ceramic) along 
with sugar and cream in front of each member, next to the bottle of water and glass which 
had been placed on the table prior to the meeting. 
At 3:05 the last invited advisor arrived along with a couple of officials from the 
ACA. Apologies were offered and the meeting began. A male official read a summary 
of the previous meeting. A separate assistant, a woman, read a summary of the current 
meeting and confirmed that everyone had all of the materials provided in the packet of 
information. Hamano-san then offered some updates on the development of the Center. 
He introduced the three invited advisors, each of which took ten to fifteen minutes to 
present their thoughts and the materials they had prepared in advance. After each 
speaker, Hamano-san offered some further comments and after all presenters had fmished 
Hamano-san then solicited opinions from other members of the committee. 
The exchanges at such meetings are formal and polite. Even though the room is 
not necessarily large enough to require the use of microphones, they are, in fact, used. 
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One is placed in front of each of the members. When one speaks he or she pushes a 
button on the stand of the microphone to activate it. A red light appears on the side of the 
stand facing out, indicating not only which microphone is activated but the person who 
has the informal authority to speak. This facilitates more formal statements of opinions 
rather than informal and conversational exchanges and debate. Members will usually 
offer a number of different opinion points rather than respond to those of others, 
suggesting that many came prepared with ideas to offer. Each member is given a chance 
to speak and given the infrequency of the meetings, about one a month, it is clear that 
participants feel the urge to be heard at least once. 
This format produces little contest and critique, as it would appear to delay the 
formal deliberation of the meeting and the implicit consensus that everyone's opinion be 
heard. Hamano-san, as the Chairman, is the most informal of the group, intetjecting his 
opinions and thoughts more frequently and spontaneously than others. His presence at 
the meeting, the formality of the deliberation, and the not unimpressive stateliness of the 
room is not overbearing but is certainly imposing enough to make the invited speakers 
hesitate at voicing overly critical opinions. 
Perhaps the most relatively critical of the opinions I heard voiced at these 
meetings came from a professor specializing in cinema at one of Japan's national 
universities whom I call Kobayashi-san. Although he struck a rather detached and 
academic tone with his comments, he offered what might be described as a more global, 
cosmopolitan perspective on the Center which contrasted with Hamano's more nationalist 
one. Speaking from an academic perspective, he offered ideas on how the Center could 
be used to facilitate research. Central to his presentation was the idea that it be used less 
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for the "pursuit of profit" (rijun tsuikyU) and more for education and research, creating an 
"international public cultural asset" (kokusai teki na kokyo teki bunkazai). Although 
supportive of the Center, the tone Kobayashi-san struck was implicitly counter-
nationalist. The ethos of creating something for an internationally-imagined and 
organized public, though not entirely unvoiced, especially not in circles of public 
diplomacy focused more on educational exchange, such as at the Japan Foundation, was 
rather novel to the committee. In a later online conversation, Kobayashi-san confirmed 
the lack of publicity for this perspective, saying that such "ideas are almost completely 
absent on Japanese websites and blogs, perhaps all 704,000 sites I hit on Google." 
As Kobayashi-san was much more critical of the project in confidence than he 
was in the public hearings, I asked later for his opinion on how the dynamics of the 
meeting might have affected him: 
The structure of the meeting frustrated me. That the regular members gave 
each of their opinions by turns after the presenters' speeches was very 
automatic. Only one member referred to my talk. And, because this was a 
critique of me, I wanted to make a counter-argument to him, but the Chair 
did not give me a chance to refute. 
Overall, when I gave a speech, I tried to avoid overt criticism because the 
most important thing is to make them accept and reflect on my ideas on 
their actual plan, and criticism, I thought, would hamper this purpose. In 
this sense, I might have been under some kind of pressure. Also, I was a 
little bit nervous and was under the pressure of the limited time, and if I 
had not, I could have offered clearer and more persuasive statements. 
Kobayashi-san's comments during the hearing, indeed, avoided criticism. He was polite, 
congenial, and deferential to the Chair. However, when I gave him an opportunity to be 
more critical of the meeting, asking what he thought motivated the administrators at the 
meeting, he quickly opened up: 
I think the strongest motive for this project has been the bureaucrats' 
desire to demonstrate their presence as significant among the national 
governmental administrations. For the committee members from industry, 
possibly the economic benefit is the most powerful driving force. For the 
rest of the members, nationalism is the rationale to accomplish their plan, 
while they might also have certain practical purposes (like preserving 
deteriorating materials). To some extent, I understand it is natural that they 
are all trying to appeal to nationalism because they have to convince the 
taxpayers to invest money in their project. But if they only consider their 
own benefits and the ones of the nation, I think the prospective center 
would not be useful for researchers, educators, and general users over the 
world. I would like the committee members and bureaucrats to elaborate 
on how they can practically serve the users well, rather than how they will 
raise Japan's presence and economic effects. But in the hearing I attended, 
I got an impression that they spent most of the given time for confirming 
how excellent Japanese products were. 
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Kobayashi-san's comments reveal his rather stark division between himself and fellow 
researchers on one hand and the "bureaucrats" or "administrators" on the other. He 
defined this distinction most overtly through a particular relationship to nationalism. 
Although I have been met with a diversity of opinions from administrators, sometimes 
from the same individual, I admit sharing in Kobayashi-san's framework of thinking, 
despite my efforts to represent my interlocutors in ways that respected their individual, 
individuated, and nuanced perspectives. 
This division between a more nationalist and more cosmopolitan ethos is easy 
enough to identify in rhetoric. Hamano's reference to the Korean manga museum and 
Kobayashi's to public cultural assets in the committee hearing are two simple examples. 
And in a kind of Bourdieusian sociological scatter, one could very likely plot these 
distinctive relationships to the nation in space by means of a number of different 
variables: generation, occupation, education, family, etc; though, on the other hand, 
Hamano and Kobayashi, both researchers at national universities and members of a 
similar generation, might likely occupy rather similar positions in this scatter. 
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Nonetheless, what seems most immediate, most tangible, and most striking about these 
differences is not how they are constructed sociologically, rhetorically, or otherwise 
categorically, but the kinds of feelings they evoke. 
In many of my interviews when listening to articulations of soft power and public 
diplomacy I sensed in myself a feeling of unease and discomfort, even a low level of 
disgust. Many of these interlocutors' arguments were well-articulated, well-argued, 
complex and convincing. And pressed into a comer where I had to make my own 
decisions about public diplomacy, my conclusions might not differ incredibly from those 
of my more "nationalistic" bureaucratic informants. Asked to explain this feeling, or 
justify why I thought the opinions of some interlocutors were unjustifiably nationalistic 
and mine more commendably not, I know I would struggle for an answer. 
This sense of frustration at the difficulty of finding rational interpretations for the 
feelings of national sentiment is common. It is beautifully captured by Richard Handler's 
work (1988) on Quebecois national identity, an incredibly skillful anthropological 
analysis of nationalism that still encounters frustrating moments. At one point in the 
work Handler asks his informant what makes him Quebecois and by what criteria in 
general one could call oneself Quebecois. His informant responds with the statement that 
Quebecois identity is not a rational thing, it is more a matter of feeling (32). This 
moment in dialogue, where words reach their impasse, is significant. Its importance 
inspires Kathleen Stewart's work on affects I introduced in chapter 1. Her 
problematization posed more simply, is, what do we do at the outer limits of narration? 
Despite his interpretive acuity, Handler too is stumped here. How does an interviewer 
proceed after a reflective informant responds defensively and impassionedly with, "I 
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don't know! It's just something you feel!" Handler does proceed though. He must. And 
he does so in a semiotic, interpretive framework, describing his informant's national 
ideology as a "relationship to local territory and a style· of living or code of conduct." 
What is clear in this exchange, though, is that sentiment is neither reducible nor 
equivalent to code. Should one ever be able to encode the entire matrix of a personal 
history, which necessarily extends far beyond a single individual, into a formula that 
accurately predicts an emotional response, the code itself would not be a satisfying 
explanation of frustration, anxiety, or pride. This is not a matter of simply choosing 
between an interpretive or phenomenological approach, but of seeking a way to 
understand how they relate to each other under different cultural configurations. The 
affect-emotion gap might be one way of formalizing this problem conceptually. 
So far in this chapter I have shown where anxious reactions to power imbalances 
are translated into policy, in this final section I want to show where it manifests more 
explicitly in subjects. 
Hopeful Embodiments of Japanese Soft Power 
In 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized and participated in a number of 
events showcasing Japan's new pop culture. One of these took place in Rome, attended 
by several high ranking members of Japan's and Italy's Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
including Japan's Prime Minister to be, Aso Taro. It was an extravagant affair, hosted 
near the Basilica di San Bartolomeo all 'Isola on Tiber Island. There were speeches by 
officials from the respective countries, dance performances by a Japanese pop group, 
cosplay displays from Italian fans of Japanese culture, and presentations of the kawaii 
taishi (cute ambassadors, see chapters 6 and 7). Amateur film was taken of the event and 
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included interviews with some of the attendees at the event's reception. Here I provide a 
transcript from one portion of an interview conducted informally at the event (in 
English). Pay attention to the way the Japanese Interviewer (JI) directs his interviewees 
to confirm his presumptions about the increasing presence of Japanese pop culture 
abroad: 
Japanese Interviewer (JI): "What do you think ofthis event, first of all?" 
Italian Woman (IWl): "Wonderful collaboration between two cultures." 
Italian Woman 2: "Nice to introduce sake to Italians. And different types 
of food, not only sushi." 
JI: "Do you like sake? 
IW2: "Yes, love it!" 
JI: "Drink often?" 
IW2: "Only in Japan." 
JI: "Oh, you've been to Japan?" 
IW2: "Yes, many times." 
JI: "So you speak Japanese, sukoshi (a little?)" 
IW2: "Sukoshi." 
JI: "And what do you think about the new Japanese culture, not old ones 
but new tendencies: the animation, the fashion?" 
IWl: "The animation is fun; the fashion is fun" (in a concessionary tone). 
IW2: "I think they should show more." 
IW 1 : "Yes, like introduce new designers." 
IW2: "And it's nice to see these new movies, the new animation. It used 
to be that people only knew Ozu and Kurosawa, and that was it and ... " 
(interrupted by JI). 
JI: "And do you think there's a lot of presence of Japanese new culture in 
Italy?" 
IW2: "No, not at all." 
JI: "Not enough." 
IW2: ''Not at all!" 
JI: "Naturale?" ("Of course?" in heavily accented Italian). 
IW2: "I don't think there's a lot of new culture. As far as it goes it's 
sushi. And at a restaurant maybe some sake." 
IWl: "But animation. It's popular. More so than U.S. movies." 
JI: "And do you like Japanese food?" 
IWl: "Love it." 
JI: "You love it! (laughing excitedly) And do you cook sushi?" 
IWl: "No, just eat." 
In conversations like this, one sees a kind of stifling of communication. The 
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interviewer's aims and relationship to his interviewees is clear. He attempts to elicit 
responses that confirm what has become two conventionalized tenets and tropes of 
Japan's cultural diplomacy push: first, the belief that affection for Japanese pop culture is 
growing abroad; and second, that the Japanese government should do more to facilitate 
its continued growth. Toward a confirmation of the first, he attempts to ftnd out what 
kinds of Japanese things the women consume. It turns out that sake is one of them and he 
follows up on it. Later he asks if they like Japanese food. One woman answers 
affirmatively and animatedly, "Yes." Building offher energy and adding to it his own 
boost of intensity upon confirming his hope, he exclaims "You love it!" 
Toward confirming the second tenet, that others are open and in need of 
introductions to new elements of Japanese culture, he asks unabashedly, "And do you 
think there's a lot of presence of Japanese new culture in Italy?" She responds, "No, not 
at all." Not hearing her precisely he assumes the answer he is obviously looking for: 
"Not enough." She corrects him with, "Not at all!" The Italian women represent what is 
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often expressed by fans of various things increasingly labeled "Japanese": simply put, 
they are fans of some things and not others. These women like sake and sushi, less so the 
fashion and anime. Food and anime do not, for them, signify in equal amounts the 
attraction of a charming foreign culture. They are more discerning. They express an 
attraction for certain commodities that evoke Japan to the degree that it represents 
cosmopolitan, high-class tastes and sensibilities in Italy. Anime is less attractive on this 
point. The interviewer is clearly thinking not as a consumer but as an administrator, as 
one who by thinking of sushi, sake, fashion, and anime as equal embodiments of a 
Japanese brand can measure the penetration of that image into Italy and the degree to 
which it garners affection for Japan by Italians: "You love it!" 
Perhaps there is no better representative of how cultural anxiety and soft power 
hope become embodied sentiments than the individual Sakurai Takamasa, advisor to 
MOF A on anime diplomacy. Sakurai has been sent abroad as an informal ambassador of 
Japanese anime through programs organized jointly between MOFA and the Japan 
Foundation. At events at cultural expos and Japanese embassies overseas, he often 
presents a PowerPoint presentation titled, "The Secret of Japanese Anime's Power" 
(Nihon anime no pawa no himitsu). The title is hardly original but expresses a sentiment 
widely circulated since the early 2000s, most deliberately represented in the title to 
Nobuyuki Tsugata's 2004 work, Nihon animeshon no chikara (The Power of Japan's 
Animation), but also seen in a number of works celebrating the potential of Japan's new 
pop culture industries (Koyama 2004; Hamano 2005; Nakamura and Onouchi 2006; 
Sugiyama 2006; Shima 2009; Sakurai 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b). Sakurai has offered 
this presentation in a number of cities, the most recent one being in Sao Paulo Brazil ("0 
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Segredo do Poder do Anime ''). His second slide to his PowerPoint presentation, with the 
English title "Japan is Cool!," proclaims, "Japanese anime is being warmly embraced by 
young people all over the world" ( 0 anime japones e calorosamente apoiado pelos 
}ovens do mundo todo). Sakurai then proceeds to present statistics representing anime's 
global popularity, measured in the number of people attending major anime and Japanese 
pop culture expos in Italy, France, Spain, and the US. He shows pictures of these events, 
mostly of the young attendees and fans of pop culture, often dressed in cosplay as their 
favorite anime or manga character. He goes on to list the most popular anime across the 
world and explain a bit about the process of anime production. He also presents some 
notable characteristics of Japanese anime: "diversification," "the portrayal of actual 
Japanese fashion, culture, and society," and its "ability to spread via the internet." 
Sakurai's presentation reads more like a celebration ofanime's popularity around 
the world than as an introduction to anime culture. The content seems even more 
curiously out of place when considering the audience to whom he is speaking, composed 
overwhelmingly of anime and manga fans. From the perspective of a soft power strategy, 
Sakurai is addressing the wrong people. His enthusiasm for anime's global appeal clearly 
motivates his work, demonstrated best in two of his books, Anime Diplomacy (Anime 
bunka gaiko) and The Global Cute Revolution (Sekai kawaii kakumei). Sakurai is also 
often quoted expressing his disappointment at how little Japanese people understand of 
anime's global appeal: 
Most Japanese people do not know about the popularity of Japanese pop 
culture overseas. Many young people in other countries grow up with 
Japan's anime. For instance, there is a bookstore near Lac Leman in 
Geneva that has about 11,000 Japanese comic books. You don't see a lot 
ofbookstores with 11,000 comics, even in Japan! ["Anime Makes Japan 
Superpower" 2010] 
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In this light, Sakurai's anime diplomacy seems as much a practice to confirm Japan's 
appeal overseas than it is a program to cultivate it. In one especially telling segment of 
this presentation, Sakurai presents a slide showing the "Evolution of the Reception of 
Japanese pop culture," starting with anime and progressing through manga, the Japanese 
language, fashion, and finally, "interest in Japan in general" (interesse sabre o Japiio em 
geral). Through the logic of soft power Sakurai transforms fans of anime into fans of 
Japan, implicitly making soft power resources of his listeners in the space of one slide. 
In another section of his speech he again casts his audience as resources for soft 
power, warning them about the current crisis the anime industry is facing, citing illegal 
anime streaming and downloading sites as major threats to the continued production of 
quality anime. In this version of soft power, fans consuming anime illegally are lost as 
soft power resources to the degree that they do not contribute to the support and growth 
of Japan's content industries. In these new sites of Japan's "anime diplomacy," Sakurai's 
presentations reveal the degree to which his hopes for soft power confirm its emergence 
as the dominant discursive lens of cross-cultural exchange. 
The observation of such intimate hopes clearly sustained by affective energies 
enabled through national thinking reminds scholars of late liberalism of the capacity such 
affects have to guide, restrain, and contradict the increasing economic rationalization that 
predicted the dissolution of so-called "primordial" attachments to national identity. 
Although examples like the emergence and globalization of mass media confirms the 
capacity for capital to transcend national imaginaries, the naturalization of soft power 
confirms the power of those same imaginaries to appropriate global flows toward 
nationalism's own, more particularly and personally invested desires. This is, again, 
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Appadurai's cannibalization properties of globalization on display. Affective dimensions 
of this process, as seen in Sakurai, appear to split and divide subjects in national terms. 
Soft power renders Lolita fashion, for example, Japanese, and Russian fans of it fans of 
Japan. Only by dividing consumers by nationality through the rhetoric of soft power can 
one feel communion with them as other. The naturalization of soft power, thus, reclaims 
for national identities much of the ground claimed by cosmopolitan ones. The flow of 
power in this process reveals itself as hegemonic: national bodies with significant funding 
and power show their ability to affect the meaning and feeling of consumption. As this 
process becomes increasingly realized through its institutionalization in national branding 
campaigns, one can expect to see an increasing cannibalization of the global and 
cosmopolitan by the local and national. The materialization of national branding 
campaigns, the affective dimensions that sustain it, and the affective transformations it 
engenders, are the subjects of the next chapter. 
Chapter Five 
Nation Branding: Neo-Japanesque and "Cool Japan" 
With advancing globalization and its pressures to enhance international 
competitiveness, many in Japanese government and industry feel an urgent 
need to establish a distinctive brand for products and services originating 
in Japan to serve as a mark of excellence. 
In this context, and in light of recommendations of the Neo-Japanesque 
(Japanesque Modem) Brand Promotion Council, a Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry advisory panel, a Committee (Japanesque Modem) has 
been set up on the belief that enhancing the value of such a "Japan" brand-
i.e., creating an integrated image encompassing Japan's culture, 
technology, and sensibilities and their strengths and benefits-will serve to 
enhance the international competitiveness of products and content 
originating in Japan. 
The Committee's (Japanesque Modem) founding members envision a 
membership consisting of a broad range of industrial associations, 
enterprises from all industry sectors, and private individuals. The council's 
role will be to propel an extensive program of activities, including 
management of the (Japanesque Modem) brand; provide assistance in the 
development of products and content, and actively distribute information 
to the rest of the world. [Japanesque Modem "Raison d'Etre," 2006] 
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This "Raison d'Etre," as it is labeled on the organization's website, is the mission 
statement of Japanesque Modem (Shin nihon yoshiki or "new Japan style"), a project 
overseen by Japan's Intellectual Property Policy Headquarters (Chiteki zaisan senryaku 
honbu) and administered by Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry to foster 
the production and global reach of a new Japan brand. It is just one of a number of 
programs initiated by the Strategic Council on Intellectual Property, organized by the 
Office of the Prime Minister in 2003 as the head body designing and integrating 
strategies for Japan's new investment in nation branding. 
The Emergence of Nation Branding 
Nation branding has come to occupy the center of soft power strategies, not only 
because of the potential it appears to have for building economic and political prestige 
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but also because the marketing logic of branding has been naturalized as a common 
strategy of public diplomacy. Each nation, it is now argued, must market its image to 
compete in the global economy. One of the first textbooks on nation branding, while 
acknowledging its critics, ultimately reinforces its naturalness, calling it a "benign force 
at the disposal of all nations" (Dinnie 2007: 251 ). Given that nation branding has become 
a ubiquitous field of international competition, the book argues, it can help "smaller, 
poorer or otherwise struggling nations, to help them compete effectively on the world 
stage rather than being trampled upon by more powerful rivals" (251 ). The conclusion: 
nation branding is not only natural, it is indispensible. 
Naomi Klein's historical account (2000) of the emergence ofthe "new branded 
world" provides one account challenging the naturalness with which Dinnie describes 
nation branding's emergence. Deregulation and privatization policies of the 1980s, she 
explains, not only opened public service sectors to private investment but rendered them 
dependent on it. With the logic ofbranding and the growing power of the logo already 
expanding since the late 1970s, privatization facilitated a brand competitiveness that 
fmally engendered a metaphorical shift in which products carrying a brand name were 
eventually swallowed by the brand itself, goods becoming "empty carriers for the brands 
they represent" (2000: 28). This freed the name from product and enabled the branding 
of culture and of lifestyle itself. 
This transition is clearly exhibited in the marketing of Japanese goods from a 
strategy that in the past sought to erase the national essence or "odor" (mukokusekz) of 
commodities to one that today seeks to cultivate it (Iwabuchi 2002: 24-28). The goods 
that measured Japanese presence in foreign markets in the 1980s, for example, VCRs, 
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computer games, video cameras, and Walkmans, evoked little sense of Japanese culture 
or lifestyles, and given the virulent nature of the competition between the US and Japan 
in the field of manufacturing, appealed to images of Japan only to its detriment. The 
conscious shift to market Japan's content industries represents the inverse of this 
marketing strategy. As consumption of anime, manga, and video games produced in 
Japan increases around the world, it is the branding of these commodities as Japanese 
that, it is surmised, holds the most potential for economic gain. 
Nation Branding and the Affect-Emotion Gap 
Before returning to the Japanesque Modem project and to some of the concrete 
policies through which nation branding is realized in Japan, I want to return to the affect-
emotion gap and its basic productive friction that enables nation branding's emergence. 
As I discussed in chapter 1, the enormous amount of opacity between what one feels and 
what one knows about what one feels opens up a number of sites for political and capital 
investment and appropriation. Like particular sectors of the pharmaceutical industry, 
nation branding appeals to a particular technology---iidvertising-in staking its claim in 
the unexhausted region of affectivity between the felt and the known, between affect and 
emotion. That this realm of rather slippery and never quite satisfactory correspondence is 
continually tapped for opportunity indicates not that it is necessarily an inexhaustible 
frontier with as yet untapped resources but, rather, that its plasticity, mutability, and 
relative opacity is as resistant to single as it is to final, authoritative accounts of it; that is, 
one can neither hold it in place nor guarantee its accuracy. This makes it a richly 
productive field, culturally, economically, and politically. And nation branding is 
dependent upon intersecting interests of all three of these categories. 
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Nation branding stakes its claim in the space between consumption and identity, 
between a desire that arises as affect and a narrative that names that desire. It recognizes 
that consumers invest heavily in both significance and feeling not only in the things they 
buy but also in the way they buy. Consumers both affect and are affected by their 
commodities, a fact of social life identified by Marx in his definition of the "commodity 
fetish" and alluded to in classic studies of gifting and exchange (Malinowski 1922; 
Mauss 1924; Weiner 1992). Nation branding reasons that if consumers attach positive 
feelings to their commodities then they might equally as plausibly attach positive feelings 
to the nation state in which those commodities are produced. If Chinese youth show 
affection for manga and anime, it is argued, why can't they show affection for Japan at 
large? The responsibility of brainstorming and designing strategies in response to the 
potential productivity of this notion falls to politicians concerned with political prestige 
and bureaucrats in various government agencies charged with the task of thinking 
through nation branding's potential relative to their administrative domains: economy 
(METI, JETRO), foreign relations (MOFA), public diplomacy (Japan Foundation), 
culture (ACA). In their active investments in nation branding they confirm empirically 
what is theorized in the abstract by psychologists and philosophers of affect: that there is 
a modal difference between it and emotion and that the transformation from the former to 
the latter is at once an epistemological and political project--a project of knowing and 
legitimizing that, because of affect's complexity, is open to contest. 
In the early 2000s Japanese politicians for the first time actively encouraged 
programs that sought to build the Japan brand. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro' s 
speech to the diet in 2002 is usually cited as the watershed for this transition to building a 
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chizai rikkoku (intellectual property-based nation, Dinnie 2007: 211), although, again, the 
trumpeting of Japan as a cultural nation has been performed repeatedly since the end of 
World War II. This time, however, Koizumi's speech inspired a number of 
administrative actions, the most significant of these being the enactment of the Basic Law 
on Intellectual Property ( Chiteki zaisan kihon ho), out of which came the formation of the 
Strategic Council on Intellectual Property, known as Policy Headquarters (Chiteki zaisan 
senryaku honbu), composed of the prime minister, high level politicians and ministers, 
and experts from industry (211 ). In 2003 Policy Headquarters drafted the Intellectual 
Property Strategic Program, which outlined 270 measures for the "creation, protection 
and effective utilization of intellectual property" (211 ). This strategy report is renewed 
each year and has since its inception increased its scope to include not only technology 
but also design, brands, media content, music, movies, game software, and animation 
(212). Along with this report came a number of other programs organized in conjunction 
with Policy Headquarters and government ministries. The neo-Japanesque project 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter is just one of these programs. I explore the 
background and details of this project in detail below. 
Neo-Japanesque 
The mission statement of the Neo-Japanesque project that I opened this chapter 
with represents a version of nation branding most specifically concerned with the 
regeneration of Japan's economy. This is, after all, the primary obligation ofMETI 
officials. And with memories of Japanese prestige based on Japan's economic prowess in 
the 1980s not nearly forgotten, narratives of hope for Japan's future are often formulated, 
at least in some way, in economic terms. 
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The connection between soft power and economic development, however, is 
neither natural nor intuitive, at least not by reading Nye's text alone. As is demonstrated 
by the Fulbright/CULCON conference, the term is ambiguous enough to allow for a 
range of interpretations and applications. This fact is further demonstrated in thoughts on 
soft power by a chief official in METI' s Content Industries section, Kitagawa-san: 
It's not easy to defme the word of soft power, it depends on the people 
who explain it. I'm in charge of content industry policy. The content 
industry is one of the main sources of soft power of a country. I mean, 
through the content industry we express our lifestyle, Japanese animation, 
TV broadcasting, etc. If we provide our content to markets abroad, it is 
one of the best ways to promote understanding of our lifestyle ... If people 
look at Japanese content, like movies or animation, people may want to 
buy Japanese goods, like Japanese cars, Japanese televisions, I mean, cool 
gadgets. 
Kitagawa-san's view of soft power is based on an American version of it, close to Nye's 
own. He expressed this point through a personal narrative: 
In the 1960s, when I was a child, many of my friends watched TV 
programs from the US. So we understood what life is like in the US, and 
what is a better life: people drive big cars, live in a big house, and that 
kind of thing. At that time, young people wanted to buy big cars and to go 
to some theater or somewhere with a girlfriend, in an American style. 
And people wanted to eat hamburgers. Ok, that kind of thing. That is soft 
power. We can promote our lifestyle to the world market. There is no 
logical linkage between soft power and hard industry. It's kind of an 
emotional linkage. 
This reference to the "emotional" element of soft power, especially given in the context 
of a personal reflection, reveals the importance that US pop culture had on youth growing 
up in the 1960s, the generation largely occupying the middle to upper management in 
Japanese bureaucracies today. One sees similar sentiments expressed in the interviews of 
the prominent author Murakami Haruki, of the same generation of Kitagawa's, and in the 
multitude of American pop culture references from the 1960s in his literature. And I 
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heard it expressed to me a number of times in Japan. Perhaps the most impressionable of 
these moments was during the standing ovation to an especially energetic jazz set by 
three African American musicians in a small club in the Aoyama district of Tokyo. The 
director of Japan's Agency for Cultural Affairs with whom I was in attendance that night 
turned to me and yelled enthusiastically, "Now that's soft power!" 
Responding to the urgency of Japan's slipping economic and political prestige, 
the hopefulness in the soft power discourse propels the term into a field of national 
administration---"Economy, Trade and Industry"- where the term is both appropriated 
to previous projects and styles of administration and generative of new ones. Kitagawa 
saw the formation of the Content Industry section of METI in 2000 as a consequence of 
soft power discussions in Japan. As the meaning of soft power originally conceived of by 
Nye and, in Kitagawa's own words, does not bear a direct relationship to "hard industry," 
which is the target ofMETI's projects, framing economic revitalization in terms of soft 
power takes some discursive remodeling. McGray's article connecting Japan's media 
commodities to soft power and the subsequent hypemormalization of Cool Japan aids in 
this. And recent programs administered by METI and other related organizations have 
institutionalized an understanding of soft power that sees affection for Japanese lifestyles, 
the products that inundate them, and the media forms of anime, manga, and film that 
convey those products in digital images as resources for economic development. Soft 
content thus translates into hard economic power. 
The strategy, then, for nation branding campaigns which see potential for 
economic growth through soft industries is to attach images of Japan to as many products 
as possible, or at least potentially profitable. Kitagawa-san explained this logic to me 
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straightforwardly: "If people look at Japanese content, like movies or animation, people 
may want to buy Japanese goods." Simple enough. The question that follows is, then, 
how does one turn goods made in Japan into Japanese goods? 
The Shin nihon yoshiki 100 sen (New Japan Style 100 Selections) is a project of 
METI's Japanesque Moden1 group. The "100 Selections" refers to a hundred specific 
items chosen by the group that "represent the link between cutting edge modern 
technologies and our country's most highly valued traditional culture, expressed in 
modem lifestyle trends" (Japanesque Modem 2006b ). The elegantly designed website of 
the project displays each item along with a description. From "silent violins" to cell 
phones, pencils, toilets, manga, video games, and a number of other things that are most 
appropriately named by Kitagawa-san as "cool gadgets," the items are all products which 
one could readily purchase (see figs 3-5). 
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Criteria listed for the selection of each product include the following: 
1. Products should fuse Japanese traditional culture, materials, techniques 
and spirit with cutting edge global technologies (hard and soft), including 
those from Japan. Further, such products should fittingly express Japan's 
traditional culture, materials, techniques, spirit and forms of modem 
lifestyle. 
2. Products should realize the integration of "traditional culture and 
cutting edge technologies" or "traditional culture and modem lifestyles." 
Along with the criteria for selection are listed the objects the committee aims for: 
1. Made by Japanese industry (including individual and entrepreneurial 
Japanese bodies) 
2. Products "Made in Japan" ["Made in Japan" is given in English] 
3. Objects are not limited to the genres of products, content, service, 
systems, and space. 
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The emphasis on the fusion of traditional culture and modem lifestyle trends shows how 
an ideology of soft power as rooted in a national culture stretching far into a nation's past 
is realized in specific branding programs. This rhetorical exercise of history, connecting 
Japan's contemporary popular culture with the traditional, is repeatedly performed by 
elite administrators, as is seen in a speech by the most elite of them all, Prime Minister 
Abe Shinzo: 
Japanese pop culture such as manga (comic), animation, game, music, 
movie and TV drama, as well as modem art, literature, theater arts and 
others are referred to as "Japan cool." It is gaining popularity among the 
younger generation around the world. Japanese lifestyle represented in its 
cuisine and fashion has also widely spread in other countries. However, [it 
is not only] the attractiveness of [contemporary] Japanese culture 
transmitted and spread through cultural exchanges [that can] be classified 
as being "cool." As shown by the fact that Japan is the very country of the 
cradle of "Japanimation," Japanese contemporary culture's coolness is 
founded in and derived from its traditional culture. [ Aso, Prime Minister 
of Japan and His Cabinet: 2007] 
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Such historical integrations of the old with the new are seen as imperative to the 
construction of a strong national narrative. As Japanese traditional culture has long 
served as a source of pride and a resource for a modem, unique Japanese identity, it 
seems only natural that in the turn to the promotion of pop culture national administrators 
would seek to connect its significance to the traditional. In terms of narrative structure, 
reconciling an obvious disjunction between the traditional high arts and contemporary 
popular culture by identifying the latter as originating from the former is the most readily 
available and convincing alternative. Establishing this connection in speech acts, in the 
public performance of it, is essential to securing its authenticity. Its subsequent 
circulation in a media field characterized by the faithful rendering of official government 
statements into news, thanks to the structure of its kisha kurabu (press club) system (Hall 
1997), naturalizes it through sheer publicity. And a public field permeated by the 
constant affective energy of anxiety and hope for Japan's future propels it into the 
forefront of those scripts to which one appeals when interpellated to give an account of 
oneself in terms of the nation. (The process by which this increasing demand on the 
citizen to account for him or herself in terms of Japan's contemporary pop culture is the 
subject of chapter 8.) 
The next step for a nation branding strategy operating on the logic that if one 
associates an affmity for a product with the nation from which it originated then he may 
show similar affection for other products associated with the nation is to create a brand 
image in the form of a trademark that easily and readily evokes those associations and 
forms of affection. With such intentions in mind, the Japanesque Modem project created 
its own logo (fig. 6). 
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(Figure 6. Japanesque Modem Design Mark) 
The Japanesque Modem group's website provides an explanation of the logo's design: 
Within Japanese calligraphy, this shape embodies the originality and 
meaning of tome (to fix), harai (to brush), ore (to weave), and magari (to 
curve). In the first stroke of a character and in the stroke order of the 
character, it delivers beauty's energy to the tip of the brush. 
Not limited to a literal meaning, the character's shape and significance 
represents the Japanese identity (aidentetei) flowing from the bottom of 
the heart, which is also seen in Japanese craftsmanship. 
' Imbued with the Japanese heart, and combining the wonderful culture of 
deep sensibilities and aesthetic beauty with cutting edge technologies, 
"Japanesque Modem" embodies the originality and strong international 
competitive power of content unique to Japan. These are the things 
represented in this mark. [Japanesque Modem 2006b] 
One can identify in the explanation of the logo the welding of three themes: a 
traditionally construed Japanese aesthetic sensibility; a highly-valued, French-inspired 
cosmopolitan style; and an economic competitiveness premised on popular content and 
advanced technologies. Such themes represent fairly well what one expects from the 
fields from which committee members were largely selected: Japanese academia, design, 
and art, the latter field including a renowned kabuki actor. Representing in the particular 
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what Foucault describes of the dispositifin the abstract, nation branding mobilized 
toward the realization of soft power connects this rather disparate set of interests in new 
assemblages, a new way of relating objects and fields. Kitagawa explains some of the 
more specific aims nation branding is mobilized to achieve: 
The problem of our industry is that they [content commodities] cannot go 
abroad. Why? Because we don't have a distribution network. Hollywood 
has it. Disney has it. Some European countries have global distribution 
channels but they are much smaller. We don't have such kinds of things. 
We have big movie companies but they are only domestic. They don't 
have a distribution network outside of Japan. This is the biggest problem. 
So if we make good animation movies we need to sell it to other 
distributors and they take the money. We cannot make money from that. 
We need to have a kind of branded distribution network. Disney itself is a 
brand. If you attach the Disney mark, there will be many buyers from 
abroad. But we don't have that kind of thing. One solution is that we 
make our own distribution channel. And that channel should have kind of 
a brand power. An image. 
Creating a brand image with the status of a Disney, for example, becomes the immediate 
and practical aim of nation branding strategies most specifically aimed at distributing soft 
content to global markets. 
When I asked Kitagawa-san about whose job it was to create this brand he 
indicated that it was the private sector. He added, "The Chinese government might want 
to make their own government-branded network but we cannot do that. We are different 
from that kind of thing." In answering my question, one that might be perceived as 
loaded to set him up for a condemnation of strong handed government investments in 
culture, Kitagawa clearly separated his own activities from those of nation branding. 
However, despite Kitagawa's distinction from more government controlled branding 
campaigns like the kinds he identifies in China, the everyday practices of METI activities 
reveal a much less demarcated division between government and industry. As Kitagawa 
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at another point explained, one of his responsibilities is to serve and support Japanese 
industry. And the Japanesque Modem project was, in fact, created in conjunction with 
and overseen by METI itself, along with other government agencies: the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Agency for Cultural Affairs, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism. 
NHK's "Cool Japan" 
Another cultural administration which has a long history of criticism for its 
inextricability from government control is Japan's public broadcaster, NHK. With a 
budget and staff more than three times the size of any other private television station in 
Japan, it commands significant influence. Its revenue is collected largely through door-
to-door solicitations by NHK officials, thus organizationally distinguishing itself from 
government by avoiding the direct use of tax revenue. But as Kawasaki (1997) and 
Kawasaki and Shibata (2004) have shown, in practice, NHK has proved quick to 
acquiesce to the influence of politicians. 
"Cool Japan," as former MOF A Public Diplomacy Department Chair Yamamoto 
Tadamichi explained, is the label inspired in part by UK's Cool Britannia campaign of 
the 1990s and applied to Japan's new cultural diplomacy efforts. With McGray's article 
making famous the phrase "gross national cool," the label's appropriation was all but 
assured. The "Cool Japan" phrase is stamped on a variety of media forms across 
government, from posters and videos from Japan's National Tourism Organization to 
MOFA and METI white papers.23 Like "Japanesque Modem," the term is applied to any 
23 See again Kukhee Choo's work tracing the proliferation of the terms "content" and "anime" in 
government white papers paralleling this same trend (2009: 122). 
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and all commodities marketable as part of Japan's contemporary culture of charm and 
cool. In 2008, NHK produced a program built around the new brand: 
COOL JAPAN - Discovering what makes Japan cool! COOL JAPAN is a 
term that describes the growing international interest in Japan. From the 
worlds of fashion, anime, architecture to cuisine, the cultural aspects of 
Japanese society that have long been left undiscovered are starting to 
make a strong impact on global trends. COOL JAPAN is a television show 
that illustrates the quickly changing Japanese culture and how it is 
perceived by the international community that have recently made Japan 
their home. ["Cool Japan" 2010a] 
Embedded in the production logic of"Cool Japan" is an irony that underlies the entire 
soft power discourse in Japan. The "grassroots" consumers that Bouissou (chapter 2) 
credits for the growth of interest in Japanese pop were primarily attracted to objects of 
Japanese counter culture, those forms of artistic production which were either 
traditionally understood as distinct from traditional images of the nation (often 
deliberately ignored by cultural administrators and bureaucrats, see Choo 2009) or which 
took mainstream images of the nation as objects of critique, distinction, or even ridicule 
(Condry 2006). The major media commodities attracting attention were manga, anime, 
and video games, whose consumers were in their respective societies seen not as cool but 
as precisely uncool: nerdy, techie, and geeky (Condry Forthcoming). Zealous fans of 
these commodities in Japan are called "otaku" (literally "one's home"), a word connoting 
similarly uncool character traits (Galbraith 2010). When McGray offered the word 
"cool" to describe an array of popular subcultures, including a number of things which 
could more likely pass as cool and trendy (architecture, fashion, rap music), he shifted the 
meaning of consumption, opening the possibility for popular subcultures within, and 
mostly counter to, mainstream Japan to become authentic symbols of a new Japanese 
mainstream. To the degree that these subcultures were claimed by media and bureaucrats 
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as products of Japanese culture, commodities could be transformed from things made in 
Japan to Japanese things, and subsequently, into Japanese soft power. "Cool Japan" was 
the label used to facilitate this process of rebranding Japanese things not as traditional 
and high art, but as new, modem, and cool. 
The production logic of the "Cool Japan" program continues this trend and 
inscribes it in processes of media production and dissemination that affect the discourse 
of soft power and cool Japan on a much larger scale. The format of the program begins 
by introducing a particular theme for each week's show, providing a description and 
history of the topic, and then soliciting the opinions on the theme's relative coolness from 
foreign residents in Japan. While some shows focus on obvious topics like manga, idols, 
and robots, the continuation of the show into its third year has resulted in some 
increasingly ambitious extensions of the cool label. Here is an extended list of Cool 
Japan themes from previous shows: 
Stationary, shopping, winter, examinations, childbirth, childrearing, 
memorial services, Japanese men, Japanese herbivorous men (soshoku kei 
dans hi, the name given to men characterized by a lack of traditional 
masculinity, a disinterest in women, and soft, effeminate features), 
Japanese women, mothers, fathers, anniversary parties, sweets, discipline, 
hot pots, sightseeing, toys, health, luck, konkatsu (the variety of activities 
designed to facilitate the meeting of couples wanting to wed), lights, 
rain/the rainy season (tsuyu), privacy, the Japanese language, Japanese 
companies (parts 1 and 2), prayers, gifts, tears, containers, soy sauce, 
shame (haji), sleeping, books (including the book published by NHK on 
the program "Cool Japan," titled Cool Japan), and disaster prevention. 
["Cool Japan" 2010b] 
The humorous nature of the list, obvious to most any Japanese person on the street, 
demonstrates the absurdity of a discourse that attaches the label of "cool" to every 
marketable and appropriable element of Japanese culture. The fact that the list even 
includes themes traditionally understood as markers of Japan's negative cultural practices 
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(company culture, privacy regulations, discipline) seems to push the rhetoric of cool 
Japan into the realm of satire, or more precisely, what Boyer and Yurchak call 
"hypernormalization" (20 1 0). 
American Stiob, Cool Japan 
In a collaborative study of what Boyer and Yurchak call "American stiob," the 
authors analyze forms of political satire analogous to societies ofboth late socialism 
("Soviet and Eastern European socialist public culture in the 1970s and 1980s") and late 
liberalism (U.S. and Western capitalist public culture in the late 2000s: Colbert Report, 
The Onion, the Yes Men) (2010: 180). Appealing to the Russian term stiob to describe a 
form of critique in which the critic performs an over-identification with the forms 
characteristic of each respective hegemonic and normative ideology in operation, they 
analyze standardized and simplified modes of address in late socialist and liberalist 
discourses that appear to resemble one another. Their critique draws attention to the 
institutional conditions that allow for the "hypernormalization of discourse" (209). 
While the type of stiob that emerges in response to the political cultures of late 
twentieth century Eastern Europe and the early twenty-first century West bear a 
particularly similar resemblance to one another, the hypernormalization of political 
discourse itself can be viewed as a much more ubiquitous phenomenon of contemporary 
neoliberal governing cultures, incidentally evoking a variety of satirical styles that 
emerge in much more localized forms, humor constituting a mode of performance much 
less vulnerable to globalization's homogenizing tendencies. Japan's soft power discourse 
represents just such an overly normalized rhetoric characteristic of late liberalism's 
dependency on simplified and easily circulated narratives of economic rationalization. It 
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also serves as an example of the increasing encroachment of such narratives into the field 
of culture, engendering the normalization ofYU.dice's logic of"culture-as-resource" 
(2003). 
NHK's "Cool Japan" performs the hypemormalized utterances of Japanese soft 
power by first, introducing disparate items of cultural production in Japan, and second, 
confirming the popularity of such culture. In the process, it renders such items the 
propriety of Japanese national culture by appealing to the evaluation of it by foreigners 
who stand outside it. 
In one particular program featuring kanji, Chinese ideograms used in Japanese 
script, the Japanese host asks each of the seven foreigners what he or she thinks is the 
coolest part of Chinese characters. Some of the foreigners having participated in a kanji 
study class taken by Japanese adults, the host asks one of them, "Andrew-san, what did 
you think was the coolest thing about kanji?" (Andoryii-san, nani ga ichiban kUru deshita 
ka?).24 Andrew responds, "I liked that a lot of Japanese people of all ages still study 
kanji. It's really nice." ("Kotoba" 2009). 
This pattern of asking foreigners what they think is cool about particular elements 
of Japanese culture and then having the hosts respond in confirmation--''naruhodo, kanji 
wa kUru desu ne" (Ahh, I see kanji are cool, aren't they)-represents the typical style of 
exchange on the show for each element of culture taken up for discussion, whether 
robots, anime, or disaster prevention. Incidentally, the style closely resembles that of 
another NHK show, "Kawaii Japan," which features elements of Japan's "cute culture." 
This time, however, instead of confirming the coolness of Japanese culture by appealing 
24 The word "cool" here is left in English, pronounced in Japanese, "kUru." 
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to the foreign word "cool," the reverse strategy is taken, attempting to export the 
Japanese word "kawaii" as a particular, and particularly marketable, trait of Japanese 
culture (see chapters 6 and 7). 
An additional rhetorical strategy central to "Cool Japan" operates to establish a 
connection between Japan's traditional and its contemporary cool culture. In another 
segment the show follows a student from Israel through a day with an American writer of 
haiku. The two visit a park in Tokyo and discuss the charm of haiku while composing 
poems along the way. Transitioning from the video footage of the two writing haiku in 
the park to the studio where hosts and foreigners again engage in discussion, a woman 
narrator's voice says in a cute and somewhat adolescent style, "Haiku, condensing the 
eternity of time into short passages: cool isn't it!" (mijikai bunsho ni eien no tokio 
gyoshuku suru haiku: kUru deshol). What would certainly in the eyes of many poets and 
scholars of Japanese poetry be considered sacrilegious, the show reads cool into Japanese 
literary history, appropriating what was traditionally the symbol of Japan's high 
traditional arts as a resource of soft power rooted in the spread and circulation of the Cool 
Japan brand. 
In a similar segment on traditional pillow making (makura zukuri) in an episode 
focusing on sleep (suimin ), a young American, David, concludes his visit to a small 
artisan's pillow and futon making shop with an obviously well-coached narration: "I 
really respect the amount of effort and craftsmanship that went into their family business. 
And it made me realize that a pillow is not just a pillow, there's a lot that goes into it. 
And giving someone a goodnight's sleep is very important and very cool" ("Suimin" 
201 0). David ends his line, backed by a generic and sentimental music track, with a 
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thumbs up. A woman's voice narrating the segment concludes, "Stuffed with Japanese 
tradition and the spirit of craftsmanship, traditional pillows are cool" (2010). Curiously, 
the English translation voiced over the Japanese for the version oriented to foreign 
viewers emphasizes the "are" rather than "cool," as if defending the statement against 
someone who would argue they were not. After a discussion with other foreign young 
people and the hosts in the studio, and following comments by a professor of Japanese 
culture from the University of Tokyo, a male narrator's voice says, "Blended with 
traditional materials and traditional skills, custom made pillows are cool." This time the 
"are" is drawn out, similar to how a director might characteristically close a scene he is 
satisfied with by the phrase "aaaannd cut!" The segment reads like an infomercial, the 
male narrator's voice offering the final verdict that traditional Japanese pillows are, 
indeed, cool. 
NHK has invested heavily in propagating the cool Japan discourse, and while 
shows like "Cool Japan" do not go so far as to represent an explicit and integrated 
strategy to boost Japanese soft power, they do play a major role in circulating the trope of 
Cool Japan widely. This is important for at least two reasons. First, and as I illustrate in 
an interview with a MOFA official in the next chapter, circulation itselfbecomes one 
major goal of soft power strategies of cultural diplomacy. While government bureaucrats 
may not be interested, or allowed, to influence what kinds of media are circulated abroad, 
they can affect the degree to which media are circulated, effectively boosting Japan's 
cultural presence abroad. Second, the circulation of Cool Japan normalizes it as a 
legitimate trope of discourse on Japanese culture. It facilitates the normalization, at times 
the hypernormalization, of branding discourses. To the degree that this discourse attracts 
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publicity and establishes presence in media spheres it becomes a part of everyday 
language, increasingly calling on everyday citizens to account for their relationship to the 
nation in terms of its "cool" culture. These interpellations of cultural citizenship might 
be easily dismissed as momentary and isolated, but their increasing frequency indicates 
the possibility for significant shifts in the way people are incited to feel when imagining a 
nation state to which they are identified as belonging. I discuss these possibilities further 
in chapter 8. 
Conclusions on the Hypernormalization of Cool Japan 
In Boyer and Yurchak's article, significant attention is paid to the institutional and 
historical conditions enabling both the hypernormalization of political discourse and the 
forms of satirical critique it evoked: 
It is important to emphasize that parallels in the economic, organizational 
and technical ecologies of late-socialist and contemporary Western media 
and political culture are necessary but not sufficient to account for the 
hypernormalization oflate-liberal political discourse. We argue that a fmal 
and crucial generative element lies in a reorganization of political ideology 
that occurred in the West after the collapse of Eastern European and 
Soviet state socialisms in the years between 1989 and 1991. [209] 
Boyer and Yurchak's analysis that pays equal attention to the institutional and historical 
mechanisms ofthe evolution of public political culture is entirely convincing. I wonder, 
though, if one might build upon it by focusing explicitly on the affective dimensions of 
change. The argument that the emergence of American stiob is in large part dependent 
on the "evaporation" of the threat of communism serves here also as an explanation of 
those affective factors that motivated and sustained what the authors identify as the 
magnification of "ideological tendencies within liberalism toward discursive self-
referentiality and self-aggrandizement, just as happened under late socialism" (21 0). The 
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assumption is that the dissolving of a communist threat left in its wake a void, a yearning 
for a desired enemy through which such discursive forms could be continually replayed. 
The absence of this enemy resulted in forms of"self-referentiality" and "self-
aggrandizement," as if the feeling of threat remained and needed to find its expression in 
alternative forms. 
I think that such an interpretation invites opportunities to investigate more 
thoroughly those affective dimensions of the contraction of discourse. As Boyer and 
Yurchak demonstrate, such astringent discourses are increasingly typical of late 
liberalism. That a form of American stiob has not emerged in Japan does not, of course, 
suggest that political discourse there has not undergone similar processes of 
normalization (styles of humor in Japanese media are far from those of stiob); examples 
from NHK and anime diplomacy demonstrate the contrary. And even if a gaping hole of 
political crisis left by the Cold War's dissolution has affected the soft power discourse as 
well, aligning new partners against new rivals in new fields of competition, it does not 
serve as a sufficient anthropological account of affect's role in it. 
The urgency of Japan's contemporary investment in soft power is, no doubt, 
multi-faceted, but the hypernormalization of the Cool Japan discourse reveals a salient 
and shared source of affect motivating it. The channeling of anxious affect into narrowly 
constructed narratives of coolness, cuteness, and international appeal results in more 
punctuated and conscious emotions like pride and even love for one's culture. The 
globalization of the soft power theory has inscribed the term in the everyday rhetoric of 
international relations, and in the process has legitimized new and more ambitious forms 
of government investment in the field of culture. The normalization of soft power, thus, 
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fuses national sentiment cultivated through cultural consumption with international 
political competition. For those bureaucrats invested in political strategies that attempt to 
nationalize cultural commodities that previously circulated independent of national 
imagining, soft power ties pride in one's culture (cultural identity or cultural citizenship) 
to its success overseas, determined largely by its significant presence in relation to 
cultural commodities perceived as the property of other states. In this way soft power 
serves as a contemporary, more refmed, more ethical, more personal, and more urgent 
contest of cultural competition previously discussed under the rhetoric of cultural 
imperialism. 
The description of soft power as a source of"security," offered by a Japan 
Foundation official whom I described earlier (96-97), fits nicely here. In order to secure 
the economic, political, and cultural stability of the nation, and a healthy personal identity 
that depends on it, one has to secure the nation's cultural commodities and presence in 
foreign markets. The inevitabilities of global competition today are perceived to demand 
the employment of nation branding as one strategy for realizing such security. What 
motivates nation branding campaigns and soft power talk, however, is not the calculated 
analysis of realizing a nation's interests, but an intense, urgent, and anxious buzz of 
energy stimulating excitement over Japan's possible and hopeful futures. In the next two 
chapters I look at how this feeling ofurgency within administrative practices of public 
and cultural diplomacy are experienced in more intimate ways and evoke sometimes 
differing sentiments among officials. 
Chapter Six 
Cute Ambassadors 1: 
Obligatory Nationalism in the Japan Foundation and 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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The notion ofmeiwaku plays a particularly important role in Japanese public 
culture. In English it means something like "disturbance," "bother," or "trouble," as in 
"to trouble someone." But simply providing English equivalents to meiwaku will only 
help so much. Why a mere translation is insufficient for understanding meiwaku is 
because using the term correctly does not require understanding its meaning but in 
sensing its presence. Meiwaku can be used in the passive sense, as in, "someone is 
causing me meiwaku" (meiwaku o kakerareru). But it is more often used in the active 
sense: "I am causing meiwaku for others" (meiwaku o kakeru). In Japanese public spaces 
one is constantly in danger of causing meiwaku. So as not to cause meiwaku to others, 
one should refrain from talking on a cell phone in the vicinity of others, and never on the 
train; one should not have music playing through earphones too loud; students talking 
with friends should not walk through quiet residential streets (police officers sometimes 
stand at entryways to these shortcuts with signs saying so); and one should always, 
always separate and dispose of trash in one's allotted area. Understanding meiwaku takes 
time, not because there are so many particular contexts in which to learn appropriate and 
unacceptable behavior but because it takes the body time to become sensitized to the 
feeling of appropriate and unacceptable behavior. Meiwaku is a skill, a capacity, and it 
takes the body time to build the capacity to sense it. 
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Simply learning all the behavioral codes will not suffice for understanding 
meiwaku. There are too many. And one often forgets. It's better to trust one's feeling. 
Cognitive scientists call this ability to sense intelligently the "adaptive unconscious." 
The neurologist Antonio Damasio, who has also studied Spinoza' s philosophy of affect, 
gives it a better name: "somatic markers" (1994: 165-201). The "somatic marker 
hypothesis" posits that the brain catalogues a history of experiences in which an action 
results in a particular negative outcome, and a subsequent negative feeling. It stores these 
affective consequences in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area of the brain that 
specializes in pairing mental phenomena with visceral responses (1994: 32). The 
feedback assembled through an enormous amount of past experiences pairing conditions 
with affective outcomes produces a mechanism that is able to judge the outcomes of 
situations with variables far too numerous to be able to work through with the conscious 
mind. Thus, it signifies through feeling. Interestingly, for this process to work well the 
brain needs a relatively stable environment in which to build feedback loops. 
Encountering altogether novel situations one after another, the brain can only catalogue; 
it cannot establish relations between situations. For this, it must see patterns, dare I say, 
of culture. 
The resolutely anti-positivist cultural anthropologists need not be alarmed at my 
digression. I am not turning positivist myself, nor am I embracing wholeheartedly the 
presumptions of modem neuroscience. Consider it an analogy. It is certainly no more 
bold of a metaphor, and no less useful, than the machinic one that Deleuze and Guattari 
propose (1983), and with which the aforementioned anthropologists are likely far more 
comfortable. Damasio's theory allows plenty of room for culture. In fact, it depends on 
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it entirely. This is one reason Geertz, no positivist, adopted Damasio's template for 
emotions rather unobjectionably in his own reflection on them (2000: 203-217). The 
theory and/or analogy reasons that people learn about and navigate their cultural 
surroundings through somatic indicators: affects. New environments demand exposure to 
new conditions in order to build bodily capacities to activate affect effectively. 
Upon visiting Japan for the first time, I learned appropriate behaviors quickly 
enough. I avoided the usual faux pas of loud speech around others, cell phones on trains 
and so on. But it was only after living there for more than a year that I became really 
good at it. The difference between then and now is, literally, palpable. I now sense 
meiwaku. It feels more or less equivalent to feelings of embarrassment, and to what 
Benedict identified classically as shame. Of course, there is nothing particularly 
"Japanese" about meiwaku, but people accustomed to living in Japanese public spaces 
know, feel, and experience it under similarly constructed conditions. 
The point of all this is to draw a comparison between meiwaku and a particular 
mode of feeling among administrators with whom I worked at the Japan Foundation and, 
to a lesser degree, MOFA. I call it "obligation." A sense of obligation among cultural 
administrators is not unique to cultural administration or public diplomacy in general, nor 
is it, of course, entirely unique to Japanese work environments. However, like meiwaku, 
the particular conditions that produce particular ways of feeling obligated to meet certain 
tasks and demands differ from one context to the next. And patterns of work, office 
organization, language, and ethics do, in fact, take relatively well-integrated and 
structured forms in Japanese work places. Produced from this is a specific mode of 
feeling obligated to one's colleagues and one's administrative tasks through which 
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notions of soft power and nation branding must eventually pass and establish 
accommodation with. Let me provide a simple example similar to my one of meiwaku. 
Consider a typical evening in the Japan Foundation. Work at the Japan 
Foundation inevitably slows toward the evening. There are no more meetings in the day 
to prepare for, no more deadlines to meet, and very few tasks that cannot be put off until 
tomorrow. Employees are thus usually engaged in much more mundane activities: 
researching on the internet, reading relevant magazine or newspaper articles, or browsing 
materials from the stack of ringisho (documents required to be circulated to all 
employees for confirmation that they have been viewed) that never seems to exhaust 
itself. Thus, an employee can often, but not always, discern a rather tangible shift from 
work that demands one's immediate attention to work that doesn't. And this shift usually 
comes around six in the evening, the official time until which employees are required to 
be at work and marked by an electronic chime. Employees take more relaxed positions in 
their chairs and gazes to the clock on the wall are more frequent. 
Despite being officially allowed to leave the office at six o'clock, rarely does this 
occur, with officials more often leaving around nine, and often only after their section or 
division chief has left (departures usually begin from the top of each section and work 
themselves down the chain of command). To breach this code of conduct takes 
significant courage as employees' bodies are conditioned to feel a great amount of self-
conscious unease at being the first to depart. Despite an employee entertaining the idea 
ofleaving for the day, an inkling that would sit with me quite soon after six o'clock, he 
would have to be sure that his contribution to work that day had been seen by his 
colleagues as significant enough to legitimize him leaving the office. This is largely 
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determined simply by time, but one who had been laboring at a particularly grueling task 
that day might be justified in leaving earlier. Upon finally feeling that it is acceptable to 
leave, an employee starts to gather his things, already attracting the untelevised attention 
of colleagues. He fmally stands and loud enough for all in the office to hear announces 
his departure with, "Osaki ni shitsurei shimasu" (literally, "excuse me for leaving before 
you"). His colleagues all look up and confirm his announcement with "Otsukare sama 
desu" ("thank you for your efforts"). 
Upon my first extended stay in Japan I worked as an English teacher in a small 
rural town in southwestern Japan. One week a month I was posted at a desk in an office 
at the town's Board of Education. My desk was positioned at the end of a closed "U", 
facing the assistant director (jicho) and section chief (kacho) at desks at the opposite end 
of the U but separated slightly from it to indicate their special status. Most everyday 
within five minutes of the closing 5: 15 chime I would stand, offer my departing farewell, 
and be on my way with little hesitation or inhibition. It was only after one more year and 
an increased sensitivity to Japanese working conditions that my body developed the 
capacity to feel uneasy at being one of the first few to stand, bow slightly, quite casually, 
and leave the office. This was the result of a kind of education of the senses not unlike 
Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis. 
Through these practices of office culture nearly ubiquitous in Japanese 
companies, feelings of obligation to both one's colleagues and duties are built into 
subjects. One cannot fulfill the latter without respecting the former. Administrative 
duties demand that the official work toward the positive communication, representation, 
and cultivation of the nation's culture. Failing in these tasks is failing one's colleagues, 
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which, as the two examples I provided above suggest, results in incredibly unpleasant 
feelings. Thus, by fulfilling one's obligations to his colleagues he must at the same time 
fulfill obligations to the nation state. This is how national administrators are made to feel 
obligated to and personally invested in the status of the nation's culture. Obligatory 
nationalism seems as straightforward a name as any for describing this particular mode of 
thinking and feeling the nation within national administrations of culture. 
When the term "soft power" entered into administrations it stimulated positive 
sentiments as something that both represented and could be used to build even further the 
status of Japanese culture. Serving one's colleagues and national organization well, then, 
was to take soft power seriously. Comments made by a female official about soft power 
show how it connects simultaneously to the nation and to one's everyday responsibilities 
to colleagues and duties: 
Soft power is definitely something the Japan Foundation is concerned 
with, but as I am not yet at the section chief or director level yet and do 
not do much work with managing, at the everyday project level I do not 
think of it too much. I'm focused less on what can contribute to Japan's 
interest and more on doing a good job. However, on the other hand, I 
know there are many administrators who put priority on contributing to 
soft power, so as an organization it is a highly important concern. 
Here, the official I call Otsuka-san demonstrates her commitment to her personal duties. 
She considers her own interests secondary to those of the organization as a whole, 
providing an insight into the role that obligation plays in understanding, as Mary Douglas 
put it, "how institutions think" (1986). Interestingly, Otsuka-san notes how soft power 
does not necessarily concern her on an everyday level. This is evidence for the fracturing 
of soft power as it moves from the abstract realms of ideology among high-level officials 
to the more practical concerns oflow-level ones. As I show in this chapter, the latter are 
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much more concerned with the immediate tasks of administrative management and 
although soft power does affect the way they think about and conduct their work, soft 
power's inability to be accommodated to the practicalities of program creation serves as 
another example for the contradiction underlying the soft power discourse: although soft 
power serves effectively as ideology sustained by affects of hope for its potential, 
realizing that potential in practice proves far more difficult. 
In the rest of this chapter I want to examine how affects of obligation to a Japan 
Foundation official's occupational demands simultaneously produce feelings of 
obligation toward the nation state. By analyzing one particularly polarizing program 
administered jointly by MOFA and the Japan Foundation, I analyze how soft power 
illuminates a tension between public diplomacy conceived of in variously nationalist and 
non-nationalist terms. Finally, I look at how such tensions are reconciled in bureaucratic 
practice simultaneously with accommodations of soft power. 
Kawaii Taishi: The Cute Ambassador Program 
The kawaii taishi project was the program with which I worked closest during my 
internship at the Japan Foundation. The kawaii taishi (cute ambassadors) is the informal 
name given to the popukaruchii hashinshi - fuasshon bunya (New Trend Communicators 
of Japanese Pop Culture). They are three young girls (ages 23, 23, and 27) selected by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' public diplomacy department (Koho bunka koryu bu) to 
represent the latest in Japanese youth fashion trends. Each girl represents a particular 
fashion trend: Kimura Yu represents the Harajuku kei fuasshon (Harajuku-style fashion); 
Aoki Misako does the same for the roritafasshon (Lolita fashion style); and Fujioka 
Shizuka represents thejoshi koseifuasshon (girls' high school uniform style). Together, 
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the girls represent MOFA's most creative plan to brand Japanese kawaii (cute) culture. 
Monji Kenjio, the head ofMOFA's Public Diplomacy Department, explained the role of 
the girls at a press conference in February 2009: 
The main mission of the three ambassadors is to transmit the new trends of 
Japanese pop culture in the field of fashion to the rest of the world and to 
promote understanding of Japan through their respective cultural projects 
carried out by the Japanese Embassies and the Japan Foundation. Pop 
culture, including fashion, is an integral part oftoday's Japanese culture. It 
enjoys worldwide popularity and we witness that its fans are ever-
increasing. Pop culture is expected to help the people of the world have 
more chances to know about contemporary Japan, hand-in-hand with other 
parts oftraditional and contemporary Japanese culture. [MOFA 2009] 
The cute ambassadors have become a contested symbol. For many in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs they represent a progressive and cutting edge technology of foreign 
relations. For many others in government administrations they are the example par 
excellence of Japan's misguided Cool Japan campaigns. Only a few of the many people 
outside administration I spoke with about the cute ambassadors liked the idea, with most 
others objecting to the use of government budgets being spent on such embarrassing 
(hazukashii) activities. 
Despite the Japan Foundation establishing quasi-independent status from MOFA 
in 2003 under the status of an "independent administrative body" (dokuritsu gyosei hojin), 
with many administrative and personal connections still governing the relationship 
between the two bodies, administrative independence only goes as far as MOF A is 
willing to concede. This is especially true given the fact that two-thirds of the Japan 
Foundation's budget comes directly from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the rest coming 
from a variety of donations and other private investments. Roughly two-thirds of the 
Foundation's programs are conceived of internally or in conjunction with other arts 
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organizations in Japan or with counterparts abroad. Of the remaining one-third of 
programs, many of these come as ideas created directly by MOF A or by officials in its 
consulates overseas. The cute ambassador program is one of these, having been 
brainstormed by a handful of people in and associated with MOFA's Public Diplomacy 
Department. As such, it is largely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not the Japan 
Foundation that is in control of the program. 
The many stories on the cute ambassadors in the foreign press, and there are many, 
generally treat the girls as yet another facet of quirky Japanese culture, similar to its robot 
pets, love hotels, video game urinals, and a plethora of inventions, gadgets, house-hold 
appliances, and other curiously odd contraptions. Many of these stories are tracked by 
Japan Foundation officials and filed in large, plastic binders. Thus, officials are perfectly 
aware of some of the less flattering views on the cute ambassadors in foreign media. 
However, they have just as many articles highlighting the ambassadors' success and their 
many fans who never seem to fail to fill seats for events on Japanese pop culture, a fact 
which is cited sometimes as evidence for cool Japan's success abroad and sometimes for 
its redundancy as policy, depending on who is speaking. 
Public polarization between policy seen as alternatively smart and silly 
characterizes discourse on the cute ambassadors. And the conflict is of course recognized 
and shared by some of the officials tasked with administering the logistics of the cute 
ambassadors' appearances at various events. During my time at the Japan Foundation the 
team in charge of the cute ambassador program was preparing for one of the 
ambassador's visits to Brazil to participate in two events sponsored by the Japanese 
embassy in Sao Paulo. This meant making travel, accommodation, and transportation 
arrangements; monitoring the expenses of the trip to assure it stayed within budget 
limitations; and fmalizing the ambassador's trip schedule based on input from the 
embassy. 
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The officials within the team offer only the most minor contributions in terms of 
the schedule's content. The program's design and format is primarily left to Sakurai 
Takamasa, the "Special Expert Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Anime 
Diplomacy" ( Gaimusho anime bunka gaiko ni kan suru yushikisha kaigi in), who is in 
charge of introducing the girls at various venues displaying the latest in Japanese pop 
culture trends, which I describe in detail in the following chapter. 
The cute ambassador program exemplifies how abstract ideological initiatives 
imagined under the logic of soft power are filtered through the more mundane practices 
of administration. While the aims of soft power and nation branding mesh fluidly with 
how national policy is imagined by high-level officials in the Japanese cabinet in 
positions that allow for overarching strategizing, they do not accommodate so easily to 
planning within ministry-level bureaucracies that are charged with administering 
programs with specific, measurable outputs applied to objectives specific and unique to 
each ministry. Strategizing within each ministry has as its ultimate aim objectives which 
are distinct and that sometimes outright contrast with those of other ministries. The 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's primary objectives, for example, are to 
support, stabilize, and invigorate Japanese industry; the ministry of Foreign Affairs' are 
to guarantee the security of the nation state and realize national interests in the foreign 
sphere; those ofthe Japan Foundation are to build understanding of and stimulate interest 
in Japanese culture abroad. Each of these administrations is directed to carry out 
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programs designed in part to contribute to Japan's soft power as it is imagined in abstract 
terms by elites less connected to the practical functions ofbureaucracy. The everyday 
administrative demands of bureaucratic practice do not, however, sustain soft power 
ideology as well as do those abstract modes of strategizing afforded to high-level officials. 
The result is the division, dispersion, and appropriation of ideology to particular 
administrative bodies that, in the practice of translating such ideology into programs that 
meet their respective administrative demands, transform that policy into programs whose 
newly imagined objectives sometimes differ, sometimes contest and conflict, and 
sometimes expose some of the ironic contradictions of the soft power discourse in 
general. 
Splitting the administration ofthe cute ambassador program between MOFA and 
the Japan Foundation, each with its own internal and highly rationalized criteria for what 
counts as legitimate policy and how such policy is to be ethically implemented, reveals 
some of this ideological fracturing. Important to understand in this process is how affect 
and emotion serve as the points and cracks of fracture, acting as breaks against which 
ideology infused with a particular affective tone can no longer flow and permeate other 
administrative practices smoothly. Sara Ahmed's analysis of emotion and politics 
theorizes this process of"how emotions operate to 'make' and 'shape' bodies as forms of 
action, which also involve orientations towards others" (2004: 4). The different and 
distinct positions one takes toward the cute ambassadors--either enthusiastically 
favorable or resolutely critical--is characterized by a distinct tone of feeling--either 
excitedly hopeful or moderately disgusted. There is an extensive and complex social 
matrix that builds these capacities to feel in subjects and one could, should he have the 
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time and resources, attempt a stratification of qualities that to some degree characterize 
and predict one's position in regard to the cute ambassadors. Such qualities could be 
potentially charted through categories such as age, sex, level of education, aesthetic 
interests, experience abroad, and any other variables that interviews or surveys indicate 
are operational. Bourdieu' s undertaking of a study like this ( 1979) enlisted several 
researchers conducting surveys over a period of five years. The final work in French 
nears 700 pages. It is a momentous work in both scale and significance. Its experimental 
conditions can and have been repeated across social contexts and yield results of similar 
productivity and predictability. Such a study would no doubt aid the one at hand. Still, 
in works like Bourdieu's there are always embodied clusters of particularities we call 
subjects that challenge findings, one reason anthropology often deals with the 
particularities of subjects as much as it does the commonalities ofthem. Given obvious 
limitations, I want here to articulate the two clusters of feelings, or ideal types, embodied 
by those on average favorable to and those on average opposed to programs like that of 
the cute ambassadors. Rather than viewing them in a Bourdieusian scatter constructed 
across numerous social categories, I locate them within the organizational structures and 
demands pulling officials to one side or another. 
Official Types: MOFA and the National 
On average, a MOF A official is far more likely to favor the cute ambassador 
program than a Japan Foundation one. Although he is more likely to have certain 
personal qualities that suggest a more conservatively national identification--older, male, 
regimented University of Tokyo education--rather than a more liberal cosmopolitan one, 
such factors are secondary to the demands ofMOFA's administrative culture which are 
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simply more likely to elicit positions favorable to the program, not because 
administration demands allegiance to policies formed by elites at its head, at least not 
entirely, but because the forms of thinking that characterize the realization of strategies to 
particular ends in MOF A are more amenable to it. 
As opposed to a Japan Foundation official who is required to account for the 
educational content of a particular program, the MOF A official is primarily concerned 
with the ability for that program to generate positive appeal for the nation state. From 
this perspective, it is quantity and not quality that matters. This ideal was represented in 
the comments of both the former and current directors ofMOFA's public diplomacy 
department I interviewed. In response to a question about criticism of the cute 
ambassador program, the current director offered the following: 
There are criticisms of course. I received a question in the parliament 
from a woman member of the parliament whom I've known for a very 
long time. And she herself is a very attractive lady. And she said there 
may be some misunderstanding in a recipient country if a young girl walks 
around with a very short mini-skirt. But, first of all, it is only one girl who 
shows her legs and ... [laughing]. But my response was very formal, but I 
thought it was appropriate to answer, in order for the cultural or art of soft 
power, when we send or deliver this soft power culture, the most 
important thing is that it is well-received by the recipient country. So in 
order for that we have to make a thorough groundwork or survey in 
advance about local conditions, situations, and so-on, so certainly we're 
not sending her to Saudi Arabia [more laughing]. So it was my simple 
answer but see, there are so many articles, programs on TV, media, and it 
is a good thing. See, one of the objectives is already achieved, to attract 
people's attention to those activities by the Foreign Ministry. 
Monji-san's answer reveals an understanding of soft power that reasons that in so much 
that the Japan brand can attract positive attention, it serves as a useful resource for soft 
power. And even despite criticism, he suggests, simply attracting attention is useful, a 
version of public diplomacy that adopts the "bad press is better than no press" mantra of 
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public relations. Soft power here is reduced to branding and the circulation of things 
Japanese becomes a primary goal. Stories of the cute ambassadors become political 
commodities circulating along with and, at times, as economic ones. With soft power 
turning cultural objects into producers of social and economic capital, the political 
concept becomes in processes of administration effortlessly enfolded into the logical 
production ofDeleuze and Guattari's capitalist machine (1983). Incidentally, the 
director's conflation of the Diet member's attractiveness with that of the cute 
ambassador's adds to the commodification of cultural symbols, here along gendered lines 
as Japanese female attractiveness is made into a Japanese product, an issue I take up 
further in the next chapter. 
Where Monji-san's interpretation of soft power diverges from the economic 
reductionism ofMETI's is where it connects with security. Security serves as the 
primary framework in which strategizing within MOF A takes place, and it is the mode of 
thinking most natural for Monji-san who had worked twenty-seven years in the field 
before moving to his post in the public diplomacy section. Immediately before his move 
he served as ambassador to Iraq, thus, he also thinks of soft power in relation to hard 
power strategies he was in charge of administering for most of his career: 
For the first twenty-seven years of my career I was in charge of security, 
either in Japan or in Brussels where the head ofNATO security is, or in 
London. Iraq was the first time I was sent to the front lines. And I enjoyed 
it very much. Iraq is where hard security counts most. But at same time I 
also discovered that soft power is a tremendous strength. That is, the 
image of a country. Japan is very popular in Iraq. Also, it is well 
respected and trusted by people. Of course, we have no difficult historical 
past in the Middle East. And we have an especially good reputation in 
Iraq, because in the 1970s Japan and Iraq established a special economic 
relationship. There were more than 10,000 Japanese living in Iraq at that 
time. Many Iraqi people worked in Japanese companies and have good 
memories of that experience working with Japanese people. And of 
course Japanese products have a good reputation there. But, Iraqi people 
also look to Japan as a model for the reconstruction of a nation, as nation 
building. I was often told how Japan is admired for performing 
miraculous construction after the war in such a short time and in its own 
way. Not like the European way. So they wanted to build their nation 
learning from Japan's experiences because this is the first time Iraqi 
people have become able to build their nation. [Because] they looked to 
Japan that helped my job enormously, my job of diplomacy as an 
ambassador. I really enjoyed it. Of course, economic assistance or 
reconstruction assistance by the Self-Defense Forces or by grant aid or by 
loans were much appreciated by Iraqis, but this good image, which is soft 
power, helped me quite a lot. So with this understanding I'm now in 
charge of soft power in a different ministry, so in this sense I'm very 
pleased. 
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Stories of Japan as a model nation, as an economic miracle, and as a leader resonate with 
Monji-san, like they do with many officials operating in a register of nationalism built on 
the idea of Japan as number one. This kind of nationalism opens bodies to be especially 
attracted to these kinds of stories, making them powerful reproducers of the ideology 
itself. Evidence for this can be seen in the amazing faithfulness with which the Japan-as-
number-one ideology is reproduced one generation to the next, attaching itself to 
different criteria of distinction: reconstruction in the postwar period; economic giant in 
the seventies and eighties; cultural one in the contemporary period. Narratives cannot 
take root in brains without an affective intensity that secures them in rigid neural 
networks. The intensities to which the body is tuned are turned into emotions of national 
and personal pride by the mind's effort to make such feelings--affects--conscious. 
The process is recursive: narratives make bodies into feeling entities and feelings 
become emotion in narrative. Narrative thus propels one through the affect-emotion gap 
as the complexity of the affective side of it is rendered intelligible in the emotional side. 
One way bodies are made capable of feeling moved by stories of the nation is through 
long processes of socialization, most observable in formal institutions like education. It 
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is not surprising, then, that Monji-san would refer to his own education in providing a 
personal narrative of these feelings of national pride, here in the context of responding to 
my question about current anxieties over Japan's economic status: 
We faced a major challenge in recent history. We say "Restoration" 
(referring to the modernization processes of the Meiji Restoration) but it 
looks more like a "revolution." We were afraid of colonization so we 
worked really hard to prevent it. It was said that millions would have died 
of starvation [in the postwar period]. No one thought Japan would 
become such an economic power in such a short time, but because we 
strived for that we worked so hard. When I was in elementary school, I 
was taught that Japan is small and has no resources so we must work very 
hard. This was wrong. Actually, Japan is big. Its size and population is 
greater than most countries in Europe. We were told we would have to 
work so hard and that's how we could survive. That's what made Japan 
today's Japan, so if we are concerned about the future then we can 
overcome difficulty once again ... But now we look at our current status 
and if we realize our real strength-- that's what I mentioned before about 
soft power in close collaboration with hard powe~n that case Japan's 
future is bright. All this depends on people's attitudes, just like Japan did 
in the past. 
Monji-san is discerning about parts of his education he feels today were right and which 
were wrong---notions about Japan being small in scale wrong, an ethical precept that 
working hard would lead to growth right. However, he attributes Japan's economic 
success to Japanese people's hard-working "attitudes," instilled through education. 
National pride of this kind takes root in simple and sanguine narratives of national 
history. As Bell has shown (2000), sentimentalism operates best through simple, well-
structured storylines. Also conducive to these kinds of stories are clearly understood 
images of a protagonist. Monji-san's accounts portray the nation as a singular, uniformly 
integrated body. The abstraction of the nation from its people (minshu) reduces its 
multiple, complex parts into a single entity that requires cultivation, protecting, and 
strengthening. Its uniformity makes it conducive to the embodiment of a national 
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sentiment that responds positively to praise for the national body (kokutai) as a whole and 
defensively to criticism, a reaction entirely natural for a body that has been conditioned 
over many years, not only through education but through occupational and administrative 
obligation, to defend the nation as integrated whole. 
The administrative culture of MOF A emphasizes security and the flourishing of 
the nation. The cute ambassadors serve nicely both as symbols of Japan's new status of 
cultural cool and as tools for guaranteeing Japan's security. Under the logic of soft 
power, the more people come to know and hold affection for a nation's images, the safer, 
stronger, and more secure the nation will be. 
Official Types: the Japan Foundation and the International 
In part responsible for the general degree of antagonism toward the cute 
ambassador program within the Japan Foundation, and among the public at large, is an 
administrative framework that emphasizes images ofthe nation that differ from MOFA in 
at least two important ways. First, although officials certainly imagine the nation as an 
integrated body, they are also taught that public diplomacy today is not about country to 
country relations but rather about public to public, or people to people exchange. Second, 
as the Japan Foundation's charter requires the organization to work to "deepen the mutual 
understanding of Japanese and other foreign cultures" (Japan Foundation 2010), simply 
circulating popular images of Japan is insufficient. The job of its officials is to provide 
multiple, deeper, and more nuanced images of Japan. These two facets of cultural 
administration in the Japan Foundation require officials to reflect on the ability for 
programs to deepen the understanding and relationship between peoples of different 
nations. The cute ambassadors embody and evoke affects of Japan's status as pop culture 
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powerhouse, but in the eyes of many cultural administrators they do little to deepen an 
understanding of everyday Japan. 
The ideal type of this ethos of cross-cultural understanding-the ideological 
counterpart to Monji-san's nationalism--is best expressed in an essay by the Japan 
Foundation's chairman, Ogoura Kazuo: 
Many players engaged in contemporary Japanese cultural diplomacy, 
including the Japan Foundation, have adopted the policy of viewing 
"Japanese" cultural traditions not as Japan's property but as the precious 
heritage of all humankind. This implies that Japanese cultural diplomacy 
should not only propagate Japanese thought and traditions to the world but 
also aim at introducing non-Japanese culture to Japan to enrich the cultural 
heritage of the world. This helps to preserve cultural diversity, thereby 
contributing to the maintenance of a rich cultural environment for all 
humankind. [2009: 18] 
Ogoura's comments express a view of culture slowly being adopted by administrations of 
public and cultural diplomacy, that of culture as "international public good" (kokusai 
kokyozai): 
If we look upon culture not as the property of one nation or ethnicity but 
as international common property that belongs to all human beings, then 
efforts must be made in the field of diplomacy to preserve not only the 
culture of one's own country but the cultures of other countries as well. 
Policies to preserve the cultural diversity of all humanity should be 
developed. [2009: 30] 
This ideological understanding of culture is formulated specifically with practices of 
cultural exchange (bunka koryii) in mind, the primary activity of the Japan Foundation: 
If we regard culture as the common property of all human beings, we will 
clearly understand the importance of "cultural exchange for the sake of 
cultural exchange itself." In other words, it is important to implement 
cultural exchange in a true sense, rather than out of a narrow sense of 
national interest or for mere diplomatic purposes. [2009: 31] 
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Ogoura's description of the ethical ends of cultural diplomacy clearly contrast with that 
ofMonji-san's. Side by side, they serve as concise summaries of the aims to which 
programs are designed and administered in each organization. Inscribed in policy 
positions and mission statements, institutionalized in the allocation and administration of 
programs, and rehearsed in everyday exchanges between officials, which take place 
largely through written shanai meru (inter-company email) in the case of the Japan 
Foundation, it makes little sense to distinguish between the ideals of the organization and 
of the individuals who speak for it. The telos guiding each organization's operations 
differs; and so too does it differ from other organizations--MET!, ACA, MEXT, JETRO, 
NHK--that also think through the relationship of culture and the nation state. Interesting 
to observe in this process is the way soft power is taken in and accommodated to the 
varying ideological aims of each organization. 
Accommodating Soft Power to Bureaucratic Practice 
As I argued in chapter 2, understanding soft power requires imagining the nation 
state and, for officials who hope to cultivate soft power, investing emotionally in the 
state's prosperity. Such an intimate coupling of national interests and soft power makes 
discussions of soft power within an organization seeking "exchange for the sake of 
exchange" difficult, on both logical and sentimental grounds. First the logical. Simply 
put, there is an obvious paradox in a national organization, the Japan Foundation, 
administering a national culture that is argued ideologically as not, in fact, the property of 
one nation. Everyday practices of administration in which officials attempt to design 
programs that in the most responsible way represent the nation's culture constantly clash 
with an ideological ethos that imagines it as equally the property of some other nation's 
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publics. Of course, all kinds of logical resolutions are possible and examples proffered. 
Problematic, though, is the fact that the cultural commodities offered as examples of 
Japan's internationalism--sumo with its influx of foreign wrestlers; the emergence of 
foreign manga writers; the internationalization of Japanese food in general--are at the 
very same time identified as wholly Japanese things. This is what Michael Herzfeld calls 
"cultural intimacy" (2005), the practice of using particular elements of culture to at one 
moment deny cultural exclusivity and at the next moment claim it. MeV eigh calls this 
seeming inability to ultimately distinguish cultural practices from national identities 
"proprietary nationalism," in which categories through which national identification is 
imagined--namely, ethnicity, aesthetics, citizenship, and race--construct Japaneseness in 
rigorously exclusive terms (2004: 187). One need not search far for evidence of this: 
foreign sumo wrestlers are welcomed in the sport officially, but the sport's recent 
domination by Mongolian wrestlers is clearly begrudged by many; and in baseball the 
participation of non-Japanese players is officially limited to four; foreign writers of 
manga are considered for a special category of awards separate from Japanese writers and, 
as shown in the article on Korean manga (manhwa) in chapter 3, manga is not only 
understood but vehemently claimed as an exclusively Japanese commodity; finally, no 
one, Japanese or otherwise, can deny that being served sushi from a chef who looks 
physically "unJapanese" feels somehow inauthentic, indicating the significant way race 
structures cultural propriety in Japan (see Yano Forthcoming). Without even mentioning 
the more widely publicized, polemical and volatile issues constructed along nationalist 
lines that gamer media attention in East Asia, such simple everyday examples confirm 
the depth to which national culture is ingrained in everyday cultural practices, rooted 
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deeply in conceptions of kinship, race, ethnicity, and self-fashioning that cannot be 
uprooted from the subject as they are not simply a part of it but entirely and wholly 
constitutive of it. 
That national identification is made of, experienced, and understood in terms of 
affects activated over long processes of socialization, language adoption, and basic 
navigation and negotiation through social environments in general guarantees that any 
ideological reinterpretation of the role of national culture in it, whether in terms of 
international public goods (kokusai kokyo zai), cosmopolitanism (kokusai shugi), the 
public sphere (kokyosei), or multiculturalism (tabunka kyosei) will be met with resistance. 
What complicates this matter even more is that such competing values are positioned 
against one another even between government agencies. If it is the Japan Foundation's 
aim to employ culture as a non-national entity (mukokuseki), it is the aim of the Ministry 
ofEconomy, Trade and Industry to stamp the Japanese brand on any facet of cultural 
conceivably marketable as an exclusive product of the nation. All this makes the 
employment of soft power within the Japan Foundation especially problematic. 
Having acquired such pervasiveness within Japanese bureaucracies, conscious 
avoidance ofthe term "soft power" within the Japan Foundation becomes nearly 
impossible. Given its prevalence within the everyday parlance of cultural administration, 
to avoid alluding to it and the discourse it has spawned is not only difficult but would be 
seen as a deliberate protest. The affective ties of organizational obligation do not 
accommodate such disruptions well. While an organization like the British Council is 
able to dismiss the concept, as was done in my interview with its president of the Japan 
Branch (chapter 3), and thus more easily operate within a framework of administration 
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that treats culture as global rather than national commodity, the Japan Foundation does 
not have the luxury. In this sense, soft power, though a concept embraced by most Japan 
Foundation officials, also proves to be an incredibly slippery concept. 
The Japan Foundation's chairman, Ogoura-san, has explicitly raised concerns 
with the phrase. He is not ultimately dismissive of the concept but warns that 
misinterpretations of it could lead to a kind ofhypocrisy (gizen) (2006: 60). The point is 
based on his reasoning, rejected by Nye (2004: 9), that soft power cannot exist exclusive 
from hard power. Nye's distinction between hard and soft power is defmed in part by a 
distinction between, respectively, coercion and attraction. However, as Ogoura points 
out, such a definition changes relative to the party exercising influence and the one being 
influenced. Related to this point is his concern that soft power may become either hard 
power in disguise--"koromo no shita kara yoroi ga mieru" (you can see the iron fist in 
the velvet glove, 2009: 44}--or simply a substitute for contexts in which hard power fails 
or is unavailable. 
Rather than doing away with the concept altogether, though, Ogoura attempts to 
redirect the concept toward the benefit of an international community rather than nation 
states exclusively. His explanation of this is worth citing at length: 
Insofar as Japan has little or no leeway to exert coercive force through the 
use of hard or economic power, which is a precondition for the exercise of 
soft power, it is doubtful whether using soft power in tandem with public 
diplomacy can be truly effective. There is the popular argument, based on 
the "Japanese cool" concept, that Japanese culture should be thought of as 
a form of national power, but to remove from the equation the issue of 
who will use this power and to what ends renders this argument 
meaningless. 
It may well be desirable for the sort of cultural content embodied in 
"Japanese cool" to spread naturally around the world through market 
forces or people's efforts, but this will not necessarily lead to an increase 
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in understanding of Japan. Those on the receiving end of contemporary 
cultural activities either from or related to Japan, such as anime or fashion, 
are not necessarily aware of any Japanese connection. Indeed, we should 
bear in mind that linking culture to the state carries a high risk of impeding, 
rather than promoting, the spread of cultural activities around the world. 
The view that culture is a form of power is connected to the belief that 
there is a self-evident link between culture and the state, but this belief is 
itself fatally flawed. The worldwide spread of Japanese culture is a 
manifestation not of Japanese power but of how the notion of state-based 
power is gradually losing its meaning in an increasingly globalized world. 
If the concept of soft power has any benefit, therefore, this benefit comes 
not from its use by the state but from the power of people engaged in 
cultural, religious, or educational activities to cultivate a common global 
awareness, increase creativity, and enrich the international community as 
a whole. The term "soft power" should be used only in this sense. (2006: 
65, italics added). 
Ogoura' s recontextualization of soft power to a global rather than national community 
represents a liberal interpretation ofNye's original concept, which explicitly defined soft 
power as a tool of realizing a nation's interests. In his most concise articulation of his 
point, Ogoura argues that "soft power should be discussed in connection with the exercise 
of power in the international community rather than in the context of domestic politics" 
(2006: 61). Sites where these kinds of discussions are taking place are, alas, hard to find. 
Where Ogoura' s vision in terms of nations mobilizing influence toward the resolution of 
global problems is discussed, rarely is the term soft power invoked. Rather, soft power 
remains a discursive organizer of ideologies and strategies making up a register of 
thinking and feeling concerned more exclusively with realizing national interests. 
Ogoura ultimately adopts and adjusts the phrase "soft power" to fit his 
bureaucratic obligations, but this is not to say that such obligation is left unaffected. 
Important to recognize in the emergence of the soft power discourse and elucidated in 
William Connolly's observation that "to place a new word or phrase into an established 
network is also to alter the network itself in a small or large way" (2002: 72) is that 
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introducing soft power into practices of administering national culture alters that 
administration, enabling new thoughts and practices or interjecting new tensions and 
problems that in their accommodation are productive of administrative change. While 
soft power operates in media and at the upper levels of bureaucracy in more abstract but 
significantly productive ideological ways, it operates in different but equally as 
significant ways within more micro processes of everyday administrative practice. Here, 
where I turn to ethnographic evidence of the administrative everyday, things become, 
predictably, more complicated. 
The Administrative Everyday: From Ideology to Ethos 
Michel Foucault makes a distinction between morality and ethics that 
characterizes well, I think, two distinct modes of engaging with soft power found within 
the Japan Foundation. Morality, he says, refers to a code (prescriptions) by which acts 
are determined as permitted or forbidden. An ethics designates a kind of relationship that 
a subject establishes with himself (rapport a soz) in the constitution of "himself as a 
moral subject ofhis own actions" (1997: 263). As the former is concerned with 
prescriptions and with absolute statements over what is and is not, ought and ought not, it 
is more conducive to ideological thinking. In Ogoura-san's comments about what soft 
power is and is not, should and should not be, he relates to soft power in a moral way, 
arguing for one absolute view of it over another. This way of thinking is typical of high-
level bureaucrats who, removed from the more complex demands of managing cultural 
programs, are free to think of soft power in absolute terms. As ethics for Foucault refers 
to a subject's relation to self and to others (255), and to a way of caring for oneself and 
one's others (287), it demands some skill or technique, a way not only of managing 
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relationships but of managing them well. As such, an ethics does not operate in 
absolutes: it requires one to adapt to particular contexts where the codes for prescriptive 
behavior are not entirely clear, and then to others where such already unclear 
prescriptions are then challenged, compromised, or contradicted. An ethics is a way of 
conducting oneself well in relation to particular rather than general contexts. 
Managing soft power within the micro spaces of cultural administration means 
compromising and manipulating its terms in establishing harmonious relationships 
between oneself and his working colleagues, and meeting obligations imposed upon him 
by the organization, both necessary conditions for the smooth operation of the 
bureaucracy as a whole. 
Early in my internship at the Japan Foundation an article criticizing particular 
foundation practices of funding Japanese films was published in a prominent Japanese 
periodical, the Asahi Shinbun. To provide a brief background, the Japan Foundation 
contracts with producers and distributors of Japanese films to show the works at overseas 
Japan Foundation offices and embassies. The Foundation pays to show the films a 
particular number of times a year, whether or not the film is actually screened or not. 
The article criticized the Foundation for sometimes not showing the films the number of 
times they were contracted for, essentially arguing that the Foundation is wasting 
taxpayers' money to the sum of$900,000 by paying for films that are never screened 
(Gerow 2009). Taking off from this point, the author broadens his criticism to suggest 
that many of these films actually depict scenes of explicit sexuality and violence, 
insinuating that they do not cast Japanese culture in a positive light. The author asks why 
taxpayers' money should be spent on films propagating negative images of Japan. 
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The critical article was authored by a journalist well-known for his practices of 
stirring up controversies, especially when seemingly outing corruption within 
government institutions, and it was seen as largely unfair by Japan Foundation officials 
who were discussing the article at work the day after it was published. A few days later I 
came across a critique of the Asahi article written by Aaron Gerow, prominent professor 
of Japanese film at Yale University. Gerow's critique, first posted on a mailing list for 
people interested in Japanese film and then later on his website, amounted to a criticism 
of the article and a defense of the Japan Foundation. I shared Gerow's response with a 
couple members of the Japan Foundation over shanai meru. Shanai meru, or 
"intercompany email," is part of a software program internal to the Japan Foundation 
which organizes information, news, policy updates, daily schedules, and intercompany 
correspondence and file sharing. A significant amount of communication within the 
organization takes place over this internal email system.Z5 After sharing Gerow's 
response, an email came back to me quite quickly from a high raking official to whom I 
had sent it expressing his desire that articles like this be published for other people to 
better understand the position of the Japan Foundation. Thinking to follow up on the 
wishes of my superior, someone whom I would hope to please and impress, as would any 
subordinate official in the organization, I told him I would send his thoughts to Professor 
Gerow and subsequently did so. 
25 Often, shanai meru serves as a substitute for casual conversation and correspondence, even when 
officials are within an immediate proximity of one another that would allow for quiet, face-to-face 
conversation. I would often get article recommendations, meeting updates, or invitations to lunch over 
shanai meru by a colleague of mine who sat immediately diagonal to me, our desks actually close enough 
to touch. The reasoning for this is that such verbal interaction might be seen as meiwaku (disturbance) to 
surrounding team members. 
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Having not yet grown accustomed to the pace at which discussion over shanai 
meru proliferates, I returned to my inbox an hour or so later, and only at the prompting of 
another colleague of mine to take a look. I was startled to find in my box a dozen lengthy 
emails by both the colleague to whom I had sent the response as well as several other 
officials to whom the response had circulated. To summarize what turned into a lengthy 
and complex incident, I had essentially caused a minor storm by sending the official's 
comments to Gerow. The problem I had not anticipated was that in doing so I had 
facilitated what could be seen as the Japan Foundation attempting to unfairly influence 
media reports about its activities. I was directed to withdraw my solicitation to Gerow as 
soon as possible. After much prolonged and anxious deliberation that followed 
throughout the next two days it was decided that we would wait to see how things 
developed before taking more serious action to prevent further complicating the already 
problematic incident. 
Events like these capture how office administration is most immediately 
concerned with, essentially, office administration, with managing its own management. 
Debates over the type and quality of Japanese images being represented in film, issues 
that connect more immediately to ideas of soft power, become of secondary importance 
to the more primary task of maintaining the integrity of the organization itself and 
harmony among its human stewards. There are no explicit guidelines for how to respond 
to a situation like this. Officials must do the best they can, balancing a number of 
complex criteria. Their goal is homeostasis, a low-level affective state of calm and 
stability that characterizes bureaucratic practice in general. This incident excited the 
system, raising a threat that was perceived in affects of anxious intensity. After appealing 
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to techniques of management and control, namely, deliberation, officials could only wait 
for the intensity to dissipate, and without any further escalations of the incident, it 
eventually did. Deliberation is the most effective and most often-appealed-to technique 
of bureaucratic management. In this case it was especially pertinent as it was human 
agency, an actor, me, working outside the customary bounds of his duties that upset the 
system's stability. Managing and restricting such agency is an effective mechanism for 
stabilization. 
This incident also demonstrates how administrative work proliferates in 
bureaucracy. Administrative action begets administrative action. It moves in large 
swells and lulls. The one I in part incited took up a large part of the afternoon of many 
officials. It attracted the full attention of officials for several hours and then slowly 
declined in attention and intensity over the next few days. An average day at the Japan 
Foundation is full of management tasks like these, albeit far less immediately urgent. 
One moves between a number of mundane duties throughout the day: emailing 
colleagues; coordinating schedules for meetings; typing, copying, and collating budgets 
and expense reports; organizing event details such as ordering chairs or caterers; and 
perhaps most often, purveying the numerous documents (ringisho) continually placed in a 
team's file box that require the official's stamp indicating the document has been read. 
This leaves very little time and space in administration for serious deliberation on issues 
of cultural diplomacy, public policy, and soft power. Most often, dealing with such 
ideologically formulated problems such as the tension between meeting either national or 
public interests, for example, is a process of accommodating the problem to more 
primary demands of maintaining institutional stability. There is simply an enormous 
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number of demands on the official. Much has to get done. And when ideological 
problems are confronted in the course of such administrative practice, it is often only the 
most expedient of solutions that wins out. 
This makes for some rather mundane and banal resolutions of what is otherwise 
crafted in more serious stylistic strokes of cultural diplomacy's ideological dilemmas. 
The cute ambassador program is a site where many conflicts between national and public 
interests obviously arise. However, as a program designed by officials in MOF A, Japan 
Foundation administrators have little say in its content. Over the term of my internship, 
Takada-san, the primary Japan Foundation team member in charge of the program, spent 
much of his time in correspondence with officials at the Japan Foundation and embassy 
office in Sao Paulo, Brazil, where an event was planned to showcase the ambassadors 
along with other items of Japanese pop culture, most specifically anime and manga. 
Reading over materials for the event, most specifically the power point presentations to 
be given at the event by Sakurai Takamasa, "Special Advisor to MOF A on Matters of 
Anime Diplomacy," I was struck by the nationalist treatment of Japanese culture. 
Although I mentioned his presentation in chapter 4, here I want to address how some 
overly-nationalist sentiments perceived in his presentation was reconciled with the Japan 
Foundation's more cosmopolitan working ethos. As I described earlier, Sakurai's power 
point prepared for his presentation in Brazil was titled "The Secret of Japanese Anime's 
Power" ("Nihon anime no pawii no himitsu"; or in Portuguese, "0 Segredo do Poder do 
Anime"). The first section of the presentation is titled "Japan is Cool!" and spends a 
number of slides documenting various events where Japanese pop culture has been 
showcased, recent statistics on the amount of anime and manga being consumed overseas, 
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mostly highlighting Western European nations, and all the countries where anime is 
featured as a part of regular programming. Sakurai calls anime a ''universal language" (a 
lingua universal). What he really seems to mean by this is that anime has achieved a 
nearly universal presence in media spheres around the world, for he ignores the fact that 
anime is often edited to fit local tastes and contexts when sent overseas. He also 
diminishes his own point about anime's universalism by listing some of the unique traits 
that he thinks accounts for anime's attractiveness overseas: its diverse storylines; its 
accurate representation of Japanese culture and society; and its portrayal of popular 
trends in Japanese fashion and lifestyles. Sakurai goes on to list some of the problems 
anime is facing, namely, illegal downloading and piracy which is cutting into the 
industry's profits and threatening its future. 
Sakurai's presentation exhibits all the characteristics of an American style soft 
power that serves as a legitimization of cultural hegemony. Presented under the general 
canopy of"Japan is cool," he essentially documents the successful spread of Japanese 
anime around the world. Why this information would resonate with fans of Japanese pop 
culture in Brazil of which his audience was largely composed is unclear; but why Sakurai 
thinks it would stems clearly from an understanding of soft power as a marker of national 
cultural status measured in the increasing reach of Japanese pop commodities around the 
world. This is most evident in the original title Sakurai gave to his presentation: "Nihon 
anime no kako, genzai, mirai-sono kokusai kyoryoku no himitsu o meguru" (Japanese 
Anime Past, Present, and Future: Investigating the Secrets of International 
Competitiveness). Clearly animated by an excitement over Japan's rising status in the 
global field of culture, Sakurai confuses his audience of Japanese pop culture fans for 
188 
fellow MOF A officials. And it is precisely this affective intensity that propels his view 
of soft power beyond the parameters originally outlined by Nye. A perception of a rising 
Japanese status measured in the increased presence of pop commodities abroad becomes 
conflated with soft power. And the excitement that both draws and limits Sakurai's 
attention to all those global sites to which Japanese culture has reached is translated into a 
view of the world that sees Japanese soft power everywhere. Under these conditions 
saturated with the affective buzz of national prestige, soft power emerges not as a 
political term mobilized to understand and address particular problems in either domestic 
or international spheres but as the categorical vessel through which a present prideful 
sentiment is expressed. 
There is little in Sakurai's presentation that meets Ogoura's standards for how soft 
power should be employed in cultural diplomacy. I raised some of these points to 
Takada-san who in general agreed with my assessment. However, the content of the 
presentation, he indicated, was at this point largely up to Sakurai-san of MOF A. Takada-
san's job was largely to facilitate the smooth implementation of the event in Sao Paulo. 
Seemingly in way of a defense of an obligation he could in no way escape, he suggested 
that the Cool Japan campaigns might stimulate as much interest in Japanese culture as it 
could discourage it. Takada-san is an incredibly sharp and inventive thinker. He is 
discerning in the way he thinks about the merits of Japan Foundation programs and he 
thinks about them a lot. However, in programs like this there is simply very little space 
to offer critique, or even more difficult, effect change. The only place in which he did 
seem to intetject his opinion concerned the title, which was eventually changed from 
Sakurai's original title emphasizing Japanese competitiveness to one emphasizing culture 
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more explicitly: "Nihon anime no pawii no himitsu" (The Secret of the Power of Japanese 
Anime), a minor but typical victory within the Japan Foundation for Ogoura's more 
broadly conceived soft power. 
Another site where this tension between the national and international arose came 
in a task I was given to translate into English the Japanese advertisement for the cute 
ambassador events in Brazil and the profiles of Sakurai-san and the three cute 
ambassadors. While the language did not necessarily convey a sense of culture being 
appropriated to feed a national pride to the degree that Sakurai's presentation did, there 
were still passages that I thought clearly demonstrated an understanding of cultural 
exchange programs as serving a set of exclusively national interests, contrary to the way 
in which Ogoura argued that cultural diplomacy should be used as a means for 
transcending them. I wanted to broach the topic with Takada-san but first reflected on 
my feelings, attempting to discern whether my desire to do so stemmed from a 
particularly personal, irksome reaction to the language or from a desire to bring forth a 
more consciously ethnographic intervention in the attempt to produce some hard data. 
Coming to the conclusions that first, I couldn't quite tell, and second, that neither 
motivation would at this time prevent me from voicing my opinion, I approached Takada-
san. 
While none of the language was as troubling to me as I had seen in other Japan 
Foundation advertisements, I still deemed it worth discussion. One example of a passage 
I brought to Takada-san's attention read: "As seen in the bustling excitement of the 
World Cosplay Summit held in Sao Paulo and the establishment of the Brazil J-Pop 
society in May 2009, now in Brazil, the opportunity to stimulate interest in Japanese pop 
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culture is rising at the hand of Brazilian people" (ima, burajiru de wa, burajiru hito note 
ni yotte nihon no poppu karuchii o moriagete ikO to suru kiun ga takamatte imasu) (Japan 
Foundation 2009a). Why in an advertisement for Brazilians to come learn about 
Japanese pop culture trends should there be a passage about now being an opportune 
(kiun) time to build an interest in Japanese pop culture was unclear to me. From my point 
of view the passage did little more than to reaffirm a self-serving satisfaction at the global 
proliferation of Japanese pop culture, a sentiment more typical ofSakurai-san and MOFA 
officials than the views of the Japan Foundation. Takada-san was receptive to my 
critique, although he did not necessarily think it a vital point necessarily worth revising. I 
offered him an alternative translation that with some negotiation resulted in a 
compromise: "With the widely attended premier of the "World Cosplay Summit" in Sao 
Paulo and the establishment of the Brazil J-Pop society in May 2009, Brazilians are 
stimulating a rapidly growing interest in Japanese pop culture" (Japan Foundation 2009b). 
In the broader debate over the meaning of soft power and the role of MOF A and 
the Japan Foundation in contributing to it, discussions like the one between Takada-san 
and me seem trivial and inconsequential. But it is in these seemingly trivial, minute 
details where soft power is accommodated to the usual practices of administration within 
the Japan Foundation. Without a doubt, a program featuring the cute ambassadors would 
never have originated from within the Foundation. It simply does not satisfy enough 
criteria for what counts as a program worthy of foundation expenses, namely, one that 
significantly deepens an understanding of Japanese culture. It thus challenges the Japan 
Foundation's working ethos and effects changes in it, albeit in small degrees. The 
advertisement for the Sao Paulo event was left unchanged in Japanese. My version 
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negotiated with Takada-san was adopted in English. Takada-san thus effectively 
managed the minor disruption I had interjected into the system. Knowing no Japanese 
colleagues would see a problem with the Japanese language he chose to leave it unedited, 
not wanting to occupy his colleagues' time with an issue that was not absolutely 
demanding of their attention. He allowed the change in the English version to appease 
my own concerns. Problem solved. Although this specific tension between the interests 
ofMOFA and ofthe Japan Foundation was largely made public by my conscious 
intervention, tensions like it arise elsewhere. And the form of its resolution operates 
similarly, usually resulting in a somewhat banal compromise that accommodates both 
parties' interests and, as a consequence, absorbs change rather than stimulates it. At an 
everyday level, this is one example of how soft power is accommodated into bureaucratic 
organizations working through representations of Japanese culture, each with their 
distinct interests and objectives. 
Balance as a Working Ethos 
In asking officials how they characterized their relationship to the contradicting 
demands of serving both national and international or public interests, I was met 
repeatedly with the appeal to the notion of balance (baransu). Managing soft power and, 
indeed, being a good cultural administrator in general is to strike a balance between the 
interests of the nation and the demands of the public, and realizing the latter often 
requires satisfying the former. The same Ogoura-san, for example, that warned against 
using "cultural activities to increase the prestige or improve the image of a particular 
nation" (2009: 45) at another point provided an example of one ideal Japan Foundation 
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program that challenged this principle. The project aimed to restore ceramic arts in the 
Istalif district of Afghanistan: 
Reviving the ceramics of Istalif---a proud part of Afghan heritage--was a 
symbol of the country's pride in its cultural traditions. The Japan 
Foundation invited ceramic artists from Istalifto Japan and gave them the 
opportunity to interact with Japanese potters. This prompted some people 
in Japan to express an interest in introducing Istalif ceramics to Japanese 
people and selling their works in Japan. By creating a network for 
international interaction, the initiative inspired further hope among the 
people of Afghanistan, boosting their determination to build peace. [2009: 
42] 
In general, it is not entirely difficult to discern the difference between programs explicitly 
designed to boost a country's image and those that seek cultural exchange as a value in 
itself, but programs like this one reveal just how much the notion of ''value" in exchanges 
like these are perceived in national terms. Success in this program was measured in the 
reclamation of pride in "Afghan heritage" and hope among the "people of Afghanistan." 
Given the degree to which the national register of thought permeates the most personal 
levels of self-confidence and identification, in some cases, building national pride rather 
than transcending it becomes the mark of value in cultural diplomacy. 
Recently, the notion of"cosmopolitanism" has been increasingly proposed as an 
alternative to the nationalist framework within discourses of cultural exchange. 
Understood as a rough constellation of identification markers that are uprooted from a 
single site of national belonging and dispersed across multiple geographic sites, traditions, 
practices, languages, and ideas, it shows the potential to disentangle identity processes 
from more primordially perceived attachments to the nation. Still, in the practice of 
administration, even cosmopolitanism shows itself as much dependent upon the nation as 
it is transcendent of it. A female foundation official around forty years old, Otsuka-san, 
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said she never thought of nationalism and cosmopolitanism as a dichotomy (nibunho) but 
rather she viewed the latter as being enfolded into the former (as Otsuk:a-san incorporates 
English words with her Japanese I have used parentheses to indicate her original words): 
When I speak of culture as a nation's policy it might seem as if I'm 
mistakenly collapsing a nation's culture (x country's culture) to the state, 
but I don't think that's quite right. The reason is because there is not a 
one-to-one relationship between the nation and state. I think the term 
"Japanese culture" includes the cultivation of a "nation-less 
cosmopolitanism" within a place called Japan. However, even saying that, 
when considering what kind of culture to introduce, we take as a target the 
notion that the main work of the Japan Foundation is to "introduce 
Japanese culture to people abroad." In general, and this is different from 
what researchers on Japan like you do, I think we usually try to choose 
"content" (kontentsu) representing so called "authentic Japanese culture" 
(osenteikku na nihon bunka), things that show off Japan to regular people 
who don't have opportunities to experience Japan. One point every 
Japanese employee is careful of is that each presentation (presentation) is 
composed of something that is absolutely (akumade) Japanese culture. On 
the other hand, one can feel a tendency for the state to take up things it 
fmds desirable, such as when organizations like the Agency for Cultural 
Affairs says this is proper Japanese culture (I think this attitude is seen as 
contrary to the perspective of Europe or globalism), but I think that when 
conservative people say "this is true x culture" or "this is proper x 
culture," and reproduce this in places of education, they are writing culture 
in ink through cultural policy. This is a misguided behavior that leaves 
culture out to dry. But, some people also say that Japanese are too 
uninformed about their own culture. I think this is in part true ... both 
points can be made I think. It's a complicated problem. 
Despite Otsuk:a-san's careful and reflective comments on the complex relationship 
between national and cosmopolitan culture, she still struggles between reconciling how to 
represent "nation-less" culture and "authentic Japanese culture." The dilemma between 
the nation-less and national is, of course, imbedded in the function of Otsuka-san' s work 
which inevitably labels culture, nation-less or not, "Japanese." This is the irony of 
national cultural administration that seeks, following Ogoura-san, to cultivate a global 
sense of community: through the sponsorship of culture identified as worthy of the 
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"common property of all human beings" (2009: 31 ), it labels that culture the property of 
Japan. All one can do in this reoccurring clash between a national and global ethos is to 
aim to strike a balance relative to the needs of each party participating in a program of 
cultural exchange, but like Otsuka-san says, "It's a complicated problem." 
"Public" Diplomacy 
An even greater challenge in balancing Ogoura's globally-minded ethos with 
nationalist demands comes from an understanding of "public diplomacy" within the 
Japan Foundation-often used interchangeably with "cultural diplomacy"- that 
constructs the notion of"public" in exclusively nationalist terms. Within the Japan 
Foundation public diplomacy is defined as "people to people" exchanges. This point is 
emphasized as an important development in how public diplomacy is conceived, given 
that in the past it was conducted primarily between governments. An official at the Japan 
Foundation drew a simple diagram for me (fig 7). 
(Figure 7. Diagram of shifts in public diplomacy) 
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Important to the new model is the fact that arrows go both ways between peoples 
and governments. Also important is the role government plays in facilitating people to 
people exchanges. The same official explained to me how he sought a very broad 
definition of public diplomacy, one that worked for the benefit of people and that 
sometimes required and sometimes did not require thinking about national interests. 
Even though the working ethos of Japan Foundation officials appeals in name to 
the concept of the "public" in its public diplomacy, the term itself is left relatively 
unproblematized. It stands more generally for the people of a specific nation, not yet 
approaching the ideal ofOgoura-san's "culture as international 'public' good." It is 
different too from Habermas's (1989) more precise definition that sees the public as a 
sphere of free and rational debate established independently of, and thus able to oversee 
and regulate, the power of the state. Even were his ideal adopted as the Japan 
Foundation's own, however, Japanese scholars like Hayashi (2006) and Hanada (1997) 
warn that the notion of a Habermasian public sphere does not and cannot operate in a 
Japanese context where the notion of"public" (ko) refers not to the people but to the 
government official.26 Thus, public interests are always conflated with those of the 
nation state. 
The notion of public diplomacy provided to me by certain Japan Foundation 
officials represents this more nationally inflected meaning. It was defmed this way in 
materials distributed to me in a course on international cultural relations taught by a 
Japan Foundation senior officer: 
26 In Japanese, kO is represented in the Chinese character(~). meaning "official" or, more traditionally, 
"lord." 
Public diplomacy should contribute to achieving the foreign goals and 
interests of a country by building the presence of that country, improving 
its image, and deepening an understanding of it through building 
relationships with foreign people and organizations, holding dialogue, 
transmitting information, and conducting various forms of exchange. 
[2008] 
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These three points-building a country's presence, image, and understanding among 
foreign publics-become the key components of a country's public diplomacy, where 
public refers to the people of a particular foreign country. 
The same materials outline why public diplomacy has become important for 
Japan in recent years: 
1. The rise of the importance of strengthening Japan's power to 
communicate its interests to the foreign community which determines its 
international status (kokusai teki na chi 'i) 
2. The amplification of the need from the perspective of Japan to solicit 
international opinion (kokusai teki na yoron) given the intensification of 
competition within the sphere of information. 
3. The existence of anti-Japanese sentiment in countries such as China. 
4. The existence of historical problems (rekishi mondai no sonzaz) [this 
refers to memories of Japan's imperialist incursions in areas of East and 
Southeast Asia in the buildup to and midst of World War II]. 
The understanding of "public" within this context points almost exclusively to activities 
designed primarily to secure the interests of a particular nation state. Where an 
organization might pursue various forms of cultural exchange--in arts, education, or 
academic research--they are done so for the benefit of the nation (jikoku no rieki). That 
this understanding of the public interest as defmed in terms ofjikoku no rieki exists 
adjacent to ideas ofOgoura-san's culture as "international public good" shows the 
complex and contrary sets of ideologies that inundate cultural administration within the 
Japan Foundation. 
197 
I often felt tom between these two ideals over the course of my fieldwork, 
perhaps more so than did employees themselves. I attributed this to the fact that my 
distance from the actual practice of cultural diplomacy, like that of Ogoura-san, Monji-
san, and other elite officials detached from the everyday demands of administration 
allowed me to entertain problems in more theoretically abstract terms. As I have already 
argued, officials have a far greater number of concerns to balance, people to appease, and 
tasks to complete. Balancing these becomes a practical skill adjusted to each context's 
particular demands. As in the translation example with Takada-san, the problem of 
balancing global and national ideals becomes enfolded into resolving more immediate 
demands of micromanagement. Before understanding this, I felt frustrated with this 
ideological contradiction between the global and the national, which manifested in a very 
palpable irritation. I asked one official if he did not feel a similar frustration. His answer 
summarized as concisely as possible what I have tried to describe as the dominant 
working ethos of cultural administrators within the Japan Foundation: baransu o 
toranakereba narimasen ne (one has to strike a balance). 
Banal Nationalism 
The varying ethical demands of administration found within MOF A and the Japan 
Foundation affix affective obligation to one's colleagues and work responsibilities to the 
nation in different ways. As illustrated through the cute ambassadors program, the mode 
of working to secure the interests of the state, typical ofMOFA officials, and working to 
build an understanding of Japanese culture that is distinct from the state's interests, 
typical of Japan Foundation officials, can take very polarizing forms. However, what 
appears problematic in ideology is rendered less pertinent in practice as bureaucracies 
198 
have over a long time established a general operative stability that accommodates tension 
by treating ideological problems as secondary to maintaining the organization's status 
quo. When MOFA directs that the Japan Foundation administer a program like the cute 
ambassadors project, imagined through the lens of Japan's new pop culture soft power 
resources, it raises the level of tension between ideals of conducting cultural exchange for 
varying nationalist and non-nationalist purposes. Given bureaucracy's primary and 
recursive focus on maintaining bureaucratic stability, such tensions are resolved in 
relatively banal ways. 
Banality, in fact, accounts for many of the accommodations of problematically 
narrow, nationalist conceptions of cultural exchange programs to ones imagined in more 
global and cosmopolitan terms. Nationalism is not inherently a problem. It is conceived 
of more simply as a natural category of cultural identification and citizenship. That the 
Japan Foundation's task is to introduce Japanese culture, art, knowledge, and lifestyles 
which are the propriety of the nation state is the natural assumption which enables its 
activity. It is built into the organization's name. Roland Barthes's insight that "ideology 
speaks with 'the Voice ofNature" (1977: 47, cited in Billig 1995: 37) is echoed in the 
transcripts of officials. Nationalism is the most natural and pervasive of modem 
ideologies, organizing so many facets of administrative and personal life. Its absolute 
givenness renders Ogoura's proposition that Japanese culture belongs not exclusively to 
the Japanese people and that national interests need be transcended almost radical. 
Although it is an attractive ideal as ideal, and one promoted by a number of critics 
seeking to move Japan beyond its more rigid and culturally essentialist forms of self-
understanding (lwabuchi 2007), it finds little traction in the day to day planning and 
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execution of cultural exchange programs. And in so much that the framework of soft 
power proliferates throughout Japanese bureaucracy so too does the naturalization of the 
idea that it can and should play a role in cultural exchange activities, whether to meet the 
more overtly nationalist aims ofMOFA or the less assertive ones of the Japan Foundation. 
Michael Billig's work (1995) goes far in describing this kind of naturalness in 
regards to national imagining. His notion of"banal nationalism" (1995: 6) is effective in 
describing a broad category of ways of relating to the nation separate from the more 
publicized ones of radical conservatism, xenophobic violence, and jingoism. He argues 
that nationalism is a consciousness more flexible than those, sometimes manifesting as an 
impassioned defense of a nation's perceived values but more often residing in the 
everyday interpellations in forms of address in the newspaper, in the singing of national 
anthems before sporting events, or in simply speaking languages which are held to be the 
propriety of some nations and not others. While his argument is convincing, I feel that in 
accepting it unconditionally there is a danger of assuming that national sentiment is 
constructed uniformly across societies. In this chapter I have tried to be more careful and 
discerning in my understanding of nationalism, showing how it can elicit different 
feelings toward images of the nation state through different ways of organizing a 
subject's obligation to it. In the next chapter I move beyond analyses of how soft power 
is accommodated to bureaucratic practice to look at sites where soft power as discourse is 
more actively affecting and altering that practice, establishing new relationships between 
organizations, enabling new thoughts and policies previously unimaginable within the 
terms of cultural diplomacy, and producing new, emergent forms of cultural life. 
Chapter Seven 
Cute Ambassadors II: 
Soft Power and its Emergent Forms of Life 
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In this chapter I want to examine soft power more specifically in its function as 
the organizing principle of that which resembles Foucault's dispositif(apparatus), 
establishing a particular way of relating disparate, heterogeneous objects within a 
network of relations (Rabinow 2003: 51). In treating soft power this way it may seem as 
if I am ascribing a kind of agency to soft power. This is not exactly right, and 
presumably Foucault would have his own objections to the suggestion. Moreover, I am 
also not attributing to soft power an institutional durability or temporal longevity that 
Rabinow ascribes to the apparatus (2003: 55), although it might, in fact, acquire it. 
Treating soft power as a specific, emerging, and institutionalizing and institutionalized 
entity with the productive capacity to organize previously disparate objects, utterances, 
and regimes of thought characterizes well how soft power operates. In short, Foucault's 
concept assists in the description of this process. In this chapter, then, I examine soft 
power's emergent properties. A further caveat: by appealing to the category of the 
"emergent," I mean to acknowledge Michael Fischer's description of it as a lens through 
which to understand contemporary cultural formations for which our traditional 
"ethnographic datum[s], social theoretic heuristic[s], and a philosophical stance regarding 
ethics have grown increasingly inapplicable (2003: 37). However, my analysis does not 
abide as assiduously to Fischer's criteria for the emergent as might be appropriate. Thus, 
I temper any suggestions of theoretical novelty, as does Fischer himself, in fact, by 
situating my understanding of the emergent in conjunction with the other two historical 
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horizons with which Raymond Williams tells us it most always appears: the dominant 
and the fading (Fisher 2003: 37). Most simply, I am interested in the emergent's ability 
to establish connections to and between new things; to enable new possibilities for 
thought; and even to produce and imagine new objects altogether. I begin with perhaps 
soft power's most famous of emergent life forms, introduced in the previous chapter: the 
cute ambassadors. 
At the modestly sized and minimally decorated press room at Japan's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on February 26, 2009, Public Diplomacy Department Director Monji 
Kenjiro presented Aoki Misako (age 27), Kimura Yii (age 27), and Fujioka Shizuka (age 
21) with their official appointments: popukarucha hashinshi - fuasshon bunya (New 
Trend Communicators of Japanese Pop Culture) or, abbreviated, kawaii taishi (Cute 
Ambassadors [fig. 8]). "The main mission of the three ambassadors," Monji-san 
explained, "is to transmit the new trends of Japanese pop culture in the field of fashion to 
the rest of the world and to promote understanding of Japan through their respective 
cultural projects carried out by the Japanese Embassies and the Japan Foundation" 
(MOF A 2009). As the three young girls lined up in front of flashing cameras, Monji-san 
elaborated: 
Pop culture, including fashion, is an integral part oftoday's Japanese 
culture. It enjoys worldwide popularity and we witness that its fans are 
ever-increasing. Pop culture is expected to help the people of the world 
have more chances to know about contemporary Japan, hand-in-hand with 
other parts of traditional and contemporary Japanese culture. [MOFA 
2009] 
The introduction, part two of a daily announcement MOFA holds for the Ministry's kisha 
kurabu (press clubs) (there are usually two meetings a day), directly followed a briefing 
on a symposium held a day earlier, a follow-up to the Tokyo International Conference on 
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African Development IV, titled "Japan's Efforts to Promote Peace and Security in Africa: 
The Case of Sudan and Beyond." Foreign Ministry Deputy Press Secretary Kawamura 
Yasuhisa summarized Foreign Minister Nakasone's four major points concerning Japan's 
role in building sustainable peace in Africa: 
One, Japan's active involvement in ending conflicts and achieving peace 
by citing the cases of Sudan and Somalia. Two, Japan's active involvement 
in implementing peace agreements. Three, the importance of enhancing 
Africa's capacity for peace building. And, four, the necessity of 
strengthening Japan's personnel contribution to peace-building efforts in 
Africa. [MOF A 2009] 
The irony of the especially discordant two announcements would not have eluded Monji-
san himself. Five months later while talking about the transition from his old job as 
Ambassador to Iraq to his new one as Public Diplomacy Department Director (koho 
bunka koryii bucho, the literal translation would read something closer to "Public 
Relations and Cultural Exchange Director"), he handed me a 9xll sheet of paper with 
two pictures. The top picture showed him in Iraq during his appointment as ambassador, 
posing in front of a HMMWV with members of Japan's defense forces and Iraqi 
translators. 27 The bottom picture showed him with the winners of the World Cosplay 
Summit championship, held annually in Nagoya, Japan, where young fans dress up as 
their favorite anime characters and compete for prizes. Sharing laughter with Monji-san 
at the juxtaposition of the two images, my mind recalled other images I had encountered 
that evoked similar sentiments. One was of another group of Japanese self-defense forces, 
this time distributing water in Iraq. On the side of the Japanese water tanker trucks was 
an image of Captain Tsubasa, a character from a famous 1980s soccer anime in Japan and 
27 Monji-san inserted black lines over the eyes of the Iraqis to protect their identity. I have decided against 
publishing this photo altogether. 
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popular throughout the Middle East where he is known as Captain Majed (fig. 9). 
Another image was of former Foreign Minister K6mura Masahiko presenting a life-size 
figure of Doraemon, a popular animated robot cat, with a formal letter of assignment 
making the cat the official Anime Ambassador of Japan (figs. 10 and 11). 
(Figure 8. Cute Ambassadors Fujioka Shizuka, 
Kimura Yu, and Aoki Misako) 
(Figure 9. Water tanks with popular anime figure called 
"Captain Majed" in Iraq presented by MOF A) 
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(Figure 10. "Inauguration Ceremony of Anime Ambassador") 
(Figure 11. "Inauguration Ceremony of Anime Ambassador") 
Whereas each of these images taken alone might elicit a casual smile at the ironic 
juxtaposition of playful cuteness and hard line security operations, taken as a series, they 
encourage us to think further, asking what circumstances allow young girls in eighteenth 
century French haute fashion, anime soccer stars, and robot cats to share discursive and 
temporal space with African and Iraqi peacekeeping efforts? The answer, I think, points 
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to the capacity of soft power to not only assemble disparate objects in newly imagined 
logical relations with one other but also to produce new objects, new forms of life 
unthinkable outside the network of those relations. 
Kawaii Taishi 
The kawaii taishi, according to Monji-san, represent the cutting edge in the field 
of cute fashion trends in Japan. Each girl represents one style of such trends. Kimura Yu 
is the leader of Harajuku-kei fuasshon (Harajuku-style fashion), named after the trendy 
area up the street from one of Tokyo's most famous urban centers, Shibuya, and its iconic 
bustling crosswalk, Hachiko-crossing. Harajuku is the epicenter of the latest trends in 
youth street fashion. Kimura's style is eclectic, mixing and matching items and 
accessories from second-hand clothing stores. It is bright, colorful, and somewhat garish 
(hade), an aesthetic accentuated by her bright blond hair with pink highlights. Kimura is 
recognized for her ability to match a number of different, and often discordant, items 
collected from several different boutiques along Harajuku's main shotengai (shopping 
street). As many of her items are second-hand and generally cheaper, embedded in her 
style is also an ethical practice that values the effort put into the search for just the right 
items marked at affordable prices, not an insignificant challenge in central Tokyo. Where 
talk of price tags might be consciously avoided in other Tokyo fashion circles, among 
Kimura's fans low prices are a point of pride and aesthetic distinction. 
Aoki Misako is the representative of the more established and eccentric rorita 
fasshon (Lolita Fashion style), named after Nabokov's pubescent object of desire in the 
novel by the same name (1989). In contrast to the lascivious allusions, however, the style 
appears much more conservatively Victorian in taste, characterized by frills, lace, long 
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skirts and sleeves, and high socks and collars. Aoki herself claims to be nothing of the 
sexualized object portrayed in Nabokov's novel. Instead, her object of adoration is a 
mixture of the Victorian styles of nineteenth century England and the Rococo period 
fashions of eighteenth century France. Although there are several ever-evolving genres 
of Lolita fashion, Aoki's is the most conservatively "sweet," represented by such brands 
as Baby, the Stars Shine Bright and Angelic Pretty. Compared to Kimura's Harajuku 
style, Lolita items are significantly higher in price, with dresses usually marked between 
two and three hundred dollars, but sometimes going as high as five or six hundred, and 
accessories like headdresses, shoes, and bags going from between one and two hundred. 
The actress and fashion coordinator Fujioka Shizuka represents the joshi kosei 
fuasshon (girls' high school uniform style), characterized by plaid skirts, blazers, and 
ribbons and scarves. Although similar to the uniforms mandatory at all of Japan's public 
and most of its private secondary schools, the school uniform has also emerged as its own 
genre with its accordant fashion magazines and catalogues (Conomi 2009). The 
schoolgirl uniform is a highly polysemic symbol in Japan, sometimes representing 
conservatism, sometimes cute culture, and very often made into a highly fetishized sexual 
object. The schoolgirl uniform has been made especially popular abroad through manga 
and anime, many stories of which focus on young girls (shojo manga). 
The fashion styles of the cute ambassadors are distinct, representing, as with most 
trend setting, not only differences in taste but also distinctions in the practices of its 
consumers. Each kei (type or style), a word that could refer as much to a style as it could 
to a person who embodies it, carries with it its own ethos, and given the number of sub-
categories within each style, the different sites and forms of leisure associated with each 
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group, and the vastly different price ranges between each style, one fmds a rich web of 
subtle distinctions and nuances among its consumers. 
Such richness and subtlety of fashion's lived expressions, however, are 
nonetheless lost in the introductions of cute ambassadors at overseas events. The media 
producer and "General Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Issues of Pop 
Culture," Sakurai Takamasa, who I described in previous chapters, is the individual in 
charge of accompanying and presenting the ambassadors at overseas events.28 At the 
2009 Japan Expo in Paris, Sakurai, dressed in the breeches, cloak, and ruff of the 
Elizabethan Period and speaking through a French translator, began his introduction of 
Kimura Yu by asking his audience of about one hundred, "How many people know the 
word 'kawaii'?" (the word "kawaii" was left in the original Japanese). He pointed his 
microphone to the audience and raised his hand, eliciting a lackluster and confused 
response. He then asked, "Who wants to see the cute ambassador?" repeating the same 
routine. After inviting Kimura-san to the stage he asked again, "Who thinks she is cute?" 
After having Kimura-san turn around for the audience--"chotto guru guru shite" (do a 
little turn}---he interviewed her about what she was wearing and how she selected her 
clothes to make her ensembles. He then showed a slide show of other cute fashion trends 
in Harajuku and ended having Kimura sing sections from two of her pop songs a 
cappella (she is also a moderately famous pop star). Assuming that people would likely 
want to take pictures of Kimura-san, Sakurai ended the presentation and invited audience 
members to bring their cameras to the front of the stage. 
28 At the time of writing Sakurai had accompanied at least one of the ambassadors to Russia, Italy, France, 
Spain, Thailand, and most recently, Brazil. 
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Sakurai's introduction is commensurate with a number of critics' readings of cute 
culture (Otsuka 1989, 1991; Shimamura 1991; Yamane 1991; Miyadai 1993; Kinsella 
1995; McVeigh 1996; Harris 2001) that note the ability of cute to resist critique. Asking 
young Tokyo women to define cuteness, McVeigh notes a common answer with which 
he was often met: "Cuteness is something one can't talk about. It's something one can 
only feel, in one's heart" (1996: 294). Harris agrees that cuteness is above all an 
affective aesthetic but certainly not one, in his opinion, we should necessarily cultivate. 
For him, cuteness evokes sentiments of the malformed, grotesque, and pitiable, triggering, 
"with Pavlovian predictability, maternal feelings for a maternal condition of endearing 
naivete" (2001: 2). Cuteness is not something we find in subjects, he says, but something 
we do to them, effectively rendering them helpless and dependent upon our care (200 1: 
5). This ability for cute to resist critique as well as elicit one's parental desires for 
nurturing is evidenced in Sakurai's presentation. In projecting images of cute fashion 
from Harajuku on screen, Sakurai has little more to offer the crowd than "kawaii desu ne" 
(isn't it cute?). He provides nothing of the context of the cultural mise-en-scene of 
Kimura's fashion, neither relating fashion to Kimura's social life, interests, work, or 
leisure activities nor soliciting questions from audience members who might be interested 
in such things. In effect, he renders Kimura---just like that famous kitty who without a 
mouth is unable to speak- anonymous, void of any distinctive personality traits. 
Gendering Soft Power and Kawaii 
Not surprisingly, in my presentations at conferences and other public venues in 
which I relayed Sakurai's performance I was consistently met with reactions of disgust at 
Sakurai's treatment of the girls as "products" (shohin). These came mostly from Western 
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men and women, more than a few of them anthropologists. They also came from women 
identifying as Japanese, but these were fewer in number than I expected. This might be 
in part explained by the more exclusive relegation of the aesthetic of cute in the West to 
adolescence compared to the Japanese kawaii, which has its acceptable counterparts in 
adult fashion trends; thus, kawaii is seen as the dominant and natural--thus less 
problematic-aesthetic defining femininity in Japanese fashion. Although such 
disparaging displays toward women, especially as performed by older men toward young 
women, is cited as typical to Japanese institutions--job hiring (shiishoku katsudo), 
classrooms, media, pornography--it takes on a new significance when cast in the light of 
soft power strategies and the affects of cultural anxiety that sustain them. 
Sianne Ngai offers a portrait of anxiety as a particularly male-dominated affect. 
In her literary readings of "spatialized representations of anxiety" in works by Herman 
Melville, Alfred Hitchcock, and Martin Heidegger, she sees anxiety as acquiring a 
"certain epistemological cachet" (2005: 212-212): "Pointing to the general prominence of 
phobia as a signifying economy in modem culture, expressions such as 'anxiety of 
influence,' 'middle-class anxiety,' and 'millennia! anxiety' use the negative affect they 
invoke as a handy way of immediately establishing a skeptical or critical stance toward 
the phenomena described" (213). She finds parallels in the "primary model of gender 
differentiation" of Freud's psychoanalysis as well as in the Continental tradition of 
existentialist philosophy, where the "privileging of anxiety as a key for interpreting the 
human condition is accompanied by its being secured as the distinctive-if not 
exclusive-emotional province of male intellectuals" (213). To females, incidentally, are 
attributed the less traumatic and less profound affects like nostalgia and envy. Ngai sees 
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this particular male anxiety too in the Don Giovanni of Mozart's opera who is described 
as "anxiety itself' (214). Through a number ofliterary readings of Western culture Ngai 
examines how anxiety comes to acquire a special status as the distinctive "feeling-tone" 
of self-inquiry, slowly replacing its precursor of a melancholia that was the intellectual's 
signature sensibility prior to the modem period. 
If anxiety does become the signature affective mode of male self-inquiry in the 
modem West, as Ngai argues, could it be especially characteristic of a form of national 
Japanese belonging that emerged specifically in response to a perceived threat ofWestem 
modernity in the late twentieth century? Although I do not want to stretch such a 
generalized historicization of modem masculinity in Japan too far beyond its 
ethnographic indicators, the cultural crisis formalized repeatedly in modem Japanese 
literature and scholarship--from the literature of Soseki and Dazai to the Kyoto school 
scholars of the "Overcoming Modernity" symposium (Kindai no chokoku) held in the 
midst of the Pacific War--consistently conflated modernization with Western culture. 
Despite rhetorical alternatives that aimed to split the two, wakon yosai (Eastern spirit, 
Western technology/techniques) being the most prominent, the highly sought-after 
modernization toward which Japanese elites strived was inescapably entangled with 
Westernization. Extending this logic, if anxiety was the dominant affect characterizing 
self-reflection in the West, a crisis of Japanese national identity instigated by the West 
itself could not be overcome but through the West's own modes of reflection and 
resolution. This was the irony inspiring and ultimately derailing "Overcoming 
Modernity," an exclusively male project (not one of the thirteen participants was female). 
Styles of soul searching for the Japanese spirit in the new Japanese state, in its prewar 
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military buildup, in its postwar depression, in its economic expansion, and now in the 
persistent malaise that followed in its wake prove to be male dominated and anxiously 
affected. 
Such a reading, broad though it may be (and I am narrowing now), is consistent 
with the genealogy of the cute ambassador program, which emerged out of discussions by 
a handful of men in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its critiques, which might be labeled 
feminist of a general kind, have been few, the most prominent one so far being the diet 
woman's concern raised to Monji-san about potential misunderstandings should such cute 
girls in short skirts be paraded about Middle Eastern countries. This reading is also 
consistent with Sakurai's treatment of the cute ambassadors in Paris and even more 
clearly evidenced in the nationalist enthusiasm he exhibits for the spread of cute culture 
throughout the world in his 2009 publication, Sekai kawaii no kakumei (The Global Cute 
Revolution), which I describe in more detail below. Finally, national identity as 
emerging from a particularly male anxiety is most acutely demonstrated in a passing 
comment during an interview with the female director of a prominent graduate program 
in cultural policy in Japan. Upon soliciting her thoughts on the cultural programs of 
MOF A and the Japan Foundation, she fell back in her chair and let out a scoffing laugh. 
It was the first mocking tone I had encountered from my informants formally engaged in 
cultural policy. "The Japan Foundation is just a money bag for MOFA; I never know 
what those bureaucrats are thinking," she said, laughing again. In one short mocking 
comment she had undermined the entire project of my male interlocutors' investments in 
cultural policy as a safeguard against an impending national crisis. And in our exchange 
and, indeed, in her writings on cultural policy (which I do not cite to protect her 
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anonymity), I could identify little of the anxious urgency I had elsewhere encountered 
among male informants. 
Critics like Tomiko Y oda have identified what they see as clear metaphorical 
shifts in the historical development of gendered frameworks used to imagine Japanese 
society. Yoda argues that a concept of maternal society (bosei shakai) defined ideologies 
of social management in the late 1960s and was then reconfigured into what was called 
the "enterprise society" (kigyo shakai) during the 70s and 80s (2006: 240). Recently, 
though, she sees this maternal "metaphor of power and order" giving way to a "vogue of 
paternalism" (241). Yoda's critique is useful in showing how rhetorical abstractions of 
the national body rely on differing and developing models of gender in their articulation. 
In the generalization of these frameworks for imagining Japanese society to a pervasive, 
culture-wide sensibility, however, I think Y oda sacrifices some precision in showing 
which institutions effected social change discursively and how (a point similar to the one 
I raise with Ivy in chapter 1 ). Less emphasized in this generalization is a critique of a 
male-dominated bureaucratic system (kanri seido) that in its practices leaves the 
manufacturing of national discourses to male elites, resulting in distinctively gendered 
policy and emergent forms of life like the cute ambassadors. Further, to say these 
discourses of paternalism and maternalism pervade Japanese society is likely an 
overstatement, and one that too easily portrays Japan as a homogenous and integrated 
cultural unit. I want to alternatively suggest that the discourse of soft power within 
Japanese bureaucracies divides maternalism and paternalism administratively rather than 
historically, applying symbols of maternity to "society" (shakai), often imagined through 
issues like welfare, and those of paternalism to the "nation" (kokka), imagined in terms of 
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prestige and status (chi'i). Common critiques, which I described in chapter 2, of Japan 
too often occupying the role of the needy and nagging wife in relation to a more 
masculine husband in the United States demonstrate this. Such emasculating 
characterizations of Japan inspire defensive responses of Japanese masculinity, seen in 
works like Hayashi Yoshimichi's Fusei no Fukken (The Restoration of Fatherhood, 1996) 
and Ishihara Shintaro's Chichi nakushite kunitatazu (No Father no Nation, 1997) which 
argue that Japan needs to become a stronger, more assertive, and thus more masculine 
nation (Y oda 2006: 240)?9 
Contrary to Y oda, I do not want to say this kind of paternalism pervades 
contemporary Japan at large. It does, I think, fairly characterize sentiments pervading 
Japanese national bureaucracies, but only when bureaucratic practice is mobilized to 
address international concerns, where the framework of competitiveness inspires 
responses articulated in more masculine symbols and imagery. In the next chapter I 
attempt to show where such administrative practices and their associated affects of 
anxiety begin to penetrate spaces of the everyday, but in doing so I want to be very 
careful in showing this discourse as existing primarily in only one register of nationalism, 
one constellation of symbols, sentiments, and utterances that exists alongside others. Soft 
power, then, in no way evokes or is sustained by affects of anxiety characteristic of 
Japanese society as a whole but rather is limited to this specific, masculine register that 
imagines the nation as responding to definitively foreign threats and competitors. This 
register of imagination and feeling characterizes the bureaucratic mode of engaging with 
29 Additionally, Article 9 of Japan's constitution stating that the nation will not engage in belligerent 
activity of any kind has been long interpreted through the metaphor of castration, a nation without the 
ability to wage war analogous to a man without a penis. 
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soft power; it extends beyond it only where bureaucracy touches the everyday through 
tangible sites of administration and media. 
The performance in Paris of Sakurai and Kimura, the cute ambassador, exhibits 
the signs of a political discourse that characterizes anxiety over cultural prestige as an 
overwhelmingly male concern. Kimura embodies Japanese charm but does not explain, 
interpret, or critique it. That is Sakurai's job. From the perspective of soft power, 
Kimura is a resource of soft power while Sakurai is the administrator who must care for it, 
cultivate it, and ultimately make it into something productive. Through Sakurai's 
introduction of Kimura and through his solicitation of particular responses from the 
audience-- Sakurai: "Isn't she cute?!" Audience: "Yeeeahh!"---he turns kawaii into a 
cultural trait that has its origins in a locally produced Japanese culture that one can take 
pride in precisely because of its uniqueness. 
The particular coupling of national anxiety and cultural pride is even better 
exhibited in two of Sakurai's publications, Anime Diplomacy (Anime bunka gaiko, 
2009a) and The Cute Revolution (Sekai kawaii kakumei, 2009b). The two works share a 
similar structure with his cute ambassador presentations, charting the respective 
popularity of Japanese anime and cute culture abroad both in statistics and in personal 
anecdotes of his encounters with young foreign fans of Japanese pop culture, such as in 
meeting adulators of cute culture in Paris who express to him their desire to become 
Japanese (2009b: 21 ); speaking with youth in Bologna who tell him they were raised on 
anime (2009a: 69); or in encountering die hard fans of Japanese anime and TV drama in 
places as seemingly removed from Japan as Saudi Arabia (2009a: 34-35) or Syria (2009a: 
53-55). Overly tuned in to praise for Japanese pop culture, Sakurai presents such cases as 
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hard evidence for the success of Japanese soft power. He returns home anxious to bring 
his message to other Japanese who have no idea their culture is so respected abroad. This 
notion of Japanese being not sufficiently aware of how popular their culture is abroad 
was commonly cited to me as a concern among administrators, and it has become a 
common trope of cultural diplomacy. Building Japanese people's awareness of their own 
culture's presence overseas has even been taken up by the Japan Foundation as one role 
of cultural diplomacy. Such repetitive public evocations of self-reassurance only make 
sense as remedies for confidence building, turning, like soft power does in general, 
cultural anxiety into national hope. 
The History of Cute: Critical and Revisionist 
Also characterizing the discourse of the cute ambassadors and kawaii culture 
more generally is its ahistoricism. Turning cute into a tool of cultural expediency 
requires a naturalizing process, obscuring the particular context of its emergence so as to 
define it as a product of a Japanese cultural essence unchanged over the nation's long 
history. Sharon Kinsella's (1995) and Yamane Kazuma's (1986) historical accounts of 
the emergence of cute challenge national narratives connecting Japan's pop commodities 
to its traditional ones. They trace the origin of Japanese cute to the practice of junior high 
and high school students in the 1970s who started writing in a creative and feminized 
script--"rounded characters with English, katakana and little cartoon pictures such as 
hearts, stars and faces inserted randomly into the text"- in contrast to the more 
conventional and more typical, straight vertical style (Kinsella 1995: 2). The handwriting 
went by a number of names according to Kinsella, such as "marui ji (round writing), 
konekoji (kitten writing), mangaji (comic writing) and burikkoji (fake-child writing)" 
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(1995: 2). Associated with the popularization of cute speech and baby talk in the 1970s 
and combined with transformations in mass-consumption habits, companies like Sanrio 
began to capitalize off these new youth trends by offering so called "fancy goods," the 
essential ingredients of which, says Kinsella, "are that it is small, pastel, round, soft, 
loveable, not [a] traditional Japanese style but a foreign, ... European or American style, 
dreamy, frilly and fluffy" (1995: 4). Consumers today recognize these qualities in 
Sanrio's most iconic commodity, Hello Kitty, the small, white, cartoon cat cited earlier, 
created in Japan but who, as her biography indicates, is originally from England and 
whose face now covers everything from toasters to assault rifles. 30 
What establishes a logic of relationships between Hello Kitty, teenage writing 
styles, Lolita fashion, and cute ambassadors? What makes these things objects of 
Japanese culture that share affinity with other pop culture life forms like animated cats 
(Doraemon) or mobile robots (Asimo ), or with traditional ones like geisha, samurai, or 
any other number of artifacts designated as representative of Japan by MOP A's public 
diplomacy divisions or the Japan Foundation? Finally, how do these things become 
objects of national administration? I think the answers point to soft power's potential to 
create and illuminate connections between these heterogeneous objects, assembling them 
in relation to one another within an apparatus of cultural diplomacy. So effective does 
the affectively sustained discourse of soft power prove to be in establishing relationships 
between new things in a network that it produces not only new ways of understanding the 
present but also of the present's relationship to the past. 
3° Credit goes to Christine Y ano for first drawing my attention to the latter of these products. 
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Japan's Prime Ministers have made specific allusions to the continuum between 
Japan's traditional and contemporary pop culture. Aso Taro does this by identifying both 
traditions as equally emergent of a single national heritage: 
We continue to get the word out on Japan's truly splendid traditional 
culture, and we are very fortunate that in addition to the items of Noh 
drama and Bunraku, tea ceremony and flower arranging, Japan also boasts 
many newer forms of culture that have a high degree of appeal. This 
would be pop culture, including anime, music, and fashion among others, 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is really going all out to "market" this, 
so to speak. [ Aso 2006] 
Abe Shinzo's address to the National Diet in 2007 even more directly integrates the 
traditional with the contemporary: "Japanese contemporary culture's coolness is founded 
in and derived from its traditional culture" (Abe 2007). A similar logic has been repeated 
to me numerous times in interviews with officials and administrators, and from multiple 
agencies. This rather new rhetoric linking Japan's contemporary popular arts to its 
historical ones, effectively effacing historically particular narratives of pop culture such 
as those provided by Kinsella (1995) and Yamane (1991), only grows stronger and more 
natural with the plethora of new publications trumpeting the "pop power" of Japan's 
"cool culture" (Koyama 2004; Hamano 2005; Nakamura and Onouchi 2006; Sugiyama 
2006; Shima 2009; Sakurai 2009a, 2009b). 
Such examples employ homogeneous tropes of Japan in the reproduction of 
familiar, culturally essentialist antidotes in response to perceived threats to Japanese 
integration and national prestige. In many ways, these tropes constructed in narratives of 
history invert the usual affective order of anxiety's effects on national identification: 
rather than anxious affects in the present contributing to the formulation of hopeful 
futures, in repeatedly imagining impossibly pure, enclosed, and exceptional portraits of a 
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distinct culture untenable under conditions of globalization today, hopeful expectations 
for the future are made perceivable in memories of a glorified past. Hopeful portraits of 
prestige for a future Japan produce the perception of power imbalances as anxious threat 
in the present. The familiar discomfort of nostalgia that Ivy describes (1995) reproduces 
itselfby guaranteeing the failure of propitious futures measured against impossibly 
prestigious pasts. 
Emergent forms of life like the cute ambassadors, though, suggest that the 
symbols of Japanese nostalgia might be more easily shrugged off than Ivy predicts: in so 
much that the future of Japan and its new popular symbols of national culture secure a 
familiar connection between cultural uniqueness and cultural anxiety, soft power 
promises to alleviate the latter by regenerating the former. Soft power seeks out symbols 
for such regeneration, combining pop cultural fandom with economic and national 
security in the manufacturing of strange new entities. Its institutionalization in national 
bureaucracies--large, complexly structured, slow-moving blunt bodies--naturalizes soft 
power while at the same time almost certainly guaranteeing its inadaptability to the speed 
and flux of global economies. Such a situation promises to sustain the disjunction 
between the affective excitement that characterizes soft power as ideology and the 
practical challenges that burden it as policy. In the next chapter, I trace how the adoption 
ofNye's "soft power" by Japanese national bureaucracies has begun to alter not only 
relations within national administrations but also, as a consequence of the highly 
integrated organization of government, media, and daily life in Japan, the network of 
relations between politics and culture in sites of the everyday as well. 
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Chapter Eight 
Soft Power and the Everyday 
This chapter begins from an observation that I more conservatively treat as a 
hypothesis but that in his study of the rationality and rituality of the Japanese state Brian 
Me Veigh treats more literally: 
What is significant for my present argument is that the ministries have set 
the pace, tone, and standards not just for the more obvious aspects of 
modernization, but also for the rationalized, bureaucratized, and ritualized 
resonance of daily life in present-day Japan. I also contend that Japan's 
bureaucracies have taken advantage of and sustained sociopolitical 
arrangements that do not always distinguish clearly between public (state) 
and private (society) interests. Thus, much of Japan's bureaucratic power 
rests on its ability to segment, fragment, and categorize society (gender, 
interests, regional, national, etc.) as it sees fit, thereby weakening state-
society distinctions. [1998: 72] 
McVeigh's evaluation ofhow administrative bodies in Japan blur the boundaries between 
the public and the state is consistent with Hayashi (2006) and Hanada's (1997) discussion 
of the Japanese public sphere that I presented in chapter 6. What all these critics point to 
is the degree to which national bureaucracies in Japan have established smooth 
administrative mechanisms for integrating policy and national narratives into everyday 
life. 
If Me Veigh is right about bureaucracy's ability to extend its structures of control 
into the more intimate spaces of private lives, then the fact has serious consequences for 
the way people think through cultural citizenship. Throughout this dissertation I have 
attempted to describe a particular anxiety characteristic of a mode ofbureaucratic 
practice that is oriented to problems of global urgency, thus evoking both a desire to 
strengthen Japan in response to its perceived threats and a hope that it can, in fact, be 
done. If Japan is this well integrated administratively, and this administrative mode is 
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characterized by a particular national anxiety, to what degree can we expect these forms 
of anxiety and hope generated by the discourse of soft power to become inscribed in the 
everyday? Entertaining McVeigh's idea that a good deal of culture in Japan flows from 
the top down, through government administrations to those sites of the everyday with 
which they come into contact, I want to attempt to trace a few paths by which the rhetoric 
of soft power in national administration does seem to be affecting life outside it. 
However, in order to avoid providing a homogenous view of this process, I want to take 
up three very different cases in order to show how the emerging institutionalization of 
soft power affects in diverse ways, in no way providing for the inscription of a singular 
affective mode of imagining the nation analogous to that of national bureaucrats. While 
in some cases soft power rhetoric might be seen to affect discourse directly, producing 
results anticipated by administrators, at other times it elicits dissonance and 
estrangement, producing the exact opposite of desired outcomes. In illustrating this 
suggestion I draw on fieldwork examples from media, the content industries, and 
education. 
Media 
In media, Japan's unique kisha kurabu (press club) system has long been regarded 
as a major institution through which government establishes influence and control. In 
Japan, news organizations do not compete freely for information but are granted or 
denied formal access to government briefings through passes allotted by each ministry. 
Thus, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for example, must grant an organization like the 
Asahi Shinbun (Asahi newspaper) a pass in order for its journalists to attend briefings 
where information is disseminated. Such a system restricts access to information to only 
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the major news agencies whose staff must establish a congenial rapport with ministry 
personnel. The system also guarantees that reporting on the government will be 
relatively consistent from one news organization to the next. Investigative journalism 
and harsh government opinion pieces, thus, are rare relative to Western press (although 
the United States' cable news networks are increasingly complicating this distinction). 
Government and press in Japan, then, have established a cooperative and reciprocal 
relationship that is criticized equally by scholars of media both in and outside Japan (Hall 
1997; Kawasaki 1997; Krauss 2000; Kawasaki and Shibata 2004). 
NHK, Japan's public broadcaster, has been similarly criticized for its close 
relationship to government. A number of works in Japan criticize the intimate 
relationship between politicians and the high-level administrators ofNHK (Kawasaki 
1997; Kawasaki and Shibata 2004). NHK sponsors the show "Cool Japan" I discussed at 
length in chapter 5, and although space limits further discussion of it here, the section can 
be reread in the context of how nation branding logic reaches everyday publics. 
A story told by a prominent media scholar in Japan reveals exactly how a register 
of nationalist thinking within government bureaucracy translates and appropriates more 
cosmopolitan critiques circulating in media spheres toward its own ends. Iwabuchi 
Koichi begins his story by explaining how excited he was at reading a 2006 newspaper 
article stating that the Koizumi cabinet was looking to create new television channels 
within Japan that went beyond the usual programming in Japanese and English, providing 
broadcasts in Korean, Chinese, Portuguese, Spanish, Tagalog, and Thai. Iwabuchi writes, 
"I remember thinking after reading that article, wow, finally, even Japan can construct a 
media environment that respects the diversity of its multiple peoples" (2007: 114). The 
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cabinet (kakugi) seemed to be finally getting the message of the need for more culturally 
diverse broadcasting that Iwabuchi and other prominent academics and media figures had 
been suggesting for some time. However, Iwabuchi's optimism was quickly deflated: 
What I was shocked at was that the point of view emphasizing the 
importance of providing broadcasts in languages other than Japanese for 
foreign residents of Japan was at later cabinet meetings suddenly 
supplanted by the view emphasizing the importance of transmitting media 
from Japan to the world, with only the latter one being forwarded. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs then quickly set up a foreign ministry advisory 
committee with the theme "strengthening Japan's transmission power" 
(Nihon no hasshinryoku kyoka) in order to discuss such things as policies 
to enhance NHK's international broadcasts. The committee was called the 
"Council on Foreign Relations" (Kaigai koryu shingi kaz) and it invited 
the vice chairman of Toyota, Fujio Cho, to serve as the council's chairman. 
As former Foreign Minister Aso Taro's words made perfectly clear--"lt is 
important for the common people of foreign countries to have an 
understanding and a positive image of Japan. Shouldn't it be appropriate 
to have this done through foreign broadcasts ofNHK like the BBC and 
CNN?"--what was being aimed for was to deepen an understanding of 
Japan through information and image transmission, and build Japan's 
image in the world by tying this to Japan's interests on the political and 
economic front. However, the provision of a public broadcasting service 
for the various people living in the country and the transmission of 
information to the world toward the aim of procuring "Japanese 
understanding" fundamentally differ. In the way the development of this 
debate suddenly twisted, the limits and point at issue in the debate over 
media cultural policy that emphasizes varying public and national interests 
in Japan can be plainly seen. [Iwabuchi 2007: 114-115] 
Iwabuchi's story demonstrates the practice of transposition played by government 
administrators. In music "transposition" refers to the process of transferring a written 
piece into a different key, or, following the metaphor I developed in chapter 2, a different 
register. In an administrative setting transposition takes place discursively. The original 
fmding of the council is organized in a register of cosmopolitanism that aims to transcend 
(kokkyo o koeru) the narrow framework ofthinking in terms of a nation's interests 
(kokueki). It recommends that significantly increasing the amount of coverage on foreign 
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issues will cultivate a more international outlook that might even open spaces for the 
emergence of transnational publics, a step that might, incidentally, go a long way in 
ftnally overcoming Chinese and South Korean resentment rooted in memories of the 
Paciftc War. In subsequent meetings, however, the suggestion to increase international 
coverage is transposed into a plan to broadcast Japanese issues to an international 
audience. "Taking in" (ukeire) is transposed into ''transmission" (hasshin) as a key 
concept for public diplomacy strategies given that establishing a presence of Japanese 
culture in foreign countries is seen as an important ftrst step in cultivating soft power. A 
register of nationalist thinking enables and, in fact, guarantees that the original suggestion 
will be taken this way. A shared lexicon of "culture" and "internationalism" constitute 
the "notes" of cultural policy discourse; cosmopolitanism and nationalism make up the 
different registers or keys between which the notes are transposed. 
NHK has since reconstructed its sister corporation, NHK World, to increase 
coverage of Japan to foreign markets. Two of its ftve mission points are, fust, "to present 
broadcasts with great accuracy and speed on many aspects of Japanese culture and 
lifestyles, recent developments in society and politics, the latest scientific and industrial 
trends, and Japan's role and opinions regarding important global issues," and second, "To 
foster mutual understanding between Japan and other countries and promote friendship 
and cultural exchange" (NHK World 2011). Its flagship news program, "Newsline," now 
broadcasts thirty minutes in English every hour on the hour to an increasing number of 
foreign locations, mostly within the Asia-Paciftc region, aiming to compete not only with 
the BBC and CNN but with a number of other agencies in China, Korea, Singapore, and 
Australia. 
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As seen in Iwabuchi's narrative, debates and deliberation over what constitutes 
the ethical and organizational position of a public broadcaster is lost in the inscription of 
national interests in NHK's media structures. Institutionalized in media practices is not 
only a process of production that aims to transmit particular versions of Japan to the 
world---versions consistent with soft power ideals of broadcasting that which is thought 
to appeal most to foreign communities--but also forms of program evaluation and design 
that similarly operate through the lens of soft power, substituting debate about what 
constitutes programming serving a public's needs with unilateral decisions on meeting 
the nation's needs. In reality, as Hanada (1995) and Hayashi (2003) argue, the nation 
(kokka) and public sphere (kOkyosei) have always been conflated through the notion of 
the kokumin (literally "country's people") in Japan's modernity, so the shift is not as 
dramatic as might be perceived from the perspective of public broadcasting debates 
within the BBC for example (see Born 2004). But the reorganization ofNHK World 
toward the specific purpose of increasing the presence of obviously Japanese content in 
foreign media markets reveals how much the framework of soft power has inundated and 
appropriated existing bureaucratic structures toward its own ends. Measuring the degree 
to which shows like "Newsline" and "Cool Japan" actually increase forms of nationalist 
thinking among its consumers is difficult to measure, or would at least require another 
research project to investigate, but it is clear that there has been an increased proliferation 
and solidification through media spheres of a discourse that is appropriating more and 
more of culture toward imaginaries of national consciousness, and the anxieties that 
characterize its affective contours. 
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I opened the dissertation with a press release about NHK's new series, 
"Overcoming the 'Japan Syndrome'." Shortly after the press release the Executive 
Director-General of Broadcasting at NHK., lmai Tamaki, elaborated on the show: 
The 'Japan Syndrome' is the name that has been given by the 
'Tomorrow's Japan' project team at the News Department to describe the 
malaise that afflicts the nation. It refers to the loss of confidence and 
anxiety among large numbers of people in Japan. The nation is 
experiencing a falling birth rate, a greying population, and a shrinking 
workforce, and the pressures of global competition. The ensuing economic 
and social malaise has shaken long-held values, and seen youngsters 
withdraw into themselves, and diluted family and community ties, which 
in turn has manifested itself in various ways, such as the atomizing of 
society and the numerous elderly people who have seemingly vanished 
without anybody knowing or caring about their whereabouts. Starting 
from the New Year, the News Department will focus on the Japan 
Syndrome and offer prescriptions and ways of overcoming it. [NHK 
20llb] 
In chapter 2 I discussed two different forms of anxiety, one that connects with one's 
personal economic security and one that connects with those of the nation. The two are 
not synonymous but operate in distinct registers that appropriate different symbols, 
narratives, and affects in their manifestations. Soft power, however, shows the potential 
to conflate these two forms of anxiety, appropriating the former to meet concerns ofthe 
latter. Under this logic, one's personal financial concerns are imagined and felt 
increasingly in national, and, perhaps, nationalist terms. With series like this one, NHK 
operates as the storyteller of the nation, narrating one's personal concerns through the 
eyes of the nation. Programs like it serve as a mechanism for moving from the affective 
to the emotional end of the affect-emotion gap, translating Dewey's unperceived 
consequences into public sentiments (1991: 131). Although documenting responses to 
such programming would, again, demand a research project of its own, the repetition of 
anxious national narratives in public broadcasting reveals the degree to which they 
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become naturalized as a common story of national character. In my consideration of 
creators and artists in the next section, we witness how certain subjects who are 
interpolated to give an account of oneself in terms of the nation must increasingly do so 
in reference to its anime, manga, and general "pop power." 
Content Industries 
In October 2009, The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in conjunction 
with the Japan Licensing Association organized a trade show, Tokyo Contents Market 
and Licensing Asia, which assembled creators and licensors in a single venue in hopes of 
stimulating partnerships between industry and the arts. The program was created within 
METI's Creative Contents Division, whose director I interviewed and discussed in 
chapter 4. In attending the symposium and speaking with a number of creators and 
licensors, I tried to get a sense of to what degree ideas of soft power informed their 
thinking. 
The METI event took place at Big Site in Odaiba, where some of the biggest 
conferences, trade shows, and other events take place throughout the year. I paid the 
equivalent of twelve dollars for a day pass to the two-day event and entered a giant hall 
only moderately filled with small booths and stations. The hall was split down the 
middle with creators on one side and licensors and advertisers on the other, including 
Dentsu, the largest advertising company in Japan with a domestic market share of over 
twenty percent. Participants in the show apply to METI for an invitation, those seeming 
to have the most market potential selected for entry. The atmosphere was fun, with "soft 
characters" (yuro kyara), animated characters that accompany a majority of Japanese 
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products, companies, and events, splattered everywhere in bright colors. A few human-
size versions of them even walked around the event posing for pictures. 
I walked around from booth to booth stopping to speak with many of the 
participants about their hopes for the event and their thoughts about Japan's content 
industries. Many of the creators expressed gratitude to the Ministry for sponsoring the 
event as they have few opportunities in general for exposure to licensors. The creators I 
spoke with primarily saw themselves as artists and simply wanted to find an 
economically viable way to pursue their art. As a consequence, few showed explicit 
interest in the government's investments in pop culture but most all had heard of its new 
policies and welcomed them. 
Matsumoto-san works for a company called Animo Creative Works, a group that 
produces animated graphics for movies and anime. It also does character design. 
Without any prompting from me he alluded to the phrase "soft power" in describing his 
work. Matsumoto-san said he heard the phrase about three to four years ago. On the 
news he heard it used by a government official and at that point realized that Japan 
actually had a significant amount of charm (miryoku) abroad. He was happy (ureshii) 
that Japanese pop culture is popular overseas, he said. This reaction, "ureshii," was by 
far the most common answer to the questions I asked about the positive reception of 
Japanese pop culture abroad. Matsumoto-san compared Japan's case to Korea, saying he 
hoped the Japanese government would support creators like Korea does. "Yatto, mitai na 
kanji'' (It's about time!). 
Shimizu-san's company, Mozaiko, produces "ultra low resolution painting" and 
his work received an award from METI for most creative project. Shimizu-san had a 
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very cosmopolitan outlook on nationalism and national support for the arts. "I have no 
interest or pride as a Japanese or in the status of Japan in the world," he said. "I would 
only use 'Japan' in my work if the name happened to sell, if it had the power to sell it as 
some kind of representative or evocative image of Japan. But I don't care ifl'm 
Japanese, Chinese, or American, whatever." Shimizu- san alluded to how a hundred-yen 
bag ($1.20) can sell for 1500 yen ($18.00) due to the brand. "For Japan, this is the only 
way to compete in the world as China can always win on selling cheap items. Japan only 
has its contents (kontentsu)." Shimizu-san's point, however, did not seem to extend from 
a concern about Japan surviving in the world but about him surviving as an entrepreneur. 
"Perhaps we really need a crisis like a sinking Japan," he said, alluding to the famous 
science fiction novel Japan Sinks (Nihon chinbotsu, Komatsu 1973 ), "in order to be able 
to evoke what national sentiments exist on non-conscious levels." Shimizu-san's point 
was that he saw little of this nationalist sentiment among his friends and colleagues, and 
he certainly didn't cultivate much of it himself. He was familiar with the phrase soft 
power and interpreted it as an economic strategy, Japan's "only choice" to compete 
economically. 
Eyes Japan is a computer graphics technology company specializing in virtual 
reality technology for the medical education industry. They also engage in open source 
software, 3D printing, computer vision, robotics, motion capture, and a variety of other 
technologies. The owner, Ken-san, is in his early forties and a high school dropout. He 
is fond of Arthur C. Clarke and cited to me a favorite quote from him: "Any sufficiently 
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." The phrase is printed at the top 
of all his information pamphlets. His booth was significantly more decorated than the 
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others, in either a meager attempt at appearing haute or a satirical critique of it. Wine and 
cheese were served and an inflatable moose-head adorned one of the booth's walls. 
In thinking about the relationship of his business to the nation, Ken-san compared 
his marketing strategy to war, where one can sell weapons to both sides. He quickly 
tempered the statement though, saying it was kind of a ridiculous analogy. He was 
disappointed at Japan's system of supporting creators because "there is no copyright 
protection and no [government] budget, so we can't compete with the U.S. Ken-san has 
given up on going to a yearly licensing conference in the U.S. that he has attended for the 
last fourteen years and now just focuses on technology. He said Japanese companies 
have very nice CG but no budget. He added that the event's sponsorship from the 
Ministry of Economy was helpful because he had few chances to meet other clients on 
his own. 
The company Shikia-chan does illustrations, character design, flash media, and 
web design. It is run primarily by a young man, Kobayashi, who was inspired by Hanna 
Barbera's characters. He had not heard of the phrase "soft power" but said quite brightly, 
"If we can spread our content through it, why not?" Indeed, he hoped that people abroad 
would take an interest in Japanese pop culture. Kobayashi-san, like Shimizu-san, showed 
little interest in economic competition on a national level. He did not feel threatened by 
the U.S. dominance in media markets like Ken-san did. He had no problem with 
Hollywood and Disney, saying that animation was a common medium for creation, which 
is a good thing. "If Japan can participate in that field then great!" He also showed little 
concern for how anime was perceived overseas. "Animation is just a form of art 
(sakuhin), like Pixar. We should just enjoy it as such." 
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On average, creators and licensors alike showed little concern for Japan's 
economic status in the world. For the most part, it only concerned them in so much that it 
either facilitated or stifled their chance to make a business out of their art. Such findings 
are consistent with the distinction I drew earlier between registers of economic and 
national anxiety, the la~er being more characteristic of government administrators whose 
job it is to support Japanese industry at large. For them, economic success and cultural 
anxiety become fused under a rhetoric of soft power that imagines the former as an 
anecdote to the latter. For creators, however, art has little to do with national status or 
prestige. 
Although the Contents Market demonstrates a site where government bureaucracy 
under a soft power logic intervenes administratively into the relationship between culture 
and economy, there is little evidence to suggest that the ideology affects creators 
themselves, save Matsumoto-san who seemed, at least to some degree, motivated by the 
concept of soft power. In general, though, the only site where explicit ideological 
formations of soft power do seem to bear on the work of creators can be seen in the role it 
plays as interpellator, in Althusser's conceptualization (1972). In the same way that 
many women officials at the Japan Foundation express uneasiness at the pairing of pop 
culture, as represented in the cute ambassadors, and national identity to which they feel 
pressure to respond, some artists feel the pressure to contextualize their work in response 
to an increase of government interest in the fields of anime, manga, and video games. I 
spoke about this concern with an emerging Japanese sculptor. 
Shigematsu Hisashi ( 48 years old) is not a well-known artist by most measures 
but he does have a rising group of patrons from Japan and a few from abroad. He quit his 
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job as a "salary man" (sararfman) for a public relations company eight years ago to 
devote his attention to art full time. He is gentle and humble but also very outgoing, and 
when talking about his art and the ideas out of which it comes he becomes more intense. 
He cares deeply about his art. He also cares deeply about the state of Japanese society 
and the dreary malaise that characterizes it. His art is what gives this malaise its 
palpability. He works mostly in clay of a gray ash color. And, in fact, it is this ash color 
(hai 'ira) that he thematizes in his work. In the introduction to his "ash" series, he writes: 
Gray is something difficult to express 
As a color close to black it expresses darkness 
As a color close to white it resembles crushed bones 
At the base of all the colors there is gray 
Color expresses happiness, anger, sadness and sorrow 
But gray expresses nothing 
Gray has only silence [Shigematsu 2011] 
Shigematsu-san sculpts life-size human figures out of clay, the color of his desolate gray 
ash. One work shows an aging couple seated at a traditional Japanese hearth, the color 
and texture of their bodies the same as the ash of the fire at their feet. There is also a boy, 
lying almost flat on his back with just his head propped up by a wall only so much to let 
him see the TV screen on which he is playing a video game. The color of him and the 
snowed-out picture on the TV are the same gray. Next in the exhibition is a drunken 
salary man, the gray color of both his face and suit matching that of the vomit he has just 
expectorated on the sidewalk. Another figure, a woman, is at a desk with her head 
slumped over her arm, exhausted and asleep. She holds in her hand an open cell phone, 
the screen, again, gray. 
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Shigematsu-san went on to me at length about how he imagined the installation. 
The dreariness and affectlessness represented in some of the work and expressed in his 
line, "Gray has only silence," is not matched by the passion that animates his criticism of 
contemporary Japanese society. He bemoans the lack ofhuman ties and face-to-face 
communication in modem society (often referred to as muen shakai). He laments the 
lack of empathy as well and feeling more generally. He also bemoans the lack of 
historical consciousness among Japanese, expressing admiration to me at an exceptional 
young girl from Okinawa he saw on TV the previous night advocating the importance of 
having the older generation of Okinawans with memories of the war pass them on to the 
younger generation who has no such experience. Shigematsu-san complained that there 
seems to be no desire in people today to carry on traditions from the past nor impart them 
to future generations, an element he thought especially lacking in Japan and that 
distinguished it from other countries that did, in fact, have in their cultures mechanisms 
for generational transmission. He blamed Japan's contemporary malaise squarely on a 
culture of self-contempt resulting from the war, specifically instilled through the public 
shame of the "International Military Tribunal for the Far East" (Kyokuto kokusai gunji 
saiban). Shigematsu-san writes to me in an email, "From the Meiji Restoration forward 
Japan had a wonderful culture and traditions. However, since the Tokyo tribunal, all of 
it, everything seemed to vanish like mist (unsan musho)! What was left was only 
historical masochism." Shigematsu-san considers this new Japan born after the Pacific 
War only sixty-five years old, a short but thoroughly disappointing period compared to 
the nostalgic portraits through which he imagines its more traditional pasts. 
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In bringing up Japan's contemporary pop culture, its anime, manga, and the 
government's branding of it in Cool Japan campaigns, the patient and pleasant 
Shigematsu-san closed his eyes, seeming to suffer viscerally from his reflections on the 
topic. After a pause and a deep breath he tells me that he knows all about it and is 
definitely troubled at what he sees as a steady inundation of all things pop into a more 
diversely and richly composed field of Japanese art. He mentions Murakami Takashi as 
an example of how art has become commodified to new degrees in the present. 
However, this latter point did not trouble him as much as the former one. Artists like 
Murakami do not infringe upon his own art, which he is happy to pursue, feeling little 
pressure to yield to particular market demands. But he bemoaned the conflation of 
Japanese culture with anime and manga, concluding with, "I want to ask these officials, is 
that really all Japan is?" 
Shigematsu-san experiences culture that he labels as Japanese--and of which he 
considers himself a part--deeply. It affects him viscerally, in a disenchanted and 
disappointed tone that he experiences, perhaps, just slightly too intensely to be called 
malaise. The intensity is, after all, irritating enough to compel him to action, to produce 
art. Like a few of the other artists I spoke with and like a great many of the eclectic 
groups of people with whom I spoke over drinks at a number of Tokyo's drinking 
establishments, Shigematsu-san does not take the government's support of pop culture 
very seriously. He does not feel much connection with it and certainly does not see it as 
representative of a Japanese culture in which he does, in fact, have some personal 
investment. In these sites of conflicting representations the state, from Shigematsu-san's 
perspective, and in Gellner's terms, fails to guarantee a particular image of the nation one 
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feels affinity for. The result is a sense of alienation from those administrators of state 
affairs and the labeling of the bureaucrat as "inept" (dame), by far the most common 
epithet used to describe Japanese bureaucrats. It may not be fair to cite Shigematsu-san's 
case as an example of a kind of interpellation that happens often enough to call it either 
ideological inscription or cultural ostracism. Perhaps the most imposing case of 
interpellation he experienced, in fact, came from me. However, I suspect it actually 
happens quite often. I suspect this moment of interpellation happens each time he hears a 
story about Cool Japan or soft power or the government funding of a manga and anime 
museum in Tokyo. I suspect this because ofhis response to my question about it: the 
closed eyes, the deep sigh, and the palpable displeasure his body, voice, and words 
exhibited. Such a response could not be generated by my question alone: confusion or 
curiosity rather than discomfort would have been the more likely response. What this 
indicates is that the particular register of bureaucratic anxiety out of which excitement 
over soft power is produced has very different effects outside it. Certainly it produces 
among many subjects a kind of hope similar to that experienced by government 
administrators. But for many others it is productive of a disconnection between the 
official and the everyday citizen, even to the extent of eliciting embarrassment. The 
narratives ofnationalism circulated among officials in response to global pressures and 
perceived at the same time to be both in line with and in the service of Japanese people in 
general seem to engender even more anxiety over the status of Japanese culture, both 
within and outside administration. Under conditions like these, state policy does not 
touch the everyday like a radio dial, tuning each subject to its own interests, but rather 
like a winch, torquing sentiment against its best intentions. 
-----------------------
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Higher Education 
Bourdieu draws a pithy sketch in the abstract of how the state and its structures of 
education produce culture at the level of the everyday: "Matters of culture, and in 
particular the social divisions and hierarchies associated with them, are constituted as 
such by the actions of the state which, by instituting them both in things and in minds, 
confers upon the cultural arbitrary all the appearances of the natural" (1993: 55). I 
recalled this quote over the course of a four-day "field research program" I took part in at 
a prestigious university in Tokyo. The course syllabus states the following: "Purpose: 
Some say that in the 21st Century, Japan should make its living by its 'soft' industries. 
This year we will visit some sites of anime production, observe the manufacturing 
process for these products and consider the new support industries that form the back-up 
for anime production" (Anonymous 2010). The course was run by two professors in the 
school's Department of International Relations and invited a number of guest lecturers 
from the field of anime and manga. The course also included a trip to an anime 
production studio where participants could observe and speak with artists and producers. 
Although the course included a number of Japanese students among its enrollment 
of around forty, it was overwhelmingly attended by Chinese, Korean, and Southeast 
Asians, students from countries often identified as composing Japan's regional economic 
bloc. Sharing two experiences from the course will illustrate the general assumptions 
upon which a framework for understanding Japan's soft industries was constructed. First, 
a Japanese media studies expert on anime and manga was invited one day to give a 
lecture to the class. He described the general state of the anime industry in Japan, noting 
particular economic challenges the industry and its employees faced. By way of 
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demonstrating what he characterized as the increasingly dilapidated state of the industry, 
the lecturer showed a slide indicating the growing number of illustrator jobs that were 
being sent overseas, most specifically to China and South Korea. The purpose of the 
slide was, first, to demonstrate the increasing loss of profit in the industry to overseas 
markets through foreign distributors and, second, to show how insufficient capital within 
the industry resulted in comparatively low wages for Japanese employees. This 
particular example was just one of many provided in the class to illustrate the current 
problems facing Japanese industries and to stimulate ideas on how to address and 
overcome them. The assumption on which these examples rely is, of course, that 
international students should be concerned with revitalizing exclusively "Japanese" 
industries. The example of outsourcing within the manga industry is particularly 
revealing of this assumption as it, somewhat insensitively I felt at the moment, asks 
Chinese and South Korean students to think how Chinese and South Korean jobs could 
be returned to Japan. Given that the course was offered by an international relations 
department and not the school's economics department or business school, and further, 
that the notion of a "national" company or industry was left unproblematized despite the 
company's clearly multinational composition as well as the increasing number of other 
production companies that now regularly invest in transnational productions (The joint 
Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese production of the two-part saga Red Clifl[Woo 
2010] being an illustrative example), the lecturer's point seemed to be cast exclusively 
within a logic of soft power that imagines Japan's content industries as contributing, or 
failing to contribute, to the growth of a singularly "Japanese" economy. 
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The second example I take up from the class more succinctly and plainly 
illustrates the exclusively nationalist terms in which soft content markets were imagined. 
The final essay assignment for the course was simple: "Offer your analysis on how 
Japanese industries can be revitalized for the 21st Century." Subsequently, Chinese, 
South Korean, and a host of other students from various countries set out to strategize 
how Japan could best build its content industries, precisely the approach taken by Japan's 
Ministry ofEconomy, Trade and Industry in realizing a strategy of soft power cultivation 
reduced to economic growth. 
The course I took on Japan's soft industries provides one example for the 
increasing conflation of industry and higher education in Japan, not a trend limited to but 
certainly accelerated in a Japan characterized by its close relationship between 
universities and the government's Ministry of Education. For example, the department in 
which I took the fieldwork course I discussed above is part of one of thirteen universities 
in Japan receiving funding from the Ministry of Education's Global30 Project: 
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology has 
launched the "Global 30" Project for Establishing Core Universities for 
Internationalization, for the purpose of selecting universities that will 
function as core schools for receiving and educating international students. 
In 2009, thirteen universities were selected. These core universities will 
play a major role in dramatically boosting the number of international 
students educated in Japan as well as Japanese students studying abroad. 
[MEXT 2011] 
"Internationalization" (kokusaika), as Roger Goodman (1990, 2007) has documented 
extensively, has been a key word for the last two to three decades in Japan, and especially 
in the field of education. It serves as the ethos guiding, at least in name, of an array of 
programs opening Japan to the world and making it more competitive internationally. 
Given Japan's declining workforce and an increase in an elderly population stretching the 
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state's pension system to its limits, the inclusion of foreign workers has been proposed as 
an inevitable if also largely begrudged solution. Increasing the number of foreign 
students to Japan facilitates this aim: 
Japan formulated the 300,000 International Students Plan in July of 2008, 
with the aim of receiving 300,000 international students by 2020. The 
"Global 30" Project for Establishing Core Universities for 
Internationalization is being implemented to realize this goal by selecting 
measures for the internationalization of universities including the 
recruitment of international students, along with forming Japan's centers 
of internationalization. Selected universities will receive prioritized 
fmancial assistance of 200 to 400 million yen per annum over the next 5 
years. Endowed with this aid, each university will strive to recruit 3000 to 
8000 international students. [MEXT 2011] 
Resulting from these measures has been the emergence of undergraduate and graduate 
school programs catering specifically to international students. These schools are in 
general academically broad, incorporating several disciplines under one department; they 
have comparatively low admission standards as their goal is to meet international student 
quotas established by the Ministry's policy; and their makeup in curriculum and faculty 
reveal a close partnership between government and education. The department in which I 
took my fieldwork course, for example, included faculty members who had previously 
worked in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
the Ministry of General Affairs and Telecommunications, and the Japan Foundation. 
Given this revolving door between bureaucracy and education perhaps I should not have 
been surprised at a Japanese MA student who upon hearing that I conducted work on soft 
power came to me with his research proposal for his anthropology zemi (seminar), just 
one of several sections of the school's Department ofinternational Relations. His 
research was on how to boost Japanese soft power through the training of instructors 
teaching Japanese to foreign students at Japanese universities. If I was shocked at the 
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quite literal discursive appropriation of a student's research project by government 
policy, at least I could rest assured that my own at times seemingly complicit research on 
soft power was, by comparison, rather objective. 
Another school receiving funding from Japan's Global30 project is Meiji 
University. In 2011 they established an English track within the School of Global 
Japanese Studies which will offer students the opportunity to earn all their credits in 
English toward a Bachelor of Arts degree. The description of the program traces a clean 
line between soft power and education policy: 
This program features a curriculum that concentrates on traditional and 
modem Japanese culture, as well as Japanese society in the global 
community, all of which are currently attracting worldwide attention. The 
Cool Japan. 
The school also provides total support for students' careers in Japan or in 
Japan-related fields. They will have opportunities to learn Japanese as a 
second language, which will be included in the credits necessary for 
graduation. They will also have hands-on experience in the real world 
through workshops, extracurricular activities, and internships. ["Cool 
Japan Program" 2011] 
If in the example ofNHK above we witness a transposition of a transnational 
consciousness into a nationalist one, here there is little transposition at all: government 
policy is written, unchanged, into an educational curriculum. 
In conjunction with this program, the university also set up a "Cool Japan 
Summer Program." For two weeks in August the university invites twenty international 
students for a series oflectures, fieldtrips, and workshops among Cool Japan specialists. 
Lectures include titles such as "Akihabara and Japanese Pop Culture," "Manga Literacy," 
and "Movie, Music, and Fashion." Fieldtrips visit Akihabara, Harajuku, the Suginami 
Animation Museum, a manga studio, the comic market in Odaiba, and the Ghibli 
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Museum (Studio Ghibli is the production studio of director Miyazaki Hayao' s widely 
celebrated animated features). 
One could argue that curriculums are one thing, classes another. And in both 
knowing some of the course instructors and in speaking with them, I am assured that at 
least some of the content was less celebratory than critical of Cool Japan. But the 
discursive inscriptions seem obvious, and like the director ofMOFA's public policy 
department made clear, it is the very circulation of Cool Japan that serves as one goal of 
soft power policies. Analogous to a logic of capital, the more these narratives circulate 
and establish presence in foreign markets, the more potential they have to affect 
sentiments of foreign publics--to "sell" so to speak. Meiji University, in fact, is doing 
much more than simply offering courses on Cool Japan. They have received funding for 
the installation of a manga archive and museum in Akihabara, the Tokyo International 
Manga Museum (Tokyo kokusai manga toshokan), which will serve simultaneously as a 
museum, research center, and tourist attraction (see the project at 
www.meiji.ac.jp/manga/). These are only a few of the programs and sites where Cool 
Japan is being institutionalized in education. 
All this suggests that soft power is not on the wane but is establishing some 
permanence institutionally. Soft power proves enormously effective in uniting 
heterogeneous fields of knowledge-economics, academia, tourism--toward its own 
ends. Its discursive work produces new assemblages of objects, statements, and 
knowledges. To the degree that soft power continues to become inscribed in 
administrative structures of education, economy, politics, and the everyday, its 
assemblages approach the status of"apparatus," a set of relations with institutional 
mechanisms for the increasing naturalization of the soft power discourse and the 
nationalist consciousness upon which it depends. 
Reflections on Soft Power in Academia 
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What can be concluded from these observations is that state investments in soft 
power indeed prove effective in appropriating other fields to its interests to the degree 
that it establishes with them significant degrees of administrative integration. Just like 
the register of internationally interlinked administrations of national culture that I 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3 creates an architecture enabling the flow of certain kinds of 
cultural exchange, the connections bureaucracy establishes between itself and the 
everyday enable varying kinds of influence and determination. In METI's Tokyo 
Contents Market these lines of connection prove relatively weak, not likely to encourage 
creators to embrace soft power with much resolve. And in fact, in artists like 
Shigematsu-san, it appears to alienate rather than appropriate: still a consequence of 
connection but not one desired by soft power administrators. The partnership of 
government and media seen in NHK World and the program "Cool Japan" reveals forms 
of integration that facilitate widespread circulation. But its effects are as yet unclear, 
showing again equal potential to alienate and appropriate. Where bureaucracy seems to 
activate soft power's most productive connections with the everyday seems to be in 
higher education, where state money can be directly invested in universities serving a 
growing number of young students interested in popular culture. Observing these 
movements of soft power through academia and higher education is simultaneously to 
reflect on my own complicity with them. 
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The globalization of Japanese pop culture and the government's own creative 
investments in it have sparked an enthusiastic response from academia. Japanese and, 
increasingly, Korean pop culture are hot topics in East Asian studies and anthropology. 
There are a plethora of conferences on the subject, some even funded by the Japan 
Foundation and other government sources. Most significantly, there has been an 
explosive demand for courses on Japanese pop culture. If the trend were not obvious 
enough based solely on my encounter with international students in Japan, many 
academics working in and on East Asia have offered other evidence, if anecdotal, citing 
the vast increase of students who choose to study Japan out of an interest in anime, 
manga, or some other form of pop culture. Professor of Comparative Media Studies at 
MIT, Ian Condry, provides an entirely exemplary account of these observations: 
I felt like most of my classmates in Japanese language at Harvard in the 
mid-1980s were interested in Japan as a business opportunity (i.e., many 
were Econ majors in my cohort). Now, my sense is that students come to 
classes on Japan because they were introduced to the country through 
popular culture, especially manga, anime, and games. Of course, there is 
always a percentage (10-20% perhaps) of my classes where students come 
to Japan through other interests: martial arts, literature, family 
connections, and so on. 
Condry suggests, somewhat casually, that on average eighty percent of the students in his 
courses on Japan enroll out of an interest in Japanese pop culture. While my own 
decision to study Japan came more exclusively from an interest in the language, I was 
exposed to popular media in Japan through courses like the kind Condry teaches and, 
subsequently, I developed an interest in the consumption of popular Japanese literature. 
Much of my academic training and the dissertation I currently write are, thus, entirely a 
product of this assemblage between economic policy, soft power ideology, and education, 
sustained and made coherent by a particular set of anxious sentiments over the status of 
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the Japanese nation. I have been invited to speak at conferences on Japanese pop culture 
in Japan; the few publication opportunities I've had were also solicited by scholars 
working on popular culture; and without a doubt, the most likely employment 
opportunities I will have upon graduation will depend upon my experience researching 
Japanese popular culture, and it will also most likely be located in Japan, where an 
increase in classes designed to both meet students' needs and increase university foreign 
enrollment (and revenue) will put someone who has researched Japan's pop culture in 
demand. As can be predicted, however, the cycle is self-perpetuating and as the number 
of classes increase, so too do the number of researchers capable of teaching them. Soft 
power is an inevitable theme of such courses. And to the degree that more academics 
like myself owe their livelihood to tracing its movement, it promises to become even 
more entrenched in culture. 
This flow of soft power, its ability to move through culture like an anxious 
tornado, collecting and assembling new constellations of power, language, policy, and 
aesthetic production, has produced a particular anxiety even in me. I have stumbled 
through research self-consciously concerned about being labeled an "anime person" or 
"pop culture" person. Chalk it up to personal pride, to a desire for academic originality 
and distinction, or even to a simple and stereotypical sort of American individualism. 
Whatever it is, it is uncomfortable, anxious--not the anxiety of my bureaucratic 
interlocutors but certainly enabled through its integration in soft power policies. This 
distinction is important to recognize. It shows how a powerfully productive pairing of 
anxiety and hope in government administration is able to spawn other kinds of anxiety. 
So although the anxiety found among political elites is not the same as NHK's or Ivy's 
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culturally pervasive anxiety, discourses like soft power prove able to elicit and even 
produce other anxieties through its refraction in different registers of social life. Such are 
the predictable consequences of globalization's uneven arrangements of 
interconnectedness. 
Perhaps Sianne Ngai is right and anxiety is our age's characteristic mode of 
intellectual inquiry. From a more optimistic perspective, though, I might reflect on my 
own anxiety as a mark of ethnographic progress: I could argue that in so much that 
ethnography has once again laid bare both the fundamental contingency of culture and 
the unavoidable complicity of cultural inquiry it has accomplished something 
anthropological. We should expect the process to produce some existential discomfort, 
which, of course, is exactly what attracted me to anthropology in the first place. 
Hopefully, this personal anxiety has also been productive, enabling a mode of inquiry 
that in seeking to understand itself must necessarily work to describe the cultural 
conditions that produced it. Certainly it is no coincidence that anxiety became a 
dominant theme of my research. This is just one of the unavoidable but not entirely 
unwelcome products of ethnography's complicity. It is typical of a dialogic mode of 
anthropology I was attracted to as an undergraduate student and am indebted to as a 
graduate student. I hope admitting and, at times, even cultivating such complicity has 
yielded a richer description of soft power than denying it might have otherwise 
accomplished. 
In my concluding chapter to the dissertation I entertain alternatives to a shared 
anxiety operating through national registers. I submit my speculation and imagination as 
a potentially legitimate mode of cultural critique in the tradition but not the letter of 
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Marcus and Fischer's own reflections on it (1986). Anthropology stimulates imagination, 
but imagination itself, like all things, operates through culture; thus, in the last chapter, I 
explore the anthropologist's empirically inspired speculations on the future as an artifact 
of ethnographic exchange between self and other. 
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Chapter Nine 
Murakami Haruki and Alternative Futures of Affect: 
Anthropology as Speculation 
So far I have described how soft power imagines a particular Japanese future that 
entrenches affects of cultural anxiety in the present. In this final chapter I want to 
imagine an alternative future that does not. I do this not to perform a kind of 
anthropological therapy, nor to politicize ethnography by extrapolating potentially 
productive policy positions from my observations;31 rather, I want to imagine an 
alternative anthropological future as method.32 Doing so allows two things. First, it 
enables an engagement with national culture in affective rather than exclusively narrative 
terms. In short, by looking at some artifacts from my fieldwork that suggest this might 
already be happening, I want to suggest that ethical projects of re-creation in terms of 
how subjects relate to the nation might be effected through work that operates on the 
self's affective responses to persistent, fixed narratives of the nation rather than on the 
rhetorical recomposition of those narratives themselves. Second, imagining an 
alternative anthropological future as method posits reasoned speculation as ethnographic 
data, similar to how literature--imagined other worlds-can be made into an 
ethnographic object evidencing and reflexively describing the cultural conditions that 
give rise to it. And, in fact, I take literature as a primary object of analysis in this last 
chapter. By thinking through the literature and readers' reflections on author Murakami 
Haruki, I offer my own imaginations of an alternative way of experiencing Japaneseness 
31 I am reminded of Ernest Renan's playful comment on a related notion: "I like ethnography very much, 
and find it a peculiarly interesting science. But as I wish it to be free, I do not wish it to be applied to 
f:olitics" (1995: 150). 
2 The idea of constructing imagination as method alludes and is indebted to Hirokazu Miyazaki's 
theoretical consideration of hope as method (2004). 
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as a reflexive exercise that demonstrates how literature functions as cultural object, 
stimulating different ways of imagining and feeling that become part of a new 
ethnographic record rooted not in a Japanese or American culture but in an 
intersubjective dialogue that moves through frames of both. 
In an English conversation class I teach for some staff and professors at the 
University of Tokyo, the day's workbook exercise called for each student to list three 
possible "heroes" for a mock magazine that would feature the "World's Hero of2010." I 
also participated in the exercise and feeling it salutary to include a Japanese nominee in 
my list of three, I chose the popular author Murakami Haruki. In explanation of my 
choice I suggested that Murakami wrote narratives of such a cosmopolitan character that 
people from almost any nation could appreciate it. I added, as a special note, and as 
deferentially as possible, that it might be a particularly suitable choice for Japanese 
people as his stories provided a way of thinking about one's "Japanese" identity in 
similarly cosmopolitan and less culturally essentialist ways. Despite the directions of the 
assignment calling for nominees for a "global" hero, perhaps I was not surprised that 
eight out of the nine nominees submitted by the Japanese students were, themselves, 
Japanese, including the only moderately known sociologist, SatO Kaoru, and the sixteenth 
century warlord credited with instigating the unification of Japan, Oda Nobunaga (the 
remaining nominee, incidentally, and submitted by the only woman in the group, was 
John F. Kennedy). If, however, I was not surprised at this, I was surprised that three out 
of the four students in the class also selected Murakami as a nominee. 
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In one student's explanation for his nomination I found perhaps the best 
description of the affective quality ofMurakami's work. In response to another 
participant who suggested that upon reading Murakami one wanted to keep reading, the 
student offered the following: "I don't want to keep reading his books. But when I read 
his stories I'm left with this kind of strange feeling. I don't really understand what's 
happening in the story but somehow I'm attracted to it." He elaborated, "Many authors 
can write a story that makes you feel very strongly one way or another, but it's very 
difficult to write a story that leaves you with just such a strange feeling that compels you 
to read more." 
Murakami seems to affect readers without them being able to convey exactly how 
or why. That this is so even with university professors and experts in cultural 
administration, articulate and intelligent individuals who read and discuss literature for 
pleasure, makes this fact especially illustrative ofhow affect works. Granted Murakami's 
novels are characterized much more by a uniqueness of style than an originality of 
narrative, perhaps making it difficult for fans to explain precisely why they like him, still, 
the inability to articulate Murakami's appeal in the face of such an enormous consensus 
on his popularity is strange. The marketing campaign launched by the publisher 
Shinchosha for the release of his newest novel in 2009 displayed nothing more than the 
title, JQ84, with a large green "Q" filling up the cover of the poster, the same as the book 
cover. There was no description of the story, not even a catch phrase or slogan. The 
name Murakami alone accounted for the over 650,000 copies which were purchased in 
the first week by fans who had no idea what kind of story they were reading. After 
asking a number of friends who had recently read the first two installments what kind of 
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story it was, they were again at a loss to say. "It's kind of about religion," one said. "I 
didn't really understand the story," said another. "It doesn't really have an ending," 
claimed a third, "and I heard Murakami decided to write an additional volume to the 
story" he added. 
At one point in graduate school I had contemplated doing a research project on 
fans of Murakami. I was interested in how they took his narratives and incorporated 
them into individual practices of self-development and ethical growth, a kind of case 
study for Foucault's "technologies of the self," Murakami's novels a sort ofreadymade 
stand in for the hupomnemata ("individual notebooks" or "guides for conduct") of 
Foucault's ancient Greece (Foucault 1997: 209). Although there were a number of 
reasons I did not pursue the project, one significant one was the plethora of diverse 
answers I got upon asking the admittedly naive question, "Why do you like Murakami?" 
Some liked Murakami's protagonist "Boku"; some liked the mysterious and otherworldly 
elements of his stories, what literary critics call "magical realism"; others liked his short 
and direct style. Many people told me they liked the "feeling" (kimochi) of his stories. 
But the answer I received the most was, "nan to naku suki" (somehow, I just like him). 
How does one talk about Murakami's somewhat esoteric power to leave people 
moderately affected, or more accurately, significantly affected with a moderate tone? 
I argue that it is exactly this low to medium register of confident, alluring 
affectivity that seems to attract people to his work and that can be mobilized in crafting 
an alternative, healthy relationship between self and state. Murakami's literature is often 
described as cool and detached but, somehow, enticing, always just slightly pushing the 
reader to seek out something significant in the text, or in themselves. This is also the 
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quality that characterizes Murakami's protagonists. They are often thirty-something-
year-old males, single, engaged in some kind of monotonous but intellectual work, such 
as translation. They are cool, sometimes witty, but more often just isolated and detached, 
happy to stay at home enjoying homemade pasta with cans of beer. They are not 
impassioned, single-minded heroes but are more modest, seeking only moderately 
energetic escapes and engaging in only half-inspired protests against imposing social 
structures. Yet, it is precisely through this low-level affectivity that such characters fmd 
their strength. While maintaining only just enough anxiety to push them forward in their 
search for something other, they cultivate a kind of affective disinterest that proves 
productive in their search and in their resistance to seemingly always lurking, powerful 
and somewhat ominous entities. 
Without a doubt it is this disinterested and melancholic affective tone that attracts 
many readers to Murakami. It is a tone that resonates with many of the dwellers of 
highly developed, late capitalist urban centers: New York, London, Seoul, Tokyo. Far 
more often lauded for his style than his narrative, his ability to capture the mood of the 
urban everyday while offering subtle glimpses of hope for something slightly better and 
somewhat more satisfying appeals to readers. The satisfaction at this affective resonation 
of mood between author and reader explains much of the difficulty readers seem to 
encounter when trying to describe the source of their admiration. 
In contrast to Murakami's narratives, those of soft power and Cool Japan seem to 
strike a much more dissonant chord with many. It does, of course, seem to resonate with 
a number of politicians, officials, and bureaucrats whose sense of self is far more invested 
in the prestige of the nation in relation to its global competitors. More than resonate, 
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actually, it excites: one can run away with it. And politicians and other nationalists 
do---to such an extent, in fact, that soft power begins to circulate on an affective wave of 
expectant energy optimistic enough to render negligible any evidence suggesting its 
hopes are misplaced. But for many subjects, several of which I discussed in the previous 
chapter, the soft power rhetoric just feels uncomfortable. Some for whom it feels this 
way, like the Japan Foundation's Ogoura-san for example, even occupy those national 
bureaucracies in which it is sustained. Cute ambassadors in their short skirts and cute 
smiles provoke an awkward uneasiness; and sometimes, depending on the degree to 
which the element of kawaii is enhanced, the sensation can seem outright sinister (the art 
ofNara Yoshitomo with its cigarette-toting, slyly scowling adolescents explores this 
theme). These uneasy, imposing feelings associated with powerful national organizations 
are captured by Murakami in figures like the "boss" (bossu) of A Wild Sheep Chase 
(1982) or the "system" (shisutemu) of his Hard Boiled Wonderland (1991). They are 
foreboding figures from which one seeks escape but often cannot because they are too 
large, too complex, and too well integrated into those structures of the social world in 
which one, even in formulating projects of resistance, is implicated. 
There is perhaps no better real-life enactment of this play of appropriation and 
resistance than in the Japan Foundation's organization of a 2006 symposium on 
Murakami Haruki's literature. In the symposium's organization we see how the logic of 
nation branding extends the reach of the state into popular culture and the everyday, 
working to transform even the most cosmopolitan and international of writers into the 
quintessential Japanese author. The Japan Foundation symposium was titled, "'A Wild 
Haruki Chase': How the World is Reading and Translating Murakami" (Haruki o meguru 
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boken: sekai wa Murakami bungaku o do yomu ka). The purpose of the conference was, 
in the words of the Foundation, "to search for the unknown appeal of Murakami's 
literature by comparing the 'Haruki boom' in each country. Focusing on the novels and 
the translations of one of the most popular contemporary novelists in the world, it is 
aimed at exploring the secret of this Murakami boom" (Japan Foundation 2006). The 
symposium represents the culmination of Murakami's shifting status within Japan. With 
the increased political investment of national administrations in the field of culture, the 
symposium marks the reclamation of Murakami Haruki, once the quintessential 
cosmopolitan, un-Japanese author, as the representative par excellence of contemporary 
Japanese literature. 
Ironic in this particular appropriation is precisely this status Murakami held in his 
early career as the most Americanized, international, and resolutely un-Japanese writer as 
determined by the Japanese bundan (literary establishment). The mouthpiece for the 
establishment as it stood in the late 1980s and early 90s was the Nobel Prize laureate Oe 
Kenzaburo, who stated, "Murakami Haruki writes in Japanese, but his writing is not 
really Japanese ... 1 suspect that this sort of style is not really Japanese literature" (cited in 
Strecher 1990: 374). Oe and other old guard critics relegated Murakami to the realm of 
taishu bungaku (mass or pop literature). Oe further lamented, "I believe that any future 
resuscitation ofjunbungaku (pure literature) will be possible only ifways are found to fill 
in the wide gap that exists between Murakami and pre-1970 postwar literature" (1989: 
200). Murakami's cosmopolitanism provoked a nostalgic response from the old guard 
who defended pure literature on the grounds of its Japaneseness. Murakami represented 
the popular, and the popular was Western, not Japanese. 
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With the elevation of the popular to political in the government's Cool Japan 
campaigns, however, Murakami's status has grown. Like the trajectory many other pop 
culture products in Japan have taken, his work became popular at home only after 
securing its status as important literature abroad. Such a process indicates the degree to 
which Japan's field ofliterary production has steadily shifted to the heteronomous pole of 
literary evaluation, in Bourdieu's terms (1993), increasingly inundated by new critics 
more open to Western standards and theories of literary taste. Oe bemoaned this trend: 
This group of young intellectuals is composed of critics, playwrights, 
screenwriters, and introducers of new and diverse literary theories from 
America and Europe. It even includes writers whose works are not 
considered to be in the realm ofjunbungaku as well as journalists in 
various fields and a group who nowadays in our country enjoy the greatest 
popularity among the younger generation: the copywriters of commercial 
messages. One might also add almost all the "cultural heroes" of today's 
grotesquely bloated consumer society in Japan. [1989: 199] 
Oe' s comment indicates the degree to which ideologies of cultural difference determine 
standards of literary production. For him, Western literary theory has no bearing on a 
Japanese literature that is crafted out of different aesthetic sensibilities. The application 
of Western theory was equivalent to nothing short of cultural imperialism. Oe lumped 
Murakami together with these categorically un-Japanese literary figures. 
Such pressure from an establishment that no doubt shaped Murakami's early 
desire to write led to a predictable animosity in the writer. In an interview Murakami 
says, "The literary establishment was nothing but a pain for me, which is why I have 
stayed by myself, writing my novels. This is also why I went off to Europe for three 
years, and after a year in Japan, went to live in America for a little over four years" 
(Rubin 2002: 47). Out of such alienation, themes of"escape" became prominent in 
Murakami's literature and interviews. Late in his career, Murakami reflected on this 
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alienation: "All I could think about when I began writing fiction in my youth was how to 
run as far as I could from the 'Japanese condition.' I wanted to distance myself as much 
as possible from the curse of Japanese" (cited in Rubin 2002: 47). Looking back, 
Murakami saw himself as a rebel and outcast from the start; although, the submission of 
his first novel to the rather mainstream literary magazine Gunzo suggests that such 
alienation might have grown out of a desire for mainstream recognition from the 
establishment more so than his comments here suggest. Nonetheless, Murakami 
increasingly saw himself as an author isolated and alienated from Japan and he developed 
a certain antagonism toward what he saw as mainstream Japanese society. Such 
antagonism is demonstrated in Murakami's declination to participate in the Japan 
Foundation's symposium on his work. 
Murakami's !eeriness of the symposium was no doubt born of this political 
appropriation of a literary project he saw as always counter and consistently resistant to 
the Japanese mainstream, in which he identified an institutionalized power he was on 
principle opposed to. This theme permeates his literature, perhaps most overtly in his 
novel A Wild Sheep Chase in which his vulnerable protagonist, Boku ("I" or "me"), finds 
himself the accidental enemy of a large, malevolent, right-wing organization. It is more 
explicitly addressed in his acceptance speech for the 2009 Jerusalem Prize. In a rare 
public appearance by the author, he offered a less-than subtle condemnation of the state's 
campaign in Gaza: 
A fair number of people advised me not to come here to accept the 
Jerusalem Prize. Some even warned me they would instigate a boycott of 
my books ifl came ... Finally, however, after careful consideration, I made 
up my mind to come here ... Please do, however, allow me to deliver one 
very personal message. It is something that I always keep in mind while I 
am writing fiction. I have never gone so far as to write it on a piece of 
paper and paste it to the wall: Rather, it is carved into the wall of my mind, 
and it goes something like this: 
"Between a high, solid wall and an egg that breaks against it, I will always 
stand on the side of the egg." 
Yes, no matter how right the wall may be and how wrong the egg, I will 
stand with the egg. Someone else will have to decide what is right and 
what is wrong; perhaps time or history will decide. If there were a novelist 
who, for whatever reason, wrote works standing with the wall, of what 
value would such works be? [Murakami 2009] 
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Murakami's metaphor, in which he aligns himself always with the "egg" against the 
"wall" explains both his antagonism toward the Japanese government and mainstream 
society in general and his disinterest in the Japan Foundation's symposium in particular. 
Interestingly enough, this speech has gained wide popularity in Japan and I encountered 
officials who similarly expressed admiration for it. That an official in Japanese cultural 
administrations might show sympathy for the egg, or, even further, align himself with it 
against a "system" he himself represents is neither ironic nor contradictory. It is, rather, 
exemplary of an inevitable and obligatory nationalism that recognizes that despite one's 
uneasy ambivalence toward discourses of the nation, one cannot deny one's subjectivity 
as indebted to it, or, more fundamentally, as a piece of it. 
The low-level affectivity that characterizes my Japan Foundation colleagues' 
national sentiment, and obligatory nationalism in general, resonates with Murakami's 
literature. Such a position taking is not entirely pessimistic. There is an optimism to be 
found in that "strange feeling" permeating Murakami's work and identified by my 
English student. For those subjects engaged in projects that in some form or another aim 
to establish a healthy distance from the state, it serves as a useful tempering of the more 
impassioned rhetorics of nationalism that dominate the soft power discourse, if not 
political discourse in general today. In its mood of disinterestedness, it offers at the very 
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least a moderate space of refuge within the dominant and continually recycled national 
narratives of"Japan as number one," "Japan as economic giant," or, today, "Japan as soft 
power superpower." 
At sixty-one, Murakami has now made Japan his permanent home. He continues 
to write voraciously, motivated perhaps by this unresolved desire for escape and 
difference, but he seems also to have forfeited the possibility of complete escape. In 
another interview he provides what I think is an ideal articulation of the conflicted 
position in which many subjects in Japan, including my Japan Foundation colleagues, 
fmd themselves: 
No matter how much of an independent individual I am, and even though I 
think I live a life unrelated to Japanese literature, day after day I have to 
squarely face up to the objective reality that I am a Japanese writer who 
writes novels in Japanese. [cited in Seats 2006: 65] 
Drawing an analogy between the establishment of Japanese literature and the rhetorics of 
soft power and nation branding, Murakami's comment is ideal for thinking through how 
the nation-state affects many of the discourses through which subjects growing up and 
living in Japan inevitably make sense of their lives. As the Cool Japan discourse 
circulates, propelled by powerful state institutions and its national coffers, subjects are 
increasingly required to give an account of themselves in relation to it. While subjects 
like Sakurai-san, government officials, and some content producers who prove to benefit 
from it might embrace the image of a cool Japan, for many others it is seen as something 
imposed from above, something that feels uneasy, something to be wary of and resisted. 
Murakami's literature in its low-level but productive affective disinterestedness proves 
effective as one form of this resistance. It is not a resistance materialized in conscious 
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political projects of opposition and refusal but one simply confirmed and legitimated in 
the feelings of affinity that many readers of Murakami find in his work. For them, 
Murakami's narratives capture the complex reality of their social worlds more so than do 
those of soft power and Cool Japan. They do so not through stories that more accurately 
represent that world but through a style that affects in a way similar to how the realities 
of their urban worlds do. The affective resonance they find in his work and the strange 
attraction they feel to keep reading confirm its authenticity. His works in this way 
"speak" to them. Soft power does not. It feels uneasy and discordant, less true. 
As if it were not already obvious, I share some affinity with those who feel 
displaced, threatened, or simply uneasy in the face of soft power's normalization. I was 
drawn to them in fieldwork and, precisely on account of it, feel more confident in my 
depiction of their feelings and sensibilities. The majority of my interlocutors, however, 
were those more excited about soft power's potential than cynical of it. Although I could 
understand their position, I did not ultimately share their affective energies. No 
transmission there. And given affect's important role in sense making as demonstrated 
by Damasio (1994), this no doubt adversely affected my ability to both understand and 
faithfully represent their feelings. I would be remiss if I did not admit reservations at this 
in closing. However, that said, I am also confident that these concluding ruminations on 
alternative future figures of imagining and feeling Japan are a product of conversations 
with both groups of interlocutors and would engage them with equal interest. What 
convinces me of this is an interesting convergence I found between how some of my 
interlocutors as cultural administrators and how I as anthropologist think through the 
notion of"Japanese culture." Bourdieu's insight that I quoted earlier helps frame my 
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explanation of this convergence: "matters of culture, and in particular the social divisions 
and hierarchies associated with them, are constituted as such by the actions of the state 
which, by instituting them both in things and in minds, confers upon the cultural arbitrary 
all the appearances of the natural" (1993: 55). Despite the attempts of both Japan 
Foundation officials and anthropologists--and writers of literature at that-to find 
alternative frameworks to Japanese culture through which to think about the nature of the 
social more deeply, in its inundation ofboth cultural diplomacy and academia alike, the 
increasing naturalization of soft power proves to have similarly naturalizing effects on 
notions of"Japanese culture." Although I have attempted to locate anthropological 
critique outside the confines of a uniformly constructed Japanese culture, it is a concept 
to which I am both historically and personally indebted and, like many of my 
interlocutors, unlikely in the near future to escape, for better and for worse. 
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Postscript 
On March 11, 2011 a moving earth in northern Japan rattled and in many cases 
quite plainly destroyed both physical and social worlds. On the day of writing this the 
death toll climbed above 10,000 and with nearly 15,000 still missing is sure to climb even 
higher. Ironically, or perhaps appropriately, a dissertation dedicating 250 pages of words 
to the elucidation of feeling reaches its limits at destruction of this magnitude. Images 
and affects will have to stand alone as image and affect. That is fme. No one is in the 
mood to politicize just yet anyway. Moreover, this dissertation provides neither the 
context nor the levity to attempt accounts of this kind of loss. No eulogy here. 
Grieving-and there is much of it--will be done elsewhere. 
What I might more conservatively offer here is an extension of this dissertation's 
conclusion in its mode of imagining possible affective futures based on present 
ethnographic observations. The future imagined in the final chapter is, in all honestly, 
not likely to pass. If a long-standing, low-level anxiety characterized many ofthe 
national narratives circulating among Japan's bureaucratic elites, the Tohoku earthquake 
ruptured this, punctuating history with a fist. Although it is unclear exactly how 
prominent it will come to fix itself in memory, the event will no doubt find a place for 
itself alongside its national-historical kin: the K.anto Earthquake of 1923, the Pacific War, 
the collapse of the bubble economy, and the Hanshin earthquake and sarin gas attacks on 
the Tokyo subway, both in 1995. Nationhood, and especially the sort that has found its 
way into Japanese officialdom, proves effectively stoked by grand, romantic responses to 
overwhelming tragedies like these. Given the scale of the recent string of 
disasters--earthquake, tsunami, leaking radiation-how could one expect anything less? 
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We want to feel deeply in these moments, sentiment elicited far more readily by already 
established and celebrated scripts of disaster and regeneration than by those of 
intellectual skepticism and hedging. What can already be witnessed as emerging from 
the quake's aftermath, in fact, is precisely this resurgence of Japan's classic national 
tropes of collective determination in the face of disaster. How long it will last is 
unknown, but in so much that the loss from the quake is experienced intimately as 
tragedy and suffering, it will likely find its potential for transformation in these long-
tested stories of national regeneration and hope. 
Perhaps I am getting ahead of myself or am too immediately affected by the 
moment, but Japan's soft power and pop culture futures seem at present, like many 
things, precarious. Should soft power be seen to come and go like so many a national 
fads, I might rest just slightly more intellectually reassured knowing that the workings of 
the affect-emotion gap that sustained it will surely not. In fact, in this environment of 
anxious tension more communally shared and intensely suffered than any moment since 
World War II, as Prime Minister Kan Naoto has claimed, one expects that both sides of it 
might appropriate and feed the other to impressively transformative ends. For those of us 
deeply invested in and affected by the moment, we must, I think, also recognize in it a 
vulnerability, an increased susceptibility to what narratives might emerge to either push 
or pull us away. Capturing these affective moments, vulnerabilities, and proclivities to 
change in prose remains a challenge for ethnographies of affect, and in the face of such 
affective intensity one feels compelled to mobilize more fictional, more personal, and 
more experimental poetics to do so, whether in search of representation or just plain 
catharsis. 
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What all of this reveals, I think, is not only anthropology's role in understanding 
feeling but in feeling's role in affecting anthropology. Moments of intellectual rupture 
like these unveil their mutual determination and importance. While one may feel 
discomforted, slightly nauseous even, at the notion of anthropologizing when so 
poignantly and personally affected by one's feelings, one might also find solace in 
admitting that our anthropology has never nor has it ever been capable of doing 
otherwise. It was always already an affective enterprise. And if the deep and personal 
engagement which characterizes ethnographic inquiry rebounds hurtfully where our 
poetics seem to so plainly fail our informants, it does so because ethnography, as much as 
it ever can, has hit its mark. Here, where words prove wanting for anthropologist and 
informant alike, a shared silence seems like the most authentic account of culture one 
could offer. 
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